Wendy A. Rogers

Surgical innovation poses significant ethical challenges. Previous work has grouped these challenges under four categories: potential harms to patients; compromised informed consent; unfair allocation of healthcare resources; and conflicts of interest. We argue that recent technological developments in surgery warrant the addition of three new ethical challenges to the existing taxonomy: allocating responsibility; impact on relationships; and risks to privacy. Although these challenges predate developments in robotic surgery and Artificial Intelligence, nonetheless these technologies highlight and make more urgent the need to consider these categories and identify how the concerns they raise may be addressed.

Background There is a growing concern about artificial intelligence (AI) applications in healthcare that can disadvantage already under-represented and marginalised groups (eg, based on gender or race). Objectives Our objectives are to canvas the range of strategies stakeholders endorse in attempting to mitigate algorithmic bias, and to consider the ethical question of responsibility for algorithmic bias. Methodology The study involves in-depth, semistructured interviews with healthcare workers, screening programme managers, consumer health representatives, regulators, data scientists and developers. Results Findings reveal considerable divergent views on three key issues. First, views on whether bias is a problem in healthcare AI varied, with most participants agreeing bias is a problem (which we call the bias-critical view), a small number believing the opposite (the bias-denial view), and some arguing that the benefits of AI outweigh any harms or wrongs arising from the bias problem (the bias-apologist view). Second, there was a disagreement on the strategies to mitigate bias, and who is responsible for such strategies. Finally, there were divergent views on whether to include or exclude sociocultural identifiers (eg, race, ethnicity or gender-diverse identities) in the development of AI as a way to mitigate bias. Conclusion/significance Based on the views of participants, we set out responses that stakeholders might pursue, including greater interdisciplinary collaboration, tailored stakeholder engagement activities, empirical studies to understand algorithmic bias and strategies to modify dominant approaches in AI development such as the use of participatory methods, and increased diversity and inclusion in research teams and research participant recruitment and selection.

Bioethics is a practically oriented discipline that developed to address pressing ethical issues arising from developments in the life sciences. Given this inherent practical bent, some form of advocacy or activism seems inherent to the nature of bioethics. However, there are potential tensions between being a bioethics activist, and academic ideals. In academic bioethics, scholarship involves reflection, rigour and the embrace of complexity and uncertainty. These values of scholarship seem to be in tension with being an activist, which requires pragmatism, simplicity, certainty and, above all, action. In this paper I explore this apparent dichotomy, using the case example of my own involvement in international efforts to end forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience in China. I conclude that these tensions can be managed and that academic bioethics requires a willingness to be activist.

Moral hazard occurs when the presence or promise of a new technology or policy reduces incentives for responsible behaviour, because the consequences of risky behaviour are perceived to be reduced, transferred, or mitigated. Moral hazard risk has been widely empirically investigated in the case of geoengineering for climate change, but other novel technologies have not been subject to such scrutiny. Ever since de-extinction was announced to the public as a viable possibility with modern biotechnology, a series of commentators have argued that the promise of de-extinction will create a moral hazard. The thought is that extinction has been perceived as permanent. Any change in this belief, such as the idea that species can be brought back, potentially undermines the motivation for current conservation efforts. This is an empirical claim that we investigate. Our study assesses the public's support for conservation in scenarios that promise the use of de-extinction to address actions that are likely to cause extinction. We did not find that people were more likely to accept the extinction of a species if its de-extinction was promised in the future. We did, however, find an association between extinction acceptance and judgments that de-extinction could successfully resurrect species. The findings of this study represent a crucial step in assessing the risks novel biotechnology creates.

Patient visits are an important opportunity for general practitioners to discuss the risks of smoking and cessation strategies. In Australia, the guidelines on cessation published by the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners represent a key resource for GPs in this regard. The predominant message of the Guidelines is that pharmacotherapy should be recommended as first-line therapy for smokers expressing an interest in quitting. This, however, ignores established evidence about the success of unassisted quitting. Our analysis of the Guidelines identifies a number of potential conflicts of interest which may have affected the advice provided. These include extensive funding by the pharmaceutical industry of sources cited to support the recommendations, and relations between members of the Guidelines Content Advisory Group and the pharmaceutical industry. Recommendations issued by professional bodies have enormous potential impact upon public health and there is a need for the highest levels of scrutiny and transparency in their development. Information about research cited in guidelines should include funding sources, and developers should be free of obvious conflicts of interest. Smoking remains the leading preventable cause of global mortality. Concerns related to pharmaceutical industry funding of research, scientific integrity and recommendations on smoking cessation by medical advisory groups clearly have implications beyond Australia

