W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz

In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the realists’ emphasis on power and selfinterest is often their skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among states. Not all realists, however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. The article presents a comprehensive picture of political realism. Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

The History of the Peloponnesian War of Thucydides is usually seen as an archetypal statement of power politics. Thucydides is regarded as a political realist who asserts that the pursuit of moral principles does not enter the world of international affairs. The article shows that, on the contrary, we find in Thucydides' work a complex theory. He supports neither extreme realism, in which morality is denied, nor utopian idealism which overlooks the aspect of power in international relations. He is profoundly interested in ethical issues in domestic and international politics. One can see in the History the first example of realist-idealist debate and its conclusions are still valid for us.

On the New Politics: an Introduction to Evolutionity (publ. in Polish). In this article I introduce a vision of the new politics that emerges from my recent book Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus. The Tractatus discusses a number of topics. To name just a few, these are: politics, human nature, the state, freedom, solidarity, democracy, civilization, family and marriage, power, international relations, war and peace. Also, it introduces new words, such as sophocracy, ennobled democracy; nativeculturalism, an alternative to multiculturalism; or parentsexuality, a privileged form of sexuality. It addresses many issues that concern today’s political thinkers. The main objective of my work is to demonstrate the necessity of, and provide a guide for, the redirection of humanity. I argue that this paradigm shift must involve changing the character of social life and politics from competitive to cooperative, encouraging moral and intellectual virtues, providing foundations for happy societies, promoting peace among countries and building a strong international community. I try to show that the essence of politics is not a struggle for power, which can only be its derivative meaning, but rather the ability to organize society for cooperation and actualize a good life. Also, I try to remind humanity of its high task, which is moral and intellectual perfection, and to advance human evolution.

Heidegger’s main interest was ontology or the study of being. In his fundamental treatise, Being and Time, he attempted to access being (Sein) by means of phenomenological analysis of human existence (Dasein) in respect to its temporal and historical character. After the change of his thinking (“the turn”), Heidegger placed an emphasis on language as the vehicle through which the question of being can be unfolded. He turned to the exegesis of historical texts, especially of the Presocratics, but also of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Hölderlin, and to poetry, architecture, technology, and other subjects. Instead of looking for a full clarification of the meaning of being, he tried to pursue a kind of thinking which was no longer “metaphysical.” He criticized the tradition of Western philosophy, which he regarded as nihilistic, for, as he claimed, the question of being as such was obliterated in it. He also stressed the nihilism of modern technological culture. By going to the Presocratic beginning of Western thought, he wanted to repeat the early Greek experience of being, so that the West could turn away from the dead end of nihilism and begin anew. His writings are notoriously difficult. Being and Time remains his most influential work.

On the History of Political Philosophy: Great Political Thinkers from Thucydides to Locke is a lively and lucid account of the major political theorists and philosophers of the ancient Greek, Roman, medieval, renaissance, and early modern periods. The author demonstrates the continuing significance of some political debates and problems that originated in the history of political philosophy. Topics include discussions concerning human nature, different views of justice, the origin of government and law, the rise and development of different forms of government, idealism and realism in international relations, the distinction between just and unjust war, and the sources of public authority and the nature of legitimate sovereignty. The organizing principle of the book is the idea that the great political thinkers were searching for the best political order and a criterion for human conduct in both domestic and international politics. The book presupposes no previous knowledge of political philosophy. It will therefore be a valuable introductory book for students of philosophy, politics, and international relations. As it opens eyes to the perceptions that historical knowledge may convey, it will also be an illuminating and engaging reading for a general reader.

Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus (Political-Philosophical Treatise) aims to establish the principles of good governance and of a happy society, and to open up new directions for the future development of humankind. W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz demonstrates the necessity of, and provides a guide for, the redirection of humanity. He argues that this paradigm shift must involve changing the character of social life and politics from competitive to cooperative, encouraging moral and intellectual virtues, providing foundations for happy societies, promoting peace among countries and building a strong international community.

In this article I challenge the positivist view that ethical statements are merely an expression of our emotions or preferences. I consider a moral statement, “Killing innocent civilians is wrong,” and argue that such a statement is a truthful moral norm. I show that what is fundamental to agreement in the realm of both facts and morals is a commonly shared attitude that determines human relatedness to the world. Scientific knowledge is a partial knowledge based on indifference, the state of mind that constitutes scientific attitude. However, knowledge in morals does not presuppose indifference, but love. Once we accept that our thoughts and feelings are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective moral knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world.

