Vladimir Kanovei

The parameter-free part $$\textbf{PA}_2^*$$ of $$\textbf{PA}_2$$, second order Peano arithmetic, is considered. We make use of a product/iterated Sacks forcing to define an $$\omega $$ -model of $$\textbf{PA}_2^*+ \textbf{CA}(\Sigma ^1_2)$$, in which an example of the full Comprehension schema $$\textbf{CA}$$ fails. Using Cohen’s forcing, we also define an $$\omega $$ -model of $$\textbf{PA}_2^*$$, in which not every set has its complement, and hence the full $$\textbf{CA}$$ fails in a rather elementary way.

We show that there is a [Formula: see text]-model of second-order arithmetic in which the choice scheme holds, but the dependent choice scheme fails for a [Formula: see text]-assertion, confirming a conjecture of Stephen Simpson. We obtain as a corollary that the Reflection Principle, stating that every formula reflects to a transitive set, can fail in models of [Formula: see text]. This work is a rediscovery by the first two authors of a result obtained by the third author in [V. G. Kanovei, On descriptive forms of the countable axiom of choice, Investigations on nonclassical logics and set theory, Work Collect., Moscow, 3-136 ].

We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S , all definable sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace −∫ (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy.

To explore the extent of embeddability of Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus in first-order logic (FOL) and modern frameworks, we propose to set aside ontological issues and focus on pro- cedural questions. This would enable an account of Leibnizian procedures in a framework limited to FOL with a small number of additional ingredients such as the relation of infinite proximity. If, as we argue here, first order logic is indeed suitable for developing modern proxies for the inferential moves found in Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus, then modern infinitesimal frameworks are more appropriate to interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than modern Weierstrassian ones.

We examine Paul Halmos’ comments on category theory, Dedekind cuts, devil worship, logic, and Robinson’s infinitesimals. Halmos’ scepticism about category theory derives from his philosophical position of naive set-theoretic realism. In the words of an MAA biography, Halmos thought that mathematics is “certainty” and “architecture” yet 20th century logic teaches us is that mathematics is full of uncertainty or more precisely incompleteness. If the term architecture meant to imply that mathematics is one great solid castle, then modern logic tends to teach us the opposite lesson, namely that the castle is floating in midair. Halmos’ realism tends to color his judgment of purely scientific aspects of logic and the way it is practiced and applied. He often expressed distaste for nonstandard models, and made a sustained effort to eliminate first-order logic, the logicians’ concept of interpretation, and the syntactic vs semantic distinction. He felt that these were vague, and sought to replace them all by his polyadic algebra. Halmos claimed that Robinson’s framework is “unnecessary” but Henson and Keisler argue that Robinson’s framework allows one to dig deeper into set-theoretic resources than is common in Archimedean mathematics. This can potentially prove theorems not accessible by standard methods, undermining Halmos’ criticisms.

We apply Benacerraf’s distinction between mathematical ontology and mathematical practice to examine contrasting interpretations of infinitesimal mathematics of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, in the work of Bos, Ferraro, Laugwitz, and others. We detect Weierstrass’s ghost behind some of the received historiography on Euler’s infinitesimal mathematics, as when Ferraro proposes to understand Euler in terms of a Weierstrassian notion of limit and Fraser declares classical analysis to be a “primary point of reference for understanding the eighteenth-century theories.” Meanwhile, scholars like Bos and Laugwitz seek to explore Eulerian methodology, practice, and procedures in a way more faithful to Euler’s own. Euler’s use of infinite integers and the associated infinite products are analyzed in the context of his infinite product decomposition for the sine function. Euler’s principle of cancellation is compared to the Leibnizian transcendental law of homogeneity. The Leibnizian law of continuity similarly finds echoes in Euler. We argue that Ferraro’s assumption that Euler worked with a classical notion of quantity is symptomatic of a post-Weierstrassian placement of Euler in the Archimedean track for the development of analysis, as well as a blurring of the distinction between the dual tracks noted by Bos. Interpreting Euler in an Archimedean conceptual framework obscures important aspects of Euler’s work. Such a framework is profitably replaced by a syntactically more versatile modern infinitesimal framework that provides better proxies for his inferential moves.