As the price of pharmaceuticals and biologicals rises so does the number of patients who cannot afford them. In this article, we argue that physicians have a moral duty to help patients access affordable medicines. We offer three grounds to support our argument: (i) the aim of prescribing is to improve health and well-being which can only be realized with secure access to treatment; (ii) there is no morally significant difference between medicines being unavailable and medicines being unaffordable, so the steps physicians are willing to take in the first case should extend to the second; and (iii) as the primary stakeholder with a duty to put the individual patient’s interests first, the medical professional has a duty to address cost-barriers to patient care. In articulating this duty, we take account of important epistemic and control conditions that must be met for the attribution of this duty to be justified.

In this article we examine the role and ethics of communications in planning for an influenza pandemic. We argue that ethical communication must not only he effective, so that pandemic plans can be successfully implemented, communications should also take specific account of the needs of the disadvantaged, so that they are not further disenfranchised. This will require particular attention to the role of the mainstream media which may disadvantage the vulnerable through misrepresentation and exclusion.

Public health plays an important, albeit often unnoticed, role in protecting and promoting the health of populations. The activities of public health are complex, performed by multiple professionals, and range from the innocuous to the intrusive. Ethical analyses in public health reflect some of this complexity and fragmentation, with no one approach able to capture the full range of ethical considerations raised by public health activities. There are however, good reasons why we should pursue such analyses. Providing a robust ethical framework for public health may promote the identity and function of public health, address some of the shortcomings of utilitarianism, and help to combat the threat that public health faces through lack of political will in many parts of the world.In this paper I argue that Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of practices and virtues can make a valuable contribution to public health ethics. The first part of the paper argues that public health may properly be described as the type of practice that provides an arena for the exercise of virtues. This is followed by an analysis of the three virtues of honesty, courage and justice in public health practice. Using virtue theory captures morally important elements of public health and helps to maintain awareness of significant moral values in the practice of public health. Such awareness is crucial in maintaining and defending the integrity of public health.

Debate about whether or not addiction is a disease has been central to practice and policy responses. In this paper, we aim to move that debate forward by understanding why the disease status of addiction is so unclear and contested, and draw on pragmatic considerations to suggest a partial resolution. To do this, we apply the vague cluster view of ‘disease’. This view is pragmatic since it allows appeal to the practical implications of considering a condition to be a disease in justifying the classification, for particular purposes. After explaining the view, we apply it to addiction to show that whether or not addiction has the typical features of a disease is unclear due to the vagueness and ambiguity of these features. We then examine pragmatic considerations often deemed relevant to deciding addiction’s disease status to see if these can suggest precisification. Pragmatic disease accounts are potentially problematic in that pathologising addiction simultaneously has both positive and negative effects, and it can be difficult to maintain different precisifications across contexts. Nonetheless we argue that the vague cluster approach circumscribes some ways of conceptualising addiction as disease, namely those that conceptualise disease as solely physiological dysfunction. It thus prompts a pragmatic shift to a broader understanding of addiction that partially resolves the negative consequences of disease designation. The discussion suggests that disagreements over whether addiction is a disease are primarily normative and semantic, rather than being disagreements over facts.

Positive claims about narrative approaches to healthcare suggest they could have many benefits, including supporting person-centred healthcare (PCH). Narrative approaches have also been criticised, however, on both theoretical and practical grounds. In this paper we draw on epistemological work on narrative and knowledge to develop a conception of narrative that responds to these concerns. We make a case for understanding narratives as accounts of events in which the way each event is described as influenced by the ways other events in the narrative are described. This view of narratives recognises that they can contribute knowledge of different kinds of connections between events: not just causal, and not just of patient’s perspectives. Additionally, narratives can add further epistemic value by suggesting potentially useful lines of inquiry. We take narrative approaches to healthcare to include clinicians considering both patients’ informational offerings and their own professional understandings as narratives. On this understanding, our account is able to overcome the major theoretical and practical criticisms that have been levelled against the use of narrative approaches in healthcare, and can help to explain why and how narrative approaches are consistent with PCH.

