Temple University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1999
Long Beach, California, United States of America
  •  38
    The Things We Mean, by Stephen Schiffer (review)
    Disputatio 1 (18): 191-197. 2005.
    018-6
  • The Things We Mean (review)
    Disputatio 1 (18): 191-197. 2005.
  •  4
    A Dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter’s Account of Color
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1): 125-142. 2003.
  •  11
    Explanation and the Hard Problem
    Philosophical Studies 132 (2): 301-330. 2007.
    This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the 'sense of understanding' that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case …Read more
  •  17
  •  66
    This paper argues that the distinctiveness of the Hering primary hues – red, green, blue, and yellow – is already evident at the retina. Basic features of spectral sensitivity provide a foundation for the development of unique hue perceptions and the hue categories of which they are focal examples. Of particular importance are locations in color space at which points of minimal and maximal spectral sensitivity and extreme ratios of chromatic to achromatic response occur. This account builds on J…Read more
  • Strong Representationalism (SR) claims that the phenomenal character of experience is a certain kind of representational content. Furthermore, SR theorists often maintain that the phenomenal qualities of experience just are properties of the objects of experience, represented in experience.1 Another claim held by SR theorists, often cited as a reason for embracing their view, is that experience is transparent. Transparency is the phenomenon of introspection of your experience revealing nothing b…Read more
  •  141
    We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can by met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major disputes in the literature ab…Read more
  •  120
    A Dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter’s Account of Color
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1): 125-42. 2003.
    Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter (1987)2 have argued for a version of reductive physicalism about color which they claim can accommodate the basic intuitions that have led others to embrace dispositionalism or subjectivism about color. Jackson (1996) has further developed the view and provided responses to some objections to its original statement. While Jackson and Pargetter do not have much company in endorsing their specific form of color physicalism, elements of their view have shown up in…Read more
  •  162
    Projectivist representationalism and color
    Philosophical Psychology 16 (4): 515-529. 2003.
    This paper proposes a subjectivist approach to color within the framework of an externalist form of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness. Motivations are presented for accepting both representationalism and color subjectivism, and an argument is offered against the case made by Michael Tye on behalf of the claim that colors are objective, physical properties of objects. In the face of the considerable difficulties associated with finding a workable realist theory of color, the alte…Read more
  •  238
    In giving an account of the content of perceptual experience, several authors, including Fred Dretske, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, and Michael Tye, have employed the notion of nonconceptual representational content.[1]
  •  105
    Fodor's epistemic intuitions of analyticity
    Sorites 14 (October): 110-116. 2002.
    Semantic holism has it that the semantic properties of an individual expression are determined by that expression
  •  293
    Distracted drivers and unattended experience
    Synthese 144 (1): 41-68. 2005.
    Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists happily acce…Read more
  •  234
    Explanation and the hard problem
    Philosophical Studies 132 (2): 301-330. 2007.
    This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the 'sense of understanding' that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case …Read more
  •  42
    Reply to philipona and O'Regan
    with Kent Johnson
    This paper responds to Philipona & O’Regan (2006), which attempts to account for certain color phenomena by appeal to singularities in the space of “accessible information” in the light striking the retina. Three points are discussed. First, it is unclear what the empirical significance/import is of the mathematical analysis of the data regarding the accessible information in the light. Second, the singularity index employed in the study is both mathematically and empirically faulty. Third, the …Read more
  • In a recent book, <sup>[1]</sup> Michael Tye has offered a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness. As Tye himself admits, part of his account involves arguing for a position which has traditionally received little support; he contends that _all_ experiences and feelings have representational