If A ⊆ ω1, then there exists a cardinal preserving generic extension [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A ][x ] of [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A ] by a real x such that1) A ∈ [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][x ] and A is Δ1HC in [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][x ];2) x is minimal over [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A ], that is, if a set Y belongs to [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][x ], then either x ∈ [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A, Y ] or Y ∈ [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A ].The forcing we use implicitly provides reshaping of the given set A

In relation to a thesis put forward by Marx Wartofsky, we seek to show that a historiography of mathematics requires an analysis of the ontology of the part of mathematics under scrutiny. Following Ian Hacking, we point out that in the history of mathematics the amount of contingency is larger than is usually thought. As a case study, we analyze the historians’ approach to interpreting James Gregory’s expression ultimate terms in his paper attempting to prove the irrationality of \. Here Gregory referred to the last or ultimate terms of a series. More broadly, we analyze the following questions: which modern framework is more appropriate for interpreting the procedures at work in texts from the early history of infinitesimal analysis? As well as the related question: what is a logical theory that is close to something early modern mathematicians could have used when studying infinite series and quadrature problems? We argue that what has been routinely viewed from the viewpoint of classical analysis as an example of an “unrigorous” practice, in fact finds close procedural proxies in modern infinitesimal theories. We analyze a mix of social and religious reasons that had led to the suppression of both the religious order of Gregory’s teacher degli Angeli, and Gregory’s books at Venice, in the late 1660s.

Abraham Robinson’s framework for modern infinitesimals was developed half a century ago. It enables a re-evaluation of the procedures of the pioneers of mathematical analysis. Their procedures have been often viewed through the lens of the success of the Weierstrassian foundations. We propose a view without passing through the lens, by means of proxies for such procedures in the modern theory of infinitesimals. The real accomplishments of calculus and analysis had been based primarily on the elaboration of novel techniques for solving problems rather than a quest for ultimate foundations. It may be hopeless to interpret historical foundations in terms of a punctiform continuum, but arguably it is possible to interpret historical techniques and procedures in terms of modern ones. Our proposed formalisations do not mean that Fermat, Gregory, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy were pre-Robinsonians, but rather indicate that Robinson’s framework is more helpful in understanding their procedures than a Weierstrassian framework.

The small, the tiny, and the infinitesimal have been the object of both fascination and vilification for millenia. One of the most vitriolic reviews in mathematics was that written by Errett Bishop about Keisler’s book Elementary Calculus: an Infinitesimal Approach. In this skit we investigate both the argument itself, and some of its roots in Bishop George Berkeley’s criticism of Leibnizian and Newtonian Calculus. We also explore some of the consequences to students for whom the infinitesimal approach is congenial. The casual mathematical reader may be satisfied to read the text of the five act play, whereas the others may wish to delve into the 130 footnotes, some of which contain elucidation of the mathematics or comments on the history

In continuation of our study of HST, Hrbaek set theory (a nonstandard set theory which includes, in particular, the ZFC Replacement and Separation schemata in the st--language, and Saturation for well-orderable families of internal sets), we consider the problem of existence of elementary extensions of inner "external" subclasses of the HST universe.We show that, given a standard cardinal , any set R * generates an "internal" class S(R) of all sets standard relatively to elements of R, and an "external" class L[S(R)] of all sets constructible (in a sense close to the Gödel constructibility) from sets in S(R). We prove that under some mild saturation-like requirements for R the class L[S(R)] models a certain -version of HST including the principle of +-saturation; moreover, in this case L[S(R)] is an elementary extension of L[S(R)] in the st--language whenever sets R R satisfy the requirements.

We prove that a necessary and sufficient condition for a countable set L of sets of integers to be equal to the algebra of all sets of integers definable in a nonstandard elementary extension of ω by a formula of the PA language which may include the standardness predicate but does not contain nonstandard parameters, is as follows: L is closed under arithmetical definability and contains 0 (ω) , the set of all (Gödel numbers of) true arithmetical sentences. Some results related to definability of sets of integers in elementary extensions of ω are included