Evidence in medicine can come from more or less trustworthy sources and be produced by more or less reliable methods, and its interpretation can be disputed. As such, it can be unclear when disagreements in medicine result from different, but reasonable, interpretations of the available evidence and when they result from unreasonable refusals to consider legitimate evidence. In this article, we seek to show how assessments of the relevance and implications of evidence are typically affected by factors beyond that evidence itself, such as our beliefs about the credibility of the speaker or source of the evidence. In evaluating evidence, there is thus a need for reflective awareness about why we accept or dismiss particular claims

OBJECTIVES: This article presents an original definition of surgical innovation and a practical tool for identifying planned innovations. These will support the responsible introduction of surgical innovations. BACKGROUND: Frameworks developed for the safer introduction of surgical innovations rely upon identifying cases of innovation; oversight cannot occur unless innovations are identified. However, there is no consensus among surgeons about which interventions they consider innovative; existing definitions are vague and impractical. METHODS: Using conceptual analysis, this article synthesizes findings from relevant literature, and from qualitative research with surgeons, to develop an original definition of surgical innovation and a tool for prospectively identifying planned surgical innovations. The tool has been developed in light of feedback from health care professionals, surgeons, and policy makers. RESULTS: This definition of innovation distinguishes between variations, introduction of established interventions, and innovations in surgical techniques or use of devices. It can be applied easily and consistently, is sensitive to the key features of innovation, is prospective, and focuses on features relevant to safety and evaluation. The accompanying tool is deliberately broad so that appropriate supports may, if necessary, be provided each time that a surgeon does something "new". CONCLUSIONS: The definition presented in this article overcomes a number of practical challenges. The definition and tool will be of value in supporting responsible surgical innovation, in particular, through the prospective identification of planned innovations.

As the price of pharmaceuticals and biologicals rises so does the number of patients who cannot afford them. In this article, we argue that physicians have a moral duty to help patients access affordable medicines. We offer three grounds to support our argument: (i) the aim of prescribing is to improve health and well-being which can only be realized with secure access to treatment; (ii) there is no morally significant difference between medicines being unavailable and medicines being unaffordable, so the steps physicians are willing to take in the first case should extend to the second; and (iii) as the primary stakeholder with a duty to put the individual patient’s interests first, the medical professional has a duty to address cost-barriers to patient care. In articulating this duty, we take account of important epistemic and control conditions that must be met for the attribution of this duty to be justified.

The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Bioethics is an outstanding resource for anyone with an interest in feminist bioethics, with chapters covering topics from justice and power to the climate crisis. Comprising 42 chapters by emerging and established scholars, the volume is divided into six parts: Foundations of Feminist Bioethics Identity and Identifications Science, Technology and Research Health and Social Care Reproduction and Making Families Widening the Scope of Feminist Bioethics The volume is essential reading for anyone with an interest in bioethics or feminist philosophy, and will prove an invaluable resource for scholars, teachers, and advanced students.

Objective We reviewed human–robot interaction (HRI) participatory design (PD) research with older adults. The goal was to identify methods used, determine their value for design of robots with older adults, and provide guidance for best practices. Background Assistive robots may promote aging-in-place and quality of life for older adults. However, the robots must be designed to meet older adults’ specific needs and preferences. PD and other user-centered methods may be used to engage older adults in the robot development process to accommodate their needs and preferences and to assure usability of emergent assistive robots. Method This targeted review of HRI PD studies with older adults draws on a detailed review of 26 articles. Our assessment focused on the HRI methods and their utility for use with older adults who have a range of needs and capabilities. Results Our review highlighted the importance of using mixed methods and including multiple stakeholders throughout the design process. These approaches can encourage mutual learning (to improve design by developers and to increase acceptance by users). We identified key phases used in HRI PD workshops (e.g., initial interview phase, series of focus groups phase, and presentation phase). These approaches can provide inspiration for future efforts. Conclusion HRI PD strategies can support designers in developing assistive robots that meet older adults’ needs, capabilities, and preferences to promote acceptance. More HRI research is needed to understand potential implications for aging-in-place. PD methods provide a promising approach.