Harmonia Spoleczna -- Social Harmony. In this book, I set out to prove that once we correctly identify human nature and organize our world according to the principle of cooperation, we can arrive at a world of social harmony. The current disharmony in the world, which can be observed especially in the field of politics and economics, is largely related to the erroneous modern Western philosophical assertions identifying the human being with an individual moved by desires and the will to power, and the phenomenon of life with an endless conflict. An additional influence is provided by the flawed postmodernist conceptions of culture and family. These errors have enormous implications with regard to how we picture the world in which we live. I want to show that cooperation is an integral part of human nature, and that the society organized according to the requirements of nature is a truly happy society. Principles of happy society and of good governance are introduced.

Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus (Political-Philosophical Treatise) of W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz proposes a new idea-system. Ideas concerning different topics related to politics are introduced. The work aims to establish the principles of good governance and of a happy society, and to open up new directions for the future development of humankind. It is also in part a critique of the epistemology of early Wittgenstein as presented in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that one can speak about politics and ethics with sense, and that political philosophy is still a viable enterprise for us. This explanation is provided in response to the review of Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus by Katarzyna Heremska and a critical note of Pawel Kloczowski that were both published in Argument 6(1), 2016.

In this collection of essays, the author develops a new philosophy of life, which has in fact a long tradition. It goes back to some ancient Western thinkers, such as the Milesians, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Plato, for whom philosophy presupposes an affective engagement with the world and not merely its theoretical description or explanation. This classical tradition has been challenged by ideas of modernity, particularly by the idea that modern scientific knowledge is the highest form of human knowledge. However, as the author argues, this idea is questionable. In his view, scientific knowledge represents merely a partial knowledge. Science looks at the world indifferently as if it were an object, an “It”, but in fact the world is not that. Love, an affective engagement, and not indifference, is the way to full knowledge. Furthermore, it is lov e that fosters life and brings all things into unity. Love and life are thus closely connected. Life is the central concept around which humanity can unite, forming a unity in diversity. The author claims that global solidarity among human beings can be achieved if there is the growing common understanding of what is right for life.

In this article I present the concept of human evolution by Hoene- Wroński. I believe that his ideas are still an unexplored resource which can lead us to the better understanding of the evolution of humanity and of our destiny. I follow closely his discussion of human evolution and describe its seven stages. Further, I argue that the case of human evolution is strongly supported by new scientific theories, especially by quantum theory and the novel perspectives that it opens for humankind. I end my article with the conclusion that the insights on human evolution derived from the Hoene-Wroński’s writings and from new scientific theories can guide us to the new politics based on the awareness of human identity that can overcome old divisions among humankind and conflicts derived from them. Ultimately, they can initiate evolutionity – the new evolutionary epoch, which will replace modernity and postmodernity. On

Empedocles sees both Love and Strife as forces active on many levels and scales. But they are the same forces throughout. Everywhere their activities are essentially the same. That of Love is not merely to bring together unlike things, but to strip them of their mutually opposed properties, to assimilate them to one another, to fuse them into a homogeneous compound. That of Strife, on the contrary is to break up such compounds, and to reduce them into mutually hostile ingredients. Empedocles sees these as the two great forces that are at work in the cosmos, at the properly cosmic level, at the level of political and personal life, and at the level of “chemistry.”

According to a perhaps naive, but still dominant positivistic view of science, scientific knowledge is the only reliable knowledge. It is reliable because it is objective. It derives its objectivity from the objectivity of observation made by a detached observer. The way in which empirical scientists look at the world is sometimes described as “scientific attitude.” In order to be objective observers, scientists must be indifferent, disinterested, neutral and impartial. Personal opinions or preferences have to be suspended. No subjective elements are allowed to intrude. Science is believed to be reliable if it is based on objective and verifiable observational statements which can be transmitted into laws and theories. The spectacular achievements of natural science and technology in today’s world appear to support the belief in the objectivity, reliability, and even supremacy of scientific knowledge. But is this view truly justified? Does science offer the best possible route to reliable knowledge, not only of natural but also of social phenomena? Should pre-scientific forms of knowledge, such as ethics, be seen as a matter of individual preferences or subjective emotions, and therefore be disregarded as knowledge? Before I attempt to answer these questions, I shall address the issue of objectivity in science. I believe that the understanding of this issue will help us to evaluate rightly the scientific claim to know and to assess the place of science among other forms of knowledge.

