Wen (Bonny) Chen

The Western paradigm of philosophical practice assumes that philosophical arguments are independently comprehensible by the intellect, with spiritual exercises serving mainly to apply them in practical contexts. This paper argues that Daoism exhibits a drastically different model. Drawing on participant observation, we examine a Daoist group whose practice of Xingyi (形意) – a traditional Chinese martial art – is closely guided by the Daodejing. The meanings of this classical Daoist text are not fully accessible to the intellect alone; they are initially unsaturated and await enrichment through the embodied experience of qi. Rather than an independent text that unilaterally guides practice, the Daodejing stands in a reciprocal, dynamic relation with Xingyi: its meanings are revealed through practice, which they guide in turn. This inversion of the Western sequence of philosophical understanding and practical application poses a significant challenge to universal accounts of how philosophy ‘works’ in practical contexts.

Mystical experiences are often regarded as potential sources of epistemic justification for religious beliefs. However, the ‘disanalogy objection’ maintains that, in contrast to sense perceptions, mystical experiences lack social verifiability and are thus merely subjective states that cannot substantiate objective truths. This article explores a novel externalist response that involves the concept of angels. As spiritual beings, angels can directly perceive God and verify these perceptions in their celestial community. Thus, the ‘direct perception of God’ is not inherently incapable of social verification. While invoking angels might appear contentious, it coheres with the externalist approach of conceptualising cognitive states under hypothetical settings. Despite the differences between humans and angels and their lack of interaction for verification purposes, our approach remains valid because mystics not only exemplify the same general type of ‘direct perception of God’ as angels but can also be preliminary members of a wider celestial community.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English. 作為中國本土宗教，道教對中國人的生死觀有潛移默化的影響。對於安樂死等現代醫學語境下的抉擇，有必要考察道教的可能態度。范瑞平提出：道教“貴生”，期求修行成仙，而安樂死剝奪成仙的機會，所以道教理應禁止安樂死。本文試圖説明：道教並沒有明確禁止安樂死的動機或理由。仙法流傳於道教門内。普通人無緣得見，本就沒有成仙的機會。而道門之外，普通人能否安樂死的最為相關的道教設定，或許是“命數”不可無端更改。然而，命數的考量同樣難以構成禁止安樂死的理由。 Given the influence of religious Daoism on the concepts of life and death in China, it is important to examine the Daoist stance regarding practical issues of modern medicine, such as euthanasia. According to Ruiping Fan, Daoism would prohibit euthanasia as a practice that deprives a person of the possibility of attaining immortality. We argue, however, that Daoism has no clear motivation or reason to forbid euthanasia. The methods for attaining immortality remain a secret exclusive to the Daoist community. Other people have no access to such methods and thus lack the opportunity to become immortal. Furthermore, the prevalent concept of “destiny” or “fate” provides no basis for rejecting euthanasia.

Mystical religious experiences typically purport to engage with the transcendent and often claim to involve encounters with spiritual entities or a detachment from the material world. Daoism diverges from this paradigm. This paper examines Daoist mystical experiences of bodily transformations and explores their epistemological implications. Specifically, we defend the justificatory power of Daoist somatic experiences against the disanalogy objection. The disanalogy objection posits that mystical experiences, in contrast to sense perceptions, are not socially verifiable and thereby lack prima facie epistemic value. We argue that some Daoist mystical bodily states, being essentially spatiotemporal, are exempt from this challenge. This leads to a broader understanding of mysticism and offers a partial resolution to the disanalogy objection.