Synthetic biology is a broad term covering multiple scientific methodologies, technologies, and practices. Pairing biology with engineering, synbio seeks to design and build biological systems, either through improving living cells by adding in new functions, or creating new structures by combining natural and synthetic components. As with all new technologies, synthetic biology raises a number of ethical considerations. In order to understand what these issues might be, and how they relate to those covered in ethics literature on synbio, we conducted an interview study with practicing synthetic biologists affiliated with a synthetic biology centre in Australia. Scientists identified a range of ethical challenges germane to the field, including precarious employment, pressures from industry, gender inequity, and the negative effects of the hyping of synbio. These challenges differed markedly from those identified in the ethics literature, whose treatment of the harms and benefits of synbio remains largely speculative and abstract. In our discussion of the pragmatic, every day ethical issues synthetic biologists face, we illustrate how issues of waste or research integrity play pivotal roles in everything from lived experiences in the laboratory, to long-term research trajectories guiding the field. In a confirmation of the ethical relevance of our participant’s views on the field, we argue that the subjects they raise must be included in any ethical analysis of synbio as a field.

Many health care systems include programs that allow patients in exceptional circumstances to access medical interventions of as yet unproven benefit. In this article we consider the ethical justifications for—and demands on—these special access programs (SAPs). SAPs have a compassionate basis: They give patients with limited options the opportunity to try interventions that are not yet approved by standard regulatory processes. But while they signal that health care systems can and will respond to individual suffering, SAPs have several disadvantages, including the potential to undermine regulatory and knowledge-generation structures that constitute significant public goods. The “balance” between these considerations depends in part on how broadly SAPs are used, but also on whether SAPs can be made to contribute to the generation of knowledge about the effects of health interventions. We argue that patients should usually be required to contribute outcome data while using SAPs.

Many healthcare practices expose people to risks of harmful outcomes. However, the major theories of moral philosophy struggle to assess whether, when and why it is ethically justifiable to expose individuals to risks, as opposed to actually harming them. Sven Ove Hansson has proposed an approach to the ethical assessment of risk imposition that encourages attention to factors including questions of justice in the distribution of advantage and risk, people’s acceptance or otherwise of risks, and the scope individuals have to influence the practices that generate risk. This paper investigates the ethical justifiability of preventive healthcare practices that expose people to risks including overdiagnosis. We applied Hansson’s framework to three such practices: an ‘ideal’ breast screening service, a commercial personal genome testing service, and a guideline that lowers the diagnostic threshold for hypertension. The framework was challenging to apply, not least because healthcare has unclear boundaries and involves highly complex practices. Nonetheless, the framework encouraged attention to issues that would be widely recognised as morally pertinent. Our assessment supports the view that at least some preventive healthcare practices that impose risks including that of overdiagnosis are not ethically justifiable. Further work is however needed to develop and/or test refined assessment criteria and guidance for applying them.

Current practices of identifying and treating small indolent thyroid cancers constitute an important but in some ways unusual form of overdiagnosis. Overdiagnosis refers to diagnoses that generally harm rather than benefit patients, primarily because the diagnosed condition is not a harmful form of disease. Patients who are overdiagnosed with thyroid cancer are harmed by the psycho-social impact of a cancer diagnosis, as well as treatment interventions such partial or total thyroidectomy, lifelong thyroid replacement hormone, monitoring, surgical complications and other side effects. These harms seem to outweigh any putative benefit of knowing about a cancer that would not have caused problems if left undiscovered. In addition to harms to patients, thyroid cancer overdiagnosis leads to significant opportunity costs at a societal level, due to costs of diagnosis and treatment. Unlike many other overdiagnosed cancers, accurate risk stratification is possible with thyroid cancer. At the individual patient level, use of this risk information might support informed choice and/or shared decision-making, as mandated by clinical ethics frameworks. And this approach might, to some extent, help to reduce rates of diagnosis and intervention. In practice, however, it is unlikely to stem the rising incidence and associated harms and costs of overdiagnosed thyroid cancer, especially in situations where health professionals have conflicts of interest. We argue in this article that thyroid cancer overdiagnosis may be usefully understood as a public health problem, and that some public health approaches will be readily justifiable and are more likely to be effective in minimising its harms.