The purpose of this essay is to establish a relationship between philosophy, myth, and science in reference to a historical perspective. If for methodological reasons we now disregard the above mentioned terminological difficulties and refer to a common-sense view of myth, philosophy, and science, it remains unquestionable that myth existed long before philosophy and modern science began as late as the seventeenth century.Nevertheless, this historical perspective is not introduced to affirm the positivistic view, according to which the history of humanity should be described in terms of three stages: theological (mythical), metaphysical (philosophical), and positive (scientific); nor is it presented to say that the positive one represents the final achievement of the human race. On the contrary, I will attempt to show that by departing from myth and original philosophy, modern men and women have concealed from themselves an intensely rich experience of life. In order to regain the love of wisdom, we need first to look backwards in order to move forward.

Many scholars have argued that unity of humankind can be established on the basis of some basic or core human values. Instead of engaging in a comparative empirical research, compiling lists of core values derived from different cultures, discuss their relevance for human fellowship, I examine the simple values of life that during the 1980s united people in Poland and made them to form the powerful civic movement, which was Solidarity. Today we live in a world that is fundamentally different from that before 1989. We are no longer divided by a global ideological struggle between communism and liberal democracy. The key issue today is not a bipolar division but globalization. My thesis is today we need a new Global Solidarity and that this movement can take lessons from Poland’s Solidarity. It should not be grounded in any ideology, but in inclusive values that do not divide but can potentially unite all human beings, and these can be derived from basic human needs. In short, Global Solidarity should be based on what I call the “righteousness of life.” It can be achieved if there is a growing recognition of what is right for life and a growing interest in protecting and enhancing life.

Our way of seeing things depends upon the state of our minds. We can look at the world through the lenses of love, hate or indifference. What remains largely unquestioned about science is its essence. Scientific objectivity is not free from subjectivity. I argue that objective, scientific knowledge is a partial knowledge based on indifference, the state of mind that constitutes the scientific attitude. Hate does not produce knowledge at all, but reinforces our prejudices. However, love gives the possibility of knowing someone or something fully, and not only as an object. Once we accept that our experiences, thoughts, and feelings are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective moral knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world.

In this article I explore the question whether the condition of insecurity in which states are placed calls for the creation of a global authority. I present classical arguments for and against a world government, and inquire whether the tragedy of September 11 provides a new support for the idea of a world state. I argue that the real alternative to international anarchy, where no one is secure, is neither a powerful nation that is able to provide security for itself nor a world state but an international society.

The order which Schopenhauer follows in discussing individual arts - architecture, visual arts, poetry, and music - is dictated by his metaphysics. Thus, as with Hegelian aesthetics, the aesthetics of Schopenhauer presupposes a metaphysics. The task of philosophy, Schopenhauer claims, is to provide an answer to the problem of existence - an answer which would be sufficient for always. Strangely enough, his answer differs considerably from that of Hegel. They both strive for a complete and permanent explanation of reality, yet their conclusions apparently contradict each other. Is there any reconciliation possible between Schopenhauer and Hegel that does justice to both philosophers? Is there any meta-metaphysical ground on which we can establish the apparent disagreement between them as merely illusory? These are certainly problems to raise if one does not wish simply to enumerate the different world views of the two philosophers, but find a philosophical meaning to their difference.

There are only a few publications devoted to the subject of Heidegger and the Presocratics, some of them already outdated, most of them embedded in Heidegger’s obscure philosophical jargon, and none of them treating the subject exhaustively. Therefore, there is a need for a new, critical presentation of Heidegger’s account of Presocratic thought. However, the purpose of this book is not only to provide such a critical presentation. It raises questions which help us to understand Heidegger as a thinker. The Presocratics provide access to his lifework. The book focuses on Heidegger’s thoughtful repetition of early Greek thinking, and his receptive attention to the fragments of the Presocratics from our contemporary age. Their thought has a special value for him as the heritage which must be repeated anew in order to bring us back to the question of being and to open before us new avenues for existence. The author raises questions which help us to understand Heidegger as a thinker. He presents a deep analysis of Heidegger’s interpretations of the Presocratics and contributes to a new, insightful understanding of Heideggerian philosophy.

