Vittorio Bufacchi

In Keeping Human Rights Out of Poverty Bufacchi defends the controversial view that human rights discourse may not be the best instrument for addressing global poverty. There are four main parts to this paper. Part 1 will give a general overview of some of the main arguments in favour of addressing the question of poverty in terms of a human rights discourse, while Parts 2 and 3 will argue that the link between poverty and human rights is at best superfluous and at worse counterproductive to the advancement of human rights or to the fight against poverty. Part 4 will consider, but ultimately reject, the view that it is necessary to describe poverty in terms of a human rights violation since doing so switches the debate from ethics to international law. In Poverty and the Rhetoric of Human Rights: A Reply to Bufacchi, Jesse Tomalty argues that Bufacchi does not succeed in undermining the rhetorical value of characterizing poverty as a human rights violation. This is because his arguments rest on an unduly narrow conception of human rights, according to which their normative role is limited to providing grounds for international intervention. According to Tomalty, the characterization of poverty as a human rights violation can be supported by a broader conception of human rights that better captures the wide array of normative roles they play in discourse and practice.

Many philosophers writing about human rights have a fixation with foundationalism: What are the foundations of human rights? Can human rights exist, and flourish, without sound moral foundations? Contrary to the dominant view in the literature I argue that these are the wrong questions to ask, and that human rights are better off without foundations. The problem is that the language of ‘foundations’ is misguided, and misleading, the wrong metaphor to use in relation to the human rights project. The idea of ‘anchoring’ offers a better metaphor, suggesting a more flexible and dynamic practice, while still providing a justification for universal human rights.

This chapter explores the philosophical nature of social injustice in contemporary Ireland. By appealing to four key concepts in contemporary political philosophy (poverty, domination, egalitarianism, prioritarianism), this chapter will expose the tension between Ireland’s strong economy, currently growing faster than any other country in the European Union, and the persistent unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality in all aspects of Irish society. There are three parts to the main thesis advanced in this chapter. First, to defend the political philosophy of egalitarianism from prioritarian critics. Secondly, to refute what is known in the literature as the Levelling-Down Objection to egalitarianism, according to which we ought to prefer a state of affairs where everyone is worse off as long as equality is maintained. Third, to suggest that Levelling-Down should not be seen as something objectionable, but merely as a much-needed correction. In the final part of the chapter, two possible solutions to the problem of inequality and social injustice in Ireland will be put forward: the introduction of a maximum income cap and a radical reassessment of Ireland’s historically entrenched assumption of the right to private property as an absolute right.

If structural injustice is the problem, could liberalism be the solution? This paper argues that over the last few centuries liberalism tackled three manifestations of historical injustice (slavery; natural hierarchies; colonialism) by promoting the mantra of individual rights, but the unintended consequence of this philosophy has been to engender and legitimize even more enduring forms of structural injustice (exploitation; inequality; domination). Historical injustice has not gone away, it has simply learned to accommodate liberal orthodoxy. To tackle structural injustice, it may be necessary to look beyond liberalism.

This chapter proposes a policy to tackle the problem of global poverty, the Global Luxuries Tax (GLT). The GLT is a levy collected whenever a person, anywhere in the world, purchases a certain luxury good or service. The money collected will go towards a Global Poverty Fund to be used to alleviate the worst cases of global poverty. The tax is a miniscule percentage of the price of the good or service being purchased, so that the GLT raises money for the Global Poverty Fund by virtue of the high number of transactions taking place. The first part of the chapter will highlight two main pitfalls faced by any potential solution to the problem of global poverty, the Unintended Consequences Objection and the Implementation Objection. The second and third parts will introduce the idea of a Global Luxuries Tax, first in theory and then in practice. Examples of luxuries to be taxed by the GLT include air travel, financial transactions, texting on mobile phones, and procreation. In the final part some objections to the GLT will be considered, and appeased.

French philosopher Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) famously said that facing our mortality is the only way to properly learn the ‘art of living’. He was right. This book is about what we can learn from COVID-19 about the art of living, as individuals but also collectively as a society: this crisis could potentially change our lives for the better, ushering in a more just society. The book will explore a number of key themes through philosophical lenses. Chapter 2 asks whether coronavirus is a misfortune, or an injustice. Chapter 3 focuses on the largest cohort of victims of coronavirus: people in old age. Chapter 4 asks whether life under coronavirus is comparable to life in the so-called ‘state of nature’. Chapter 5 explores the likely impact of coronavirus on the global phenomenon of populism. Chapter 6 investigates the relationship between post-truth and coronavirus. Chapter 7 focuses on the role of experts during this crisis. Chapter 8 looks at the spike of incidents of domestic violence during the lockdown via an analysis of Sally Rooney’s Normal People. Chapter 9 explores four key lessons that must be learned from the COVID-19 crisis: that politics matters; that central states are necessary; that taxation is important; and that radical reforms, including the introduction of a universal basic income, are crucial. Chapter 10 considers what philosophy can contribute to the debate on COVID-19, and why we have a moral duty not to become ill.

How do we know what violence is? And how do we acquire knowledge of violence? The key to these questions can be found in the epistemology of testimony. Testimonies of violence are first-person narratives of violence, therefore unless first-person narratives are recognized and legitimized as philosophically and epistemologically valuable, our knowledge of violence would be seriously compromised. The value of testimonies of violence lies in part in the transmission of truth-claims, but also crucially in the speech-act of giving a testimony. It is the latter that is the focus of this article. I will argue that the act of giving a testimony of violence, being listed to and believed, is essential for the survivor of violence in the process of rebuilding the sense of self and personhood in the aftermath of the violence endured.By looking at the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions worldwide, and highlighting in particular the role of trust within the dynamics of testimonies, I will argue that first-person testimonies of violence are also indispensable for another reason; namely, they prevent acts of violence from turning into instruments of epistemic injustice.Survivors of violence often find themselves being the victims of two forms of violence: apart from enduring the violence being afflicted on them, they also often suffer the epistemic injustice of being marginalized as credible sources of knowledge. Recognizing the validity of testimonies of violence in the form of first-person narratives of violence not only enables us to acquire knowledge of violence, but acknowledging the credibility of the narrator acts as a strong antidote to epistemic injustice.

This article explores three philosophical issues regarding the concept of violence. First, violence is not just an act, it is also an experience. The study of violence should not focus exclusively on understanding actions that cause harm. Instead, a more phenomenological approach is required, one that prioritizes the experience of violence, especially those of victims and survivors of violence. Second, it is necessary to distinguish between “unwanted” and “unconsented” violence. Third, the definition of violence as violation of integrity or wholeness will come into scrutiny. In particular, to what extent does integrity as intactness apply to human beings, and if violence is defined in terms of breaking something intact, can violence be done to something that is already broken?