William Bell

ABSTRACT When aiming to justify the infliction of harm upon a culpable wrongdoer, the notion of desert most readily finds its home within the context of punishment. Thus, according to one dominant theory of punishment, retributivism, a wrongdoer deserves the hard treatment constitutive of punishment. In this paper, I argue that desert can play a role in helping justify certain types of defensive action. Specifically, I aim to show how desert‐based reasons can help justify seemingly futile defensive efforts. Importantly, this justification does not stem from the idea that the victim of an attack may “draw against punishment” in seeking to avert a threat, but rather from the belief that culpable aggressors deserve to be resisted.

Natural duty accounts of political obligation purport to explain why citizens are duty-bound to support their country’s political institutions. In brief, natural duty approaches posit that the obligation to obey the law follows from a more general natural duty, such as the duty to maximize happiness, to promote justice, or to rescue others when they are sufficiently imperiled and can be rescued at no unreasonable cost to oneself. This chapter surveys natural duty approaches to political obligation, highlighting the relative strengths and weaknesses of these accounts. Special attention is devoted to the challenge the particularity requirement presents for natural duty approaches, as well as the issue of determining which general moral principle offers the most promising explanation of the obligation citizens have to support just civil institutions.

Rights forfeiture theory seeks to explain when and why punishment is permissible. While traditional accounts, such as retributivism or deterrence theory, identify morally valuable aims that punishment might secure, only a forfeiture theory of punishment successfully establishes why a wrongdoer’s rights are not violated when she is subjected to the hard treatment characteristic of punishment. This chapter aims to give an overview of forfeiture theory, clarify the concept, and discuss a number of puzzles and objections raised by the theory.

The dominance of the Abrahamic tradition in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion has led some to call for greater exploration of alternatives to the traditional conception of God, such as Pantheism, Ultimism, and Axiarchism. While we think this call for alternatives is important, we go in a different direction. Rather than explore and defend alternative conceptions of God, we defend a range of fairly traditional but non-religious conceptions of God. This range of views, from deism to philosophical theism, enjoys a variety of benefits over its religious competitors and deserves greater attention.

The United States carceral system, as currently designed and implemented, is widely considered to be an immoral and inhumane system of criminal punishment. There are a number of pressing issues related to this topic, but in this essay, I will focus upon the problem of prison violence. Inadequate supervision has resulted in unsafe prison conditions where inmates are regularly threatened with rape, assault, and other forms of physical violence. Such callous disregard and exposure to unreasonable risk constitutes a severe violation of the rights of prisoners by the state. While there have been numerous legal, political, and activist efforts to draw attention to this issue—with the goal of reforming and making prisons safer—my goal is different. I argue that inmates who are victims of prison violence should have their sentences automatically reduced. Two distinct arguments are advanced in support of this claim. First, I argue that acts of prison violence are a sort of state-mediated harm which can thus be appropriately described as punishment-constituting. Second, and more straightforwardly, I argue that the compensation owed to prisoners who are victims of prison violence may naturally take the form of a reduced sentence.

According to a rights forfeiture theory of punishment, liability to punishment hinges upon the notion that criminals forfeit their rights against hard treatment. In this paper, I assume the success of rights forfeiture theory in establishing the permissibility of punishment but aim to develop the view by considering how forfeited rights might be reclaimed. Built into the very notion of proportionate punishment is the idea that forfeited rights can be recovered. The interesting question is whether punishment is the sole means for reclaiming forfeited rights. I argue for a pluralistic theory of rights reclamation, according to which, there are multiple ways by which a wrongdoer can recapture her forfeited rights. In particular, I argue that offering remorseful compensation is a valid means by which a wrongdoer might partially, or fully, reclaim her right against punishment.

The first and greatest commandment according to Jesus, and so the one most central to Christian practice, is the command to love God. We argue that this commandment is best interpreted in aretaic rather than deontic terms. In brief, we argue that there is no obligation to love God. While bad, failure to seek and enjoy a union of love with God is not in violation of any general moral requirement. The core argument is straightforward: relations of intimacy should not be morally imposed upon autonomous beings. We contend that such reasoning applies to human beings’ relationship to God. So, even if our ultimate end is to enjoy communion with God, God has no right that human beings seek a relationship with him. If this is correct, then the command to ‘love God’ is not the sort of moral principle that can be supported by threats of hellfire or other forms of coercion.

A number of theologians and philosophers have found theodical value in the theme of divine solidarity with human suffering. To further develop this theme, I examine what it would mean to assert that Christ on the cross participated in a representative sample of human suffering. Particular attention is paid to Christ’s cry of dereliction. I argue that if God through Christ identified with the very worst kinds of human suffering on the cross, then the cry of dereliction should be interpreted as indicating an epistemic break between God and Christ, and not merely an attentional disruption. According to this account, Christ’s death cry expressed his temporary inability to grasp the significance of his passion and death. In this way, Christ on the cross suffered the full effects of divine hiddenness, thus sharing with horror-sufferers the experience of meaning-negating suffering.