One serious defect of the polemical writings that straightforwardly charge Heidegger with Nazism is that they mostly represent a poor knowledge of his philosophy. Heidegger’s writings are painfully difficult, even to specialists, and his concepts can be easily misinterpreted, especially by those who, instead of searching for truth, embrace a prosecutor’s zeal. For example, in his influential book, Farias completely avoids asking philosophical questions. On the internet, one can easily find hundreds of articles by authors who claim that Heidegger’s guilt has already been decided. My objective is not to blame or to exonerate Heidegger before investigating the relationship between his philosophy and politics in depth. Obviously, given the limited nature of my presentation, I cannot consider Heidegger’s entire philosophical opus. I intend to concentrate chiefly on his critique of the Western metaphysical tradition and on an interpretation of his most controversial statement from An Introduction to Metaphysics about the “inner truth and greatness” of National Socialism. I investigate the essence of Heidegger's philosophy, the quest for the meaning of Being, deduce a political theory from his ontology, and arrive at his politics.

Many scholars have argued that unity of humankind can be established on the basis of some basic or core human values. Instead of engaging in a comparative empirical research, compiling lists of core values derived from different cultures, discuss their relevance for human fellowship, I examine the simple values of life that during the 1980s united people in Poland and made them to form the powerful civic movement, which was Solidarity.Poland’s Solidarity of the 1980s has not yet entered a canon of routinely studied great social movements. However, it has initiated a profound world transformation. We are no longer divided by a global confrontation between communism and liberal democracy. The main today’s issue is globalization. Although altered in many respects, the world has still been affected by many serious problems. They necessitate another positive world transformation and a new Global Solidarity that can undertake it.A Global Solidarity movement can learn from Poland’s Solidarity. My contention is that it should not be grounded in any ideological thinking, but in inclusive values—values that do not divide but can potentially unite all human beings—and these values can be derived from basic human needs. In short, Global Solidarity should be based on what I call the “righteousness of life”. It can be achieved if there is a growing recognition of what is right for life and a growing interest in protecting and enhancing life.Building a Global Solidarity is not an attempt to replace governments, but rather to exert pressure on them, so that they support international organizations and consider the welfare of all humanity. While wielding power that at present none of the NGOs represent, Global Solidarity can be a life promoting and enhancing instrument of global society through which a more humane world will be achieved.

The purpose of this essay is to establish a relationship between philosophy, myth, and science in reference to a historical perspective. If for methodological reasons we now disregard the above mentioned terminological difficulties and refer to a common-sense view of myth, philosophy, and science, it remains unquestionable that myth existed long before philosophy and modern science began as late as the seventeenth century.Nevertheless, this historical perspective is not introduced to affirm the positivistic view, according to which the history of humanity should be described in terms of three stages: theological (mythical), metaphysical (philosophical), and positive (scientific); nor is it presented to say that the positive one represents the final achievement of the human race. On the contrary, I will attempt to show that by departing from myth and original philosophy, modern men and women have concealed from themselves an intensely rich experience of life. In order to regain the love of wisdom, we need first to look backwards in order to move forward.

Carl Mika claims in the symposium’s lead essay that we need more myth today. In fact, an “unscientific” attitude can potentially reorient the alienation from the world. For Mika, a philosophical mātauranga Māori incorporates such a way of being in the world. Through it, an unmediated and co-existent relationship with the world can be built up. Some of Mika’s co-symposiasts invite Mika to substantiate aspects about this bold claim. Carwyn Jones nudges Mika to discuss the parallels between tikanga Māori—a system that seeks to incorporate Māori law—and the common-law tradition that is adopted in New Zealand today. W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz agrees with Mika that to understand the world through an indifferent “scientific” investigation is to understand the world only partially, while the Māori scientist Ocean Ripeka Mercier illustrates how she seeks to develop a third space in her work that reconciles the fear of the unknown with the propensity to control the world through knowing. Helen Verran invites Mika to think about whether, and how, his understanding of a philosophical mātauranga Māori can help to facilitate the cultivation of a naturalism that is able to generate a cosmopolitics in New Zealand.

Thirty-first August 2001 marked the 21st anniversary of the end of prolonged strikes in Poland that resulted in the forming of the trade union Solidarity. The struggle of Solidarity remains a powerful lesson in political non-violence. In spite of the wide support it enjoyed in Polish society, Solidarity was outlawed in December 1981 and its leaders were imprisoned. If one is suppressed by force, one can answer with force. But Solidarity did not. Was it an ethical standpoint that Solidarity used only peaceful means in its defence or a utilitarian or pragmatic strategy? The paper argues that it was both. The struggle of Solidarity was not only guided by pragmatic considerations on how to achieve the goals more effectively, but also by ethical principles. Also, the author discusses the nature of political system that existed in Poland from 1945 to 1989.