This paper argues that scientific progress is best understood not as mere accumulation of knowledge, but as the systematic elimination of proper ignorance, namely ignorance that is identifiable, tractable, epistemically significant, and communally recognized. Drawing on examples from both science and philosophy, I show that traditional models focusing on knowledge accumulation struggle to account for phenomena such as diminishing epistemic returns and the proliferation of irrelevant knowledge. R…
Read moreThis paper argues that scientific progress is best understood not as mere accumulation of knowledge, but as the systematic elimination of proper ignorance, namely ignorance that is identifiable, tractable, epistemically significant, and communally recognized. Drawing on examples from both science and philosophy, I show that traditional models focusing on knowledge accumulation struggle to account for phenomena such as diminishing epistemic returns and the proliferation of irrelevant knowledge. Reframing progress in terms of eliminating ignorance yields a more goal-sensitive and practice-grounded account that accommodates the shifting relevance of questions and the contextual nature of inquiry. This model not only aligns with the dynamics of actual scientific research but also provides a diagnostic lens for evaluating philosophical debates that appear conceptually saturated yet epistemically stagnant. The paper concludes by suggesting that this framework may serve as a unifying, transdisciplinary standard for understanding epistemic advancement.
