Wes Sharrock

Focusing on a discussion by Ruddich and Stassen of the ?Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough?, this paper shows that some of the usual criticisms made by sociologists of Wittgenstein are misplaced. He does not reject causal explanations of beliefs and actions and replace them with some other form of explanation, but dismisses the idea that any explanation is called for here. His argument that the origin of the desire to explain beliefs is to be found in a misconceived parallel between science and magic is explained and discussed

Peter Winch's The Idea of a Social Science has been the subject of repeated misunderstanding. This discussion takes one recent example and shows how Winch's argument is gravely distorted. What is at issue is not, as is usually supposed, whether we can accept or endorse another society's explanations of its activities, but whether we have to look for an explanatory connection between concepts and action. Winch's argument is that before we can try to explain actions, we have to identify them correctly. This can only be done by seeing how they, and the concepts they are associated with, fit within a way of life. Grasping its rule‐following character is understanding action. Once the difficulties in making such identifications are appreciated, we will be less inclined to accept facile explanations why people in other societies do the things they do.

This book provides a sustained and penetrating critique of a wide range of views in modern cognitive science and philosophy of the mind, from Turing's famous test for intelligence in machines to recent work in computational linguistic theory. While discussing many of the key arguments and topics, the authors also develop a distinctive analytic approach. Drawing on the methods of conceptual analysis first elaborated by Wittgenstein and Ryle, the authors seek to show that these methods still have a great deal to offer in the field of the cognitive theory and the philosophy of mind, providing a powerful alternative to many of the positions put forward in the contemporary literature. Amoung the many issues discussed in the book are the following: the Cartesian roots of modern conceptions of mind; Searle's 'Chinese Room' thought experiment; Fodor's 'language of thought' hypothesis; the place of 'folk psychology' in cognitivist thought; and the question of whether any machine may be said to 'think' or 'understand' in the ordinary senses of these words. Wide ranging, up-to-date and forcefully argued, this book represents a major intervention in contemporary debates about the status of cognitive science an the nature of mind. It will be of particular interest to students and scholars in philosophy, psychology, linguistics and computing sciences.

This chapter explores the significant parallels between the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the philosophy of social science developed by Peter Winch, and the themes and orientations of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (EM/CA). While EM/CA has its philosophical roots in phenomenology, particularly in the work of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch—both formative influences on Harold Garfinkel—there are striking affinities with the Wittgensteinian tradition. The chapter outlines Wittgenstein’s later vision of philosophy as a practice of clarification aimed at dissolving conceptual confusion through attention to language-in-use and shared forms of life. It then turns to Winch’s The Idea of a Social Science, a work deeply indebted to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, and reconstructs its seven central claims concerning action, meaning, rules, and understanding from the participant’s perspective. The chapter shows how these claims anticipate or parallel key concerns in EM/CA, including the irreducibly contextual character of meaning, the importance of members’ methods, and the reorientation of social inquiry away from causal explanation toward the explication of practical reasoning. Special attention is given to the Manchester School of Ethnomethodology, which explicitly integrated Wittgenstein and Winch into its analytic orientation. The chapter makes a case for renewed engagement with these philosophical resources within EM/CA.

In this paper we attempt to revisit the concept of social distribution of knowledge Alfred Schutz once put forward to be the central concept in sociology of knowledge, operationalising this in the context of practical action. In doing so, we examine how the notion of relevance is deployed as the members’ practical concern in the context of librarianship. Thus, this is an attempt to look into activities where members not only operate under auspices of organised stocks of knowledge, but also modify the organisation of those stocks of knowledge as needed in their attempts to accomplish their work. Examination of librarians making books available to users through classification in a university library in the U.K. revealed that their activities involve their management of professional and organisational corpuses of knowledge, in this case, through the medium of classification schemes. Librarians in the university studied were using the “local version” of the DDC (the Dewey Decimal Classification), and were adapting it to the needs of the library service as they saw them. The notion of “relevance” extensively informs their work, two dimensions of relevance being prominent. The librarians understand their work to be responsive to the varying and changing requirements of users, their decisions being shaped to provide what they construe as “what readers want”. The other significant relevance we considered is that of aligning the library’s classification with the relational features of academic and scientific fields as embedded in documented “subject matters”. Thus, relating the stocks of library materials to the current shape of the professional corpus in domains of knowledge so that it stays relevant to collectivity members seems to be central to the community, and what the relevance consists of may vary depending on the community.

As a contribution to current debates on the ‘social life of methods’, in this article we present an ethnomethodological study of the role of understanding within statistical practice. After reviewing the empirical turn in the methods literature and the challenges to the qualitative-quantitative divide it has given rise to, we argue such case studies are relevant because they enable us to see different ways in which ‘methods’, here quantitative methods, come to have a social life – by embodying and exhibiting understanding they ‘make the social structures of everyday activities observable’ ( Garfinkel, 1967 : 75), thereby putting society on display. Exhibited understandings rest on distinctive lines of practical social and cultural inquiry – ethnographic ‘forays’ into the worlds of the producers and users of statistics – which are central to good statistical work but are not themselves quantitative. In highlighting these non-statistical forms of social and cultural inquiry at work in statistical practice, our case study is an addition to understandings of statistics and usefully points to ways in which studies of the social life of methods might be further developed from here.

