Wayne George Deakin

This chapter focuses on structuralism and how this theory attempted, through linguistic analysis, to include both philosophy (post the high water of the analytic tradition) and literary theory within a catch-all structural rubric. It contends that that structuralist narratorial theories such as those of Greimas, Propp and Todorov came close to the logical notation of Russell and Frege’s system of logic as they reflected the same urge for structural certainty within the humanities as a whole. Applying the theoretical angle to cinema and other forms of popular culture, the chapter is concluded by a close reading of James Joyce’s short story “Araby” through the structuralist notion of the metonymic and metaphorical linguistic axes.

The final chapter summarises the argument offered hitherto, once again arguing for a communitarian approach to literary texts and their criticism, taking into account the loci in which we now find ourselves with regard literary theory and philosophy. I argue that we have (as the title implies) come back to a state where, in many ways, we found ourselves during the pre-socratic period of philosophy. The important aspect of literary criticism and composition itself, is that it “autologically” recognises gaps and dissonances in our apprehension of absolute certainty. Armed with this in mind, we can both read and critique literary texts again in the knowledge that we are not expected to discern political and philosophical certainties.

This chapter provides an approximate history of criticism right up until its current form. This historical analysis ranges from the Classical age of the Greeks, right up until the Modern age. It discusses theories and concepts such as: nous, magnitude, mimesis, tragedy, sublimity, pragmatics, didacticism, exegesis, hermeneutics and formalism. The discussion ranges over thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Horace, Longinus, Quintilian, Bede, Boethius, Augustine, Aquinas, Dryden, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Eliot, Wimsett and Richards.

This chapter develops the notion of formal structural models in the humanities being unable to, contain meanings by examining the poststructuralist model, arguing that this model is a purely logical extension of structuralism, and just as new modes of philosophy would inevitably break or rupture the proposed boundaries and certainties of analytic philosophy, then so new modes of analysis would break the certainty of structuralist literary criticism. Using Richard Rorty’s idea of behavioural pragmatism as a marker to examine the new thrust towards modern hermeneutics, deconstruction and ordinary language philosophy, the chapter develops a close reading of the deconstructive work of Derrida and de Man. The chapter argues that the new historicist, hermeneutical and deconstructive tendency in both philosophy and literary studies inevitably “dovetail” into literary criticism and importantly, theory. Philosophy has moved away, in both the analytical and the phenomenological modes, towards a more descriptive praxis. As a result, the argument postulates that literary theory and criticism, because of their descriptive and pragmatic nature, have usurped philosophy in its prescriptive mode and have encroached upon the former’s quest for certainty. The chapter examines objections by analytical thinkers such as Searle and Scruton, arguing that the binary rubric often used to critique the analytic and the phenomenological, is actually a category error and that both the latter analytical mode and the postructuralist mode of criticism, are actually two sies of the same coin. The chapter develops this argument by way of engaging with Derrida’s work on Austin and de Man’s work of the “resistance” to the notion of theory. It once again concretises the argument by examining three canonical literary texts from a deconstructive perspective: Steven’s “The Anecdote of the Jar”; Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan”; and Shelley’s “Ozymandias”.

The next chapter develops the previous case for postructuralism by contending that the work of W.V.O Quine, and in particular, Donald Davidson, have close affinities with deconstruction. As such, Davidson’s theory of for example triangulation, can be fruitfully applied to literary texts. After pointing out some of the affinities between Davidson and Derrida, the chapter provides a novel Davidsonian reading of two apparently disparate texts, Williams’ “The Red Wheelbarrow” and Sutherland’s recently celebrated, “Hot White Andy”. The chapter concludes by offering a phenomenological reading of Hemmingway’s “Hills Like White Elephants”, arguing for a strong critical affinity between Davison’s theory and modern phenomenological criticism. This furthers the argument that literary criticism and philosophy have now become synthesised as a mode of criticism.