Patient or public involvement in health research is increasingly expected as a matter of policy. In theory, PPI can contribute both to the epistemic aims intrinsic to research, and to extrinsically valued features of research such as social inclusion and transparency. In practice, the aims of PPI have not always been clear, although there has been a tendency to encourage the involvement of so-called ordinary people who are regarded as representative of an assumed patient perspective. In this paper we focus on the epistemic potential of PPI, using theoretical work in epistemology to develop a nuanced account of patients’ experiential knowledge and how this might contribute directly to conceptual development, hypothesis generation and data interpretation. We also consider how some features of health research pose barriers to this kind of epistemic contribution. Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s idea of testimonial injustice, we explore how disciplinary indicators of credibility in clinical and academic health research contexts might be wrongly applied to those involved in PPI, undermining their potential to contribute. Finally we argue for a range of strategies to maximize opportunities for patients to engage with research teams and make epistemologically significant contributions to research.

Many countries are experiencing increasing levels of demand for access to assisted reproductive technologies. Policies regarding who can access ART and with what support from a collective purse are highly contested, raising questions about what state responses are justified. Whilst much of this debate has focused on the status of infertility as a disease, we argue that this is something of a distraction, since disease framing does not provide the far-reaching, robust justification for state support that proponents of ART seem to suppose. Instead, we propose that debates about appropriate state responses should consider the various implications for health and broader well-being that may be associated with difficulties starting a family. We argue that the harms and disruption to valued life projects of subfertility-related suffering may provide a stronger basis for justifying state support in this context. Further, we suggest that, whilst ART may alleviate some of the harm resulting from subfertility, population-level considerations can indicate a broader range of interventions aimed at tackling different sources of subfertility-related harm, consistent with broader public health aims.

Throughout March and April 2020, debate raged about how best to allocate limited intensive care unit (ICU) resources in the face of a growing COVID-19 pandemic. The debate was dominated by utility-based arguments for saving the most lives or life-years. These arguments were tempered by equity-based concerns that triage based solely on prognosis would exacerbate existing health inequities, leaving disadvantaged patients worse off. Central to this debate was the assumption that ICU admission is a valuable but scarce resource in the pandemic context.In this paper, we argue that the concern about achieving equity in ICU triage is problematic for two reasons. First, ICU can be futile and prolong or exacerbate suffering rather than ameliorate it. This may be especially true in patients with COVID-19 with emerging data showing that most who receive access to a ventilator will still die. There is no value in admitting patients with poor prognostic indicators to ICU to meet an equity target when intensive critical care is contrary to their best interests. Second, the focus on ICU admission shifts focus away from important aspects of COVID-19 care where there is greater opportunity for mitigating suffering and enhancing equitable care.We propose that the focus on equity concerns during the pandemic should broaden to include providing all people who need it with access to the highest possible standard of end-of-life care. This requires attention to culturally safe care in the following interlinked areas: palliative care, communication and decision support and advanced care planning.

Synthetic biology (synbio) involves designing and creating new living systems to serve human ends, using techniques including molecular biology, genomics, and engineering. Existing bioethical analyses of synbio focus largely on balancing benefits against harms, the dual-use dilemma, and metaphysical questions about creating and commercializing synthetic organisms. We argue that these approaches fail to consider key feminist concerns. We ground our normative claims in two case studies, focusing on the public good, who holds and wields power, and synbio research projects’ particularity and context. Attention to feminist concerns is essential for synbio to realize its potential in ethically justifiable ways.

Several foundational documents of bioethics mention the special obligation researchers have to vulnerable research participants. However, the treatment of vulnerability offered by these documents often relies on enumeration of vulnerable groups rather than an analysis of the features that make such groups vulnerable. Recent attempts in the scholarly literature to lend philosophical weight to the concept of vulnerability are offered by Luna and Hurst. Luna suggests that vulnerability is irreducibly contextual and that Institutional Review Boards (Research Ethics Committees) can only identify vulnerable participants by carefully examining the details of the proposed research. Hurst, in contrast, defines the vulnerable as those especially at risk of incurring the wrongs to which all research ethics participants are exposed. We offer a more substantive conception of vulnerability than Luna but one that gives rise to a different rubric of responsibilities from Hurst's. While we understand vulnerability to be an ontological condition of human existence, in the context of research ethics, we take the vulnerable to be research subjects who are especially prone to harm or exploitation. Our analysis rests on developing a typology of sources of vulnerability and showing how distinct sources generate distinct obligations on the part of the researcher. Our account emphasizes that the researcher's first obligation is not to make the research participant even more vulnerable than they already are. To illustrate our framework, we consider two cases: that of a vulnerable population involved in international research and that of a domestic population of people with diminished capacity