Vit Puncochar

A conversation can be conceived as aiming to circumscribe a set of possibilities that are relevant to the goals of the conversation. This set of possibilities may be conceived as determined by the goals and objective circumstances of the interlocutors and not by their propositional attitudes. An indicative conditional can be conceived as circumscribing a set of possibilities that have a certain property: If the set of relevant possibilities is subsequently restricted to one in which the antecedent holds, then it will be restricted as well to one in which the consequent holds. We will identify a number of desiderata concerning the validity of arguments; we will develop a formally precise semantics for conditionals conceived in this way that satisfies the desiderata, and we will present a deductive calculus that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. Finally, we will argue that the semantics compares well, both formally and foundationally, with two other semantic theories of indicative conditionals that satisfy the desiderata, namely, those of Gillies and Bledin.

In this paper we introduce a class of inquisitive Heyting algebras as algebraic structures that are isomorphic to algebras of finite antichains of bounded implicative meet semilattices. It is argued that these structures are suitable for algebraic semantics of inquisitive superintuitionistic logics, i.e. logics of questions based on intuitionistic logic and its extensions. We explain how questions are represented in these structures and provide several alternative characterizations of these algebras. For instance, it is shown that a Heyting algebra is inquisitive if and only if its prime filters and filters generated by sets of prime elements coincide and prime elements are closed under relative pseudocomplement. We prove that the weakest inquisitive superintuitionistic logic is sound with respect to a Heyting algebra iff the algebra is what we call a homomorphic p-image of some inquisitive Heyting algebra. It is also shown that a logic is inquisitive iff its Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra is an inquisitive Heyting algebra.

This paper introduces a generalized version of inquisitive semantics, denoted as GIS, and concentrates especially on the role of disjunction in this general framework. Two alternative semantic conditions for disjunction are compared: the first one corresponds to the so-called tensor operator of dependence logic, and the second one is the standard condition for inquisitive disjunction. It is shown that GIS is intimately related to intuitionistic logic and its Kripke semantics. Using this framework, it is shown that the main results concerning inquisitive semantics, especially the axiomatization of inquisitive logic, can be viewed as particular cases of more general phenomena. In this connection, a class of non-standard superintuitionistic logics is introduced and studied. These logics share many interesting features with inquisitive logic, which is the strongest logic of this class.

This paper introduces the inquisitive extension of R, denoted as InqR, which is a relevant logic of questions based on the logic R as the background logic of declaratives. A semantics for InqR is developed, and it is shown that this semantics is, in a precisely defined sense, dual to Routley-Meyer semantics for R. Moreover, InqR is axiomatized and completeness of the axiomatic system is established. The philosophical interpretation of the duality between Routley-Meyer semantics and the semantics for InqR is also discussed.

This paper introduces and explores a conservative extension of inquisitive logic. In particular, weak negation is added to the standard propositional language of inquisitive semantics, and it is shown that, although we lose some general semantic properties of the original framework, such an enrichment enables us to model some previously inexpressible speech acts such as weak denial and ‘might’-assertions. As a result, a new modal logic emerges. For this logic, a Fitch-style system of natural deduction is formulated. The main result of this paper is a theorem establishing the completeness of the system with respect to inquisitive semantics with weak negation. At the conclusion of the paper, the possibility of extending the framework to the level of first order logic is briefly discussed

In this paper, we present Carnap’s modal logic C, which is one of the first attempts to use the concept of possible world in shaping the semantics for modalities. Some older technical results, which concern the logic C, are summarized, namely two different kinds of axiomatization of C, one unusual characterization of C as the only set of formulae having one special property, and semantical and syntactical relations of C to S5. The fact that C is not closed under the universal substitution is shortly discussed. Finally, the predicate version of C, which is not axiomatizable, is defined

This paper explores the relation between the philosophical idea that logic is a science studying logical forms, and a mathematical feature of logical systems called the principle of uniform substitution, which is often regarded as a technical counterpart of the philosophical idea. We argue that at least in one interesting sense the principle of uniform substitution does not capture adequately the requirement that logic is a matter of form and that logical truths are formal truths. We show that some specific logical expressions can produce propositions of different kinds and the resulting diversity of informational types can lead to a justified failure of uniform substitution without undermining the view that logic is a purely formal discipline.

Fine (J Philos Log 43:549–577, 2014) developed a truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is also called exact semantics, since it is based on a relation of exact verification between states and formulas. A natural question arises as to what are the limits of Fine’s approach and whether an exact semantics of similar kind can be constructed for other important non-classical logics. In our paper, we will generalize Fine’s approach and develop an exact semantics for some substructural logics. In particular, we will provide a truthmaker semantics for the Non-associative Lambek calculus and some of its extensions. This generalization will reveal some interesting connections between Fine’s recent work on truthmaker semantics and his early work on relevant logic.

We investigate an information based generalization of the incompatibility-frame treatment of logics with non-classical negation connectives. Our framework can be viewed as an alternative to the neighbourhood semantics for extensions of lattice logic by various negation connectives, investigated by Hartonas. We set out the basic semantic framework, along with some correspondence results for extensions. We describe three kinds of constructions of canonical models and show that double negation law is not canonical with respect to any of these constructions. We also compare our semantics to Hartonas’.

In this paper, the notion of structural completeness is explored in the context of a generalized class of superintuitionistic logics involving also systems that are not closed under uniform substitution. We just require that each logic must be closed under D-substitutions assigning to atomic formulas only ∨\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\vee $$\end{document}-free formulas. For these systems we introduce four different notions of structural completeness and study how they are related. We focus on superintuitionistic inquisitive logics that validate a schema called Split and have the disjunction property. In these logics disjunction can be interpreted in the sense of inquisitive semantics as a question forming operator. It is shown that a logic is structurally complete with respect to D-substitutions if and only if it includes the weakest superintuitionistic inquisitive logic. Various consequences of this result are explored. For example, it is shown that every superintuitionistic inquisitive logic can be characterized by a Kripke model built up from D-substitutions. Additionally, we resolve a conjecture concerning superintuitionistic inquisitive logics due to Miglioli et al..

V tomto článku předkládám některé důvody proti Dvořákovu nedeterministickému pojetí svobodné vůle, které vyložil ve své nedávno publikované knize Kauzalita činitele. Zejména se zabývám Dvořákovým řešením problému náhody, podle kterého je akt svobodné vůle náhodný do té míry, do jaké se nepodřizuje deterministickým zákonům, a do této míry také nemůže být předmětem morálního hodnocení. Proti Dvořákově koncepci stavím vlastní pojetí svobodné vůle, které je variací na to, co Dvořák označuje jako „standardní teorie“. Z hlediska tohoto pojetí je svobodná vůle možná i v deterministickém světě. Analyzuji, v čem spočívá volba mezi alternativními možnostmi, a argumentuji, že je možné mít kontrolu nad vlastním jednáním, i když nemáme kontrolu nad minulostí, která toto jednání jednoznačně determinuje. Zároveň vysvětluji, proč se v ostrém rozporu s Dvořákovou koncepcí domnívám, že člověk v deterministickém světě může nést odpovědnost za své činy.