Wen Yu

Bulgakov and Goethe living in different countries, different times, different cultural backgrounds, the "Master and Margarita" and "Faust" is surprisingly similar. Two works have in common the spirit of philosophy, the subject of similar performance, similar to the plot elements and characters closely associated with shape. At the same time, they have their own unique artistic creation and extraordinary aesthetic value. "Master and Margarita" for "Faust" is a continuation of and learn from, more recycling and beyond. In spite of living in different countries, times and cultural background, Bulgakov and Goethe represented remarkable resemblances in their respective works, Master and Margaret and Faustus. The two masterpieces shared interacting philosophical spirits, relevant themes, similar plots and resemble characters. But on the other hand, the two works are characterized by their own unique artistic creation and aesthetic value. This paper tries to prove that Master and Margaret not only inherited and drew lessons from Faustus, but more importantly, reproduced and surpassed the artistic value of Faustus

There are two kinds of time-bias: near-bias and future-bias. While philosophers typically hold that near-bias is rationally impermissible, many hold that future-bias is rationally permissible. Call this normative hybridism. According to arbitrariness objections, certain patterns of preference are rationally impermissible because they are arbitrary. While arbitrariness objections have been levelled against both near-bias and future-bias, the kind of arbitrariness in question has been different. In this paper we investigate whether there are forms of arbitrariness that are common to both kinds of preferences, and hence whether there are versions of the arbitrariness objection that are objections both to near-bias and future-bias. If there are, then this might go some way towards undermining normative hybridism and to defending a thorough-going time-neutralism.

Many philosophers have become sceptical of the use of thought experiments in theorising about personal identity. In large part this is due to work in experimental philosophy that appears to confirm long held philosophical suspicions that thought experiments elicit inconsistent judgements about personal identity, and hence judgements that are thought to be the product of cognitive biases. If so, these judgements appear to be useless at informing our theories of personal identity. Using the methods of experimental philosophy, we investigate whether people exhibit inconsistent judgements and, if they do, whether these judgements are likely to be the source of cognitive bias or, instead, sensitivity to some relevant factor. We do not find that people’s judgements are sensitive to any of the factors we investigate (relevant or irrelevant), nor that people have inconsistent judgements across cases. Rather, people’s judgements are best explained by them having a very minimal account of what it takes for a person to survive. Since this pattern of judgements is no reason to think that we are subject to cognitive bias, we see no reason, as things stand, to be sceptical of our judgements.