Vittorio Bufacchi

The current debate on why colonialism is wrong overlooks what is arguably the most discernible aspect of this particular historical injustice: its exreme violence. Through a critical analysis of the recent contributions by Lea Ypi, Margaret Moore and Laura Valentini, this article argues that the violence inflicted on the victims and survivors of colonialism reveals far more about the nature of this historical injustice than generally assumed. It is the arbitrary nature of the power relations between colonizers and the colonized which is at the heart of the injustice of colonization, and violence was the way arbitrariness and domination was cemented. The example of colonialism in the Caribbean during the 16th and 17th centuries is used to expose the full extent of this historical injustice.

abstract Much of the literature on torture in recent years takes the position of denouncing the barbarity of torture, while allowing for exceptions to this veto in extreme circumstances. The ticking‐bomb argument, where a terrorist is tortured in order to extract information of a primed bomb located in a civilian area, is often invoked as one of those extreme circumstances where torture becomes justified. As the War on Terrorism intensifies, the ticking‐bomb argument has become the dominant line of reasoning used by both academics and policy advisers to justify a legalized, state‐sponsored program of torture. This paper argues for the unconditional refutation of any attempt to justify torture, without exceptions. We argue against the consequentialist reasoning of the ticking‐bomb argument not from a deontological position, but on consequentialist grounds. Empirical evidence suggests that the institutionalization of torture practices creates serious problems. Torture interrogation fails to fulfil its initial purpose as a low‐cost life saver, while its long‐term potential is the devastation of democratic institutions.

This article rejects the received view that Post-Truth is a new, unprecedented political phenomenon. By showing that Truth and Post-Truth share the same genesis, this article will submit the idea of a Consensus Theory of Post-Truth. Part 1 looks at the difference between Post-Truth, lies and bullshit. Part 2 suggests reasons behind the current preoccupation with Post-Truth. Part 3 focuses on Habermas’s influential consensus theory of truth to suggest that truth and Post-Truth have more in common than is generally assumed. Part 4 puts forward the Consensus Theory of Post-Truth. Part 5 suggests three ways to emasculate the potentially destructive effect of Post-Truth on democratic society.

This article takes the first steps towards a new approach in applied philosophy, in the hope to encourage an idea of philosophy as a more empirical subject. Part I will provide an overview of the nature and scope of applied philosophy, followed in Part II by a critical evaluation of the “top-down” methodology still popular with many applied philosophers. Part III will then describe the basic axioms of “empirical philosophy,” explaining how the empirical approach differs from the top-down approach. Part IV will provide a reply to the standard criticism regarding the proposed marriage between empirical research and philosophy. Part V will test the validity of “empirical philosophy” on practical terms.

This collective paper on radicalization and violent extremism part of the ‘Philosophy of education in a new key’ initiative by Educational Philosophy and Theory brings together some of the leading contemporary scholars writing on the most pressing epistemological, ethical, political and educational issues facing post-9/11 scholarship on radicalization and violent extremism. Its overall aim is to move beyond the ‘conventional wisdom’ associated with this area of scholarly research best represented by its many slogans, metaphors and other thought-terminating clichés. By providing conceptual lenses on issues previously compartmentalized primarily [or even exclusively] in security and intelligence studies or at the fringes of scholarly interest, radicalization and violent extremism turn out to be much more complex than ‘radicalization studies’ has been eager to acknowledge.

abstract This article refutes Henry Shue's claim that in the case of preventive military attacks it is sometimes morally permissible to make an exception to the fundamental principle regarding the inviolability of individual rights. By drawing on a comparison between torture and preventive military attacks, I will argue that the potential risks of institutionalizing preventive military attacks — what I call the Institutionalizing Argument — are far too great to even contemplate. Two potential risks with setting up a bureaucracy which specializes in preventive military attacks will be highlighted: that any preventive military strike may nourish a cycle of violence that will inevitably cause more deaths and destruction than could ever be justified; and that such preventive military strikes may be abused by political leaders in a desperate effort to hold on to power, including democratically elected political leaders working within a democratic framework.