This comment provides an overview of the four articles by Lindwall, Lymer and Ivarsson; Lynch and Wong; Macbeth, Wong and Lynch; and Macbeth and Wong, which make up the kernel of this Special Issue of Discourse Studies on Epistemics; and it also examines the reasons for the assorted difficulties the authors of those articles have with the Epistemic Programme being proposed for conversation analysis. The legitimacy of their concerns is underscored by showing that the charge the EP makes, which is that the CA developed by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson gives an incomplete account of linguistic interaction, is founded on a number of mistakes. The first mistake is the idea that CA cannot effectively address so-called action formation. The second is a misunderstanding of the idea of ‘proof procedure’ in CA. The third mistake is that conversation can better be understood through an abstract analytic construction, rather than an emphasis on participants’ analysis. And the fourth is that it is necessary to rely upon an imputed cognitive machinery that is asserted to underlie conversation. The systematicity and generative power of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson’s radical work on turn-taking in conversation is emphasised and a question that begs to be answered arises, which is how well the EP compares to that earlier and still-radical work, something that the kernel articles address in their return to key transcripts used in the EP.

While Garfinkel’s early work, captured in Studies in Ethnomethodology, has received a lot of attention and discussion, this has not been the case for his later work since the 1970s. In this paper, we critically examine the aims of Garfinkel’s later ethnomethodological studies of work programme and evaluate key ideas such as the ‘missing what’ in the sociology of work, ‘the unique adequacy requirements of methods’, and the notion of ‘hybrid studies’. We do so through a detailed engagement with a study that has frequently been singled out as exemplary by Garfinkel for his studies of work programme, namely Livingston’s The Ethnomethodological Foundations of Mathematics. We show how Livingston uses the proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem as a way to exhibit the work involved in understanding mathematical proofs. We then discuss how Livingston uses this example to introduce a distinction between the written ‘proof account’ and the associated ‘lived work’ of working through that proof, which we argue allows Livingston to provide a powerful critique of a formalist understanding of the objectivity of mathematics. We then discuss three aspects that we find problematic in Livingston’s and Garfinkel’s claims about Livingston’s study. Firstly, we question whether written proofs are best conceived of as descriptions or accounts. Secondly, we interrogate whether an ethnomethodological study could teach mathematicians how to make discoveries. Thirdly, we throw doubt on Garfinkel’s claim that Livingston’s results are results in mathematics. We conclude this paper with a discussion of how Livingston’s study Gödel’s proof highlights key tensions in Garfinkel’s later work. Firstly, we argue that there exists an ambiguity in Garfinkel’s treatment of texts as ‘incompetent’. Secondly, we show that Garfinkel’s attempt to extend his idea of classical studies from sociology to other professions and disciplines is problematic. Finally, we question Garfinkel’s proposals to reorient ethnomethodological studies away from sociological audiences and ask whether ethnomethodological studies promise the delivery of a ‘large prize’ or, rather, provide something like ‘helpful therapy’.

This provocative, engaging and important book marks the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Peter Winch's seminal The Idea of a Social Science. The authors – the first two philosophers, the third a sociologist – have worked together in various permutations before. No-one familiar with their previous publications will be surprised that the dominant voice throughout is Wittgenstein's – that is, Wittgenstein as read ‘resolutely’ by ‘new Wittgensteinians’. They have three principal aims: first, to read Winch's own work in an equally ‘resolute’ way; hence to read ISS as prophylactic and therapeutic in intention, and not as heralding a wonderful or not-so-wonderful new social theory; secondly, to defend Winch against certain persistent charges; and thirdly, to persuade social theorists and philosophers of ‘social science’ that Winch's therapeutic lessons have not yet been assimilated, with the possible exception of a handful of ethnographers and ethnomethodologists.Following a substantial introductory section, Chapters 1 and 2 – respectively, entitled ‘Beyond pluralism, monism, relativism, realism etc.: reassessing Peter Winch’ and ‘Winch and linguistic idealism’ – argue that Winch cannot be seen as an advocate of linguistic idealism or “any of the other ‘isms’ that have been reactively bandied about …

A peculiar method often used in sociological practice – methodological irony – is discussed in the present paper. The idea of the method is that sociologist substitutes everyday world of actor for the world of objective possibilities, which are available only to sociological investigation. Finally with the help of this method sociologists get a specific representation of social reality corresponding to their methodological preferences. Authors identify four variations of methodological irony: transformation of the frame of reference, enrichment of the everyday, the decipherment of meaning, moral reversals.

Praise for the First Edition: `Totally reliable... the authors have produced a book urgently needed by all those charged with introducing students to the classics... quite indispensable′ - Times Higher Education Supplement This is a fully updated and expanded new edition of the successful undergraduate text. Providing a lucid examination of the pivotal theories of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, the authors submit that these figures have decisively shaped the discipline. They show how the classical apparatus is in use, even though it is being directed in new ways in response to the changing character of society. Written with the needs of undergraduates in mind, the text is essential reading for students in sociology and social theory.