This paper challenges the traditional tendency in epistemology to privilege memorization over forgetting, and instead underscores the epistemic significance of forgetting, particularly in its intentional or controllable forms. It begins by drawing attention to forms of forgetting that are, to some extent, controllable yet largely overlooked. When properly deployed, such forms of forgetting can help inquirers overcome epistemic obstacles and generate epistemic benefits, thereby facilitating the a…
Read moreThis paper challenges the traditional tendency in epistemology to privilege memorization over forgetting, and instead underscores the epistemic significance of forgetting, particularly in its intentional or controllable forms. It begins by drawing attention to forms of forgetting that are, to some extent, controllable yet largely overlooked. When properly deployed, such forms of forgetting can help inquirers overcome epistemic obstacles and generate epistemic benefits, thereby facilitating the achievement of epistemic goals. Building on this, the paper argues that an ideal inquirer is disposed to regulate such forgetting forms properly in certain situations—a disposition that can be understood as an intellectual virtue from the perspective of responsibilist virtue epistemology.