The principle of non-maleficence, primum non nocere, has deep roots in the history of moral philosophy, being endorsed by John Stuart Mill, W. D. Ross, H. L. A. Hart, Karl Popper and Bernard Gert. And yet, this principle is virtually absent from current debates on social justice. This article suggests that non-maleficence is more than a moral principle; it is also a principle of social justice. Part I looks at the origins of non-maleficence as a principle of ethics, and medical ethics in particular. Part II introduces the idea of non-maleficence as a principle of social justice. Parts III and IV define the principle of justice as non-maleficence in terms of its scope and coherence, while Part V argues that the motivation of not doing harm makes this principle an alternative to two well-established paradigms in the literature on social justice: justice as mutual advantage (David Gauthier) and justice as impartiality (Brian Barry).

This article challenges the received view on the role of motivations in contemporary theories of social justice. Neo-Kantians argue that a theory of justice must be rooted in moral motivations of reasonableness, not rationality. Yet reasonableness is a demanding motivation, stipulating actions that people may not be able or willing to perform. This opens egalitarians like Rawls to the accusation of prescribing a political philosophy that is not 'followable'. The aim of this article is to explore the benefits for egalitarian theories of justice of sanctioning both rational and reasonable motivations. Being vulnerable to self-regarding passions, people often fail to act upon the principles of fairness or impartiality, even when they are motivated by their sense of justice. The institutions of justice must therefore find a way to fortify and encourage the development of our sense of justice. This can be achieved by giving people a rational incentive to act upon and therefore engender their sense of justice. Finding ways to motivate people to act justly is the most pressing challenge facing egalitarian justice today

This article has two principal aims. First, to bring some clarity to the concept of violence. Secondly, to explore the normative dimension of violence. Part One will explore three different ways to define violence: as an act of force, as a violation of rights, and as a violation of integrity. Part Two will suggest that we can learn something about the badness of violence bad by exploring the literature on the badness of death. Part Three will suggest that the wrongness of violence can be traced back to the badness of violence.

Diana Meyers argues that breaking the silence of victims and attending to their stories are necessary steps towards realizing human rights. Yet using highly personal victims' stories to promote human rights raises significant moral concerns, hence Meyers suggests that before victims' stories can be accessed and used, it is morally imperative that requirements of informed consent and non-retraumatization are secured. This article argues that while Meyers' proviso is important, and necessary, it may not be sufficient. First, one potential problem with seeking to secure “informed consent” is that one has to ask for the consent, and in the act of asking one is potentially retraumatizing the victim. Secondly, the assumption that victims have ownership right over their stories, which is a key premise in Meyers's argument, is much more problematic than may appear.

This chapter proposes a policy to tackle the problem of global poverty, the Global Luxuries Tax. The GLT is a levy collected whenever a person, anywhere in the world, purchases a certain luxury good or service. The money collected will go towards a Global Poverty Fund to be used to alleviate the worst cases of global poverty. The tax is a miniscule percentage of the price of the good or service being purchased, so that the GLT raises money for the Global Poverty Fund by virtue of the high number of transactions taking place. The first part of the chapter will highlight two main pitfalls faced by any potential solution to the problem of global poverty, the Unintended Consequences Objection and the Implementation Objection. The second and third parts will introduce the idea of a Global Luxuries Tax, first in theory and then in practice. Examples of luxuries to be taxed by the GLT include air travel, financial transactions, texting on mobile phones, and procreation. In the final part some objections to the GLT will be considered, and appeased.

This article explores an alternative to the established dichotomy between philosophical accounts of human rights, characterized by a foundationalist tendency, and political accounts of human rights, which aspire to be non-foundationalist. I argue that in order to justify human rights practice, political accounts of human rights cannot do without the support of theoretical foundations, although not necessarily of the natural-law variety. As an alternative to natural-law metaphysics, a deflationary theory of human rights, based on a deflationary account of truth, is put forward. Starting from a distinction between ‘extreme’ and ‘moderate’ forms of deflationism, this article defends a constructivist theory of human rights grounded on the Humean notion of conventionalism. This innovative approach to human rights provides political conceptions of human rights with the foundations they need, but are currently lacking.