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3Intellectual Virtue: Emotions, Luck, and the AncientsIn Linda Zagzebski & Michael DePaul (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 34--53. 2003.
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44Brandom, Robert B. Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009 . Pp. 237. $29.95 (cloth) (review)Ethics 120 (4): 836-841. 2010.
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46Religious Fundamentalism: An Empirically Derived Construct and Measurement ScaleArchive for the Psychology of Religion 33 (3): 299-323. 2011.Items were generated to explore the factorial structure of a construct of fundamentalism worded appropriately for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Results suggested three underlying dimensions: External versus Internal Authority, Fixed versus Malleable Religion, and Worldly Rejection versus Worldly Affirmation. The three dimensions indicate that religious fundamentalism is a personal orientation that asserts a supra-human locus of moral authority, context unbound truth, and the appreciation of …Read more
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59Brandom on practical reasonPhilosophical Quarterly 53 (213). 2003.Robert Brandom claims that language expressing pro-attitudes makes explicit proprieties of practical inference. This thesis is untenable, especially given certain premises which Brandom himself endorses. Pro-attitude vocabulary has the wrong grammatical structure; other parts of vocabulary do the job he ascribes to pro-attitude vocabulary; the thesis introduces implausible differences between the inferential consequences of desires and intentions, and distorts the interpretation of conditional s…Read more
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46Desires in Practical ReasoningPhilosophical Studies 129 (2): 197-221. 2006.Inferences from desired ends to intended necessary means seem to be among the most unproblematic elements of practical reasoning. A closer look dissolves this appearance, however, when we see that such inferences are defeasible. We can nevertheless understand such inferences as leading to the adoption of plans, by analogy with inferences leading to explanations. Plans should satisfy at least some important ends desired by the agent, be consistent with the satisfaction of other desired ends, and …Read more
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58‘Ought’: The correct intention accountPhilosophical Explorations 12 (3): 297-317. 2009.“S ought (not) to see to it that p at t” is true iff an intention on the part of S to see to it that p at t is (in) correct. From this truth condition follows an understanding of the conceptual role of ought-claims in practical inference: ought-claims are interchangeable with intentions having the same content. From this conceptual role, it is quite clear why first-person, present-tense ought-judgments, and just those, motivate: failure to be motivated is a failure of rationality. The point and …Read more
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99Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent GoodnessJournal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3): 339-364. 2009.The 'fitting-attitudes analysis' aims to analyze evaluative concepts in terms of attitudes, but suffers from the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem. This article critiques some suggested solutions to the WKR problem and offers one of its own, which appeals to the aims of attitudes. However, goodness is not a concept that can be successfully analyzed according to the method suggested here. Reasons are given why goodness should be thought of, instead, as a mind-independent property
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50Mattering and mechanism: Must a mechanistic universe be depressing?Ratio 24 (3): 326-339. 2011.There is an intuition to the effect that, if human actions are explicable in scientific terms – that is, if mechanism holds – then our lives and actions do not matter. “Mattering” depends on successful intentional explanations of human actions. The intuition springs from an intuitive analogy between manipulation and mechanism: just as a manipulated agent's actions are not successfully explained in intentional terms, neither are the actions of a mechanistic agent. I explore ways to avoid the conc…Read more
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University of North Carolina at WilmingtonDepartment of Philosophy and ReligionAssociate Professor
Maple Avenue Mobile Home Park, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Free Will |
Practical Reason |
Areas of Interest
Free Will |
Practical Reason |