The next chapter argues for a reassessment of postmodernism, both as a theory and as a mode of philosophy. Particularly in light of thinkers like Jordan Peterson and their erroneous claims that postmodernism is a “New Left” phenomenon. The chapter argues that postmdodern thought is an off-shoot of Neoliberalism and it’s emphasis on individual freedoms, both personal and social. Once again, using literary criticism as a bulwark, the chapter also postulates that there have also been great works of postmodern literature, and that to get an angle on aesthetic postmodernism one first needs a clear understanding of modernism. Clearly, understanding the different senses of the postmodern and the erroneous conflation of it with “the Left” is key to settling much uninformed talk about “postmodern” culture and literary theory.

This chapter provides an overall assessment of the broad definitions of what are literary criticism and theory. It also provides a survey of some of the key movements within literary criticism, for example the trend for more politicised criticism after the second World War. In so doing, it holds in sharp relief thinkers such as F.R. Leavis and C. Achebe. It raises questions about the possible gains and potential pitfalls of theory in its modern manifestation, and also raises questions about the pervasiveness of political pathologies, which it is argued, are inherent in modern criticism.

The penultimate chapter gathers together the arguments previously adumbrated about the dovetailing of literary criticism and philosophy, while also arguing that the “postmodern” debates further echo those in philosophy that go right back to the Greeks and their dichotomy between the Logos and the Sophists. In other words, we’ve always been in a postmodern state with regard our epistemologies. I also add that the new pragmatics I postulate in philosophy, (Phrónēsis) in combination with literary criticism, also entails the notion that in keeping a pragmatic stance we must resist the new danger in the current academic climate of taking political pathologies as our guiding templates. In reading and rereading texts, we need to still recall the principles of rhetorical criticism. I also contend that this pathology of reading was what was applied by the scholastics to secular classical texts. The recognition of textual uncertainties and ambiguities makes for what I call a communitarian approach to the reading and teaching of literature, not prescriptive or political pathologies. In using this argument, I cite the work of Stanley Cavell and Terry Eagleton. I offer a reading of a famous Thai text, Red Bamboo, by Kukrit Pramoj, showing how this more open, pragmatic, communitarian approach helps open up a wider understanding of texts from different cultural contexts, without just taking a simplified political approach.

This chapter brings into focus the trends of new criticism and formalism, whilst aligning their “formal” nature with a larger quest for formal definition, in the humanities in general, based upon the formal nature of the modern sciences. It outlines the formalist and quantitative nature of formalism and the new criticism, whilst comparing their development to new developments in philosophy for the humanities; namely, the new analytical philosophy pioneered by Russell and Frege. The self-consciousness comes from the notion that these various disciplines had become philosophically self-conscious in their search for rigorous certainty and objectivity. It then flags the issues that these ran into; for example, analytic philosophy ran into the wall of Russell’s Set Theory (Barber Shop) paradox. Therefore, it argues that these theories never quite managed to supersede the Idealism on the one hand, and Expressive Romanticism on the other, that they were attempting to transcend. Analytic philosophy (and on the Continent, transcendental phenomenology) gave way to ordinary language philosophy and speech act theory, while literary criticism opened-up massively in the wake of formalism and the new criticism, ushering in all types of theory, both subjective, objective and linguistic.

This books delineates the seismic shifts of the twentieth century humanities by way of a close examination of the dynamic landscape of modern language, criticism and philosophy. In this manner, it argues that both philosophy and literary criticism have dovetailed in the twenty-first century. Starting out as a survey of literary criticism in its broadest terms, later chapters - which are more expository - assess recent movements within modern literary theory. These are located with respect to the post-Russell and Fregean “linguistic turn” in philosophy. Designed for specialists and non-specialists alike; philosophers, literary critics and even students of the modern critical tradition, the argument takes a novel stance towards modern criticism, language and philosophy, arguing for a return to a more formalist and rhetorical approach to literary criticism, while taking care not to indulge too many “political pathologies” when engaging with texts.