William Casement

The topic of art forgery draws attention in many quarters: major art fraud schemes make big news, books are written that bring forgers fame, the buyers and sellers of art look for assurance they are getting the genuine article, authentication specialists strain to spot phony items, museums present special exhibitions of forgeries, and theorists tackle the topic on occasion ranging from a postmodern perspective extolling the virtues of forgery to more traditional concerns about its ontological status. The dark side of the art world is often brought into the light. Forgery is a commonly, if uncomfortably, recognized force. It might be assumed, then, that the meaning of the term “forgery” is uniformly established:...

The fourth and last chapter approaches the problem of indoctrination from another angle. It begins by questioning the possibility of designing an approach to moral education which is free of all vestiges of indoctrination. Then, the notion held by so many people today that it is of paramount importance for this to be done is rejected. It is suggested that instead of concentrating on how to eliminate indoctrination, we should ask what sort of indoctrination is least and what sort most acceptable. Approaches such as those of Simon and Kohlberg, if not as indoctrination-free as their originators have claimed, should be evaluated in terms of whether the indoctrination they effect is more acceptable or less acceptable than that effected by traditional approaches to moral education or by any other approach which has been designed. ;Given that a proper understanding of what indoctrination is has been established , next considered are the claims made by the two currently most popular approaches to moral education that they successfully avoid it. In chapter II a summary description is offered of the values clarification approach designed by Louis Raths and Sidney Simon. Next, it is shown that when considered from the perspective of the experience of the learner, values clarification is found likely to result in indoctrination. Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach is treated in similar fashion . A summary description is offered, followed by an explanation of how this approach may very well result in indoctrination. ;Indoctrination, then, is seen to be a major problem facing moral education. Those who wish to deal with the problem have approached it from a theoretical front as well as from a practical front. Various philosophers have tried to define just what indoctrination is or to explain when it is that we may say indoctrination has occurred. Many educators, less concerned with precisely defining its nature, have tried to develop programs of moral education which will be free of indoctrination. This study examines attempts made on both of these fronts. First considered is the question of what indoctrination is. It is shown that most philosophers who have dealt with this topic have given misleading accounts of it. It has been held generally that indoctrination is a matter of the method used by the teacher, or the content he has chosen to convey to his students, or his intention to indoctrinate, or some combination of these features. It is shown that a proper understanding of indoctrination, while not disregarding these features, must also focus on the experience of the learner. ;Today there is widespread concern among parents, teachers, and educational critics regarding the moral education of youth in our society. Many of these people are of the opinion that the schools have not been as active or effective as they should be in providing moral education. In response, efforts are being made to strengthen this aspect of the curriculum. Moral education, of course, is not something new, but during recent years it has been either neglected or treated only superficially by many educators for fear they might be guilty of indoctrination. Though fear of indoctrination still exists, there now seems to be a growing confidence that it may be successfully avoided while still maintaining an effective program of moral education in the classroom

In the writings of Husserl one can uncover what could be labeled a "critical" philosophy of history, as well as what some scholars have deemed a "speculative" philosophy of history. Concerning the former, Husserl offers three criticisms of historicism: the incapability of historicism to establish that any particular theory is false, the impossibility of demonstrating inductively that there are no absolute truths, and the paradox of the claim that there are no absolute truths, for it rests on an assumption of apodicticity. However, Husserl's own notion of the historical character of the life-world seems vulnerable to the assertion that it falls into an historicist position. His defense relies on the third of the above criticisms: that historicism should recognize its own fundamental assumption of apodicticity. Regarding a "speculative" philosophy of history, if Husserl demonstrates one, it is of a very limited sort, and it relies on his reading of the history of philosophy

Michael Polanyi is best known for his work in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Less frequently discussed, but still a significant aspect of his work, is his political theory. He is an advocate of a free society which is based on “spontaneous order.” This concept is apparent in an early collection of essays entitled The Logic of Liberty, and is emphasized again in his last book, Meaning. In the latter work, Polanyi's method of argumentation involves citing three objections to the endorsement of spontaneous order, and then offering a rebuttal to each. His discussion in this regard, while brief, provides an excellent opportunity for insight into a pivotal topic in his politics. In what follows here I will offer first a brief summary of Polanyi's position on spontaneous order and certain related concepts. Then I will examine his responses to the three objections he poses, and point out their deficiencies. Involved are a commonplace logical fallacy, the tendency to underestimate the power of economic interests and egoistic motivations, and, ultimately, an overstated and untenable epistemological position which does not adequately support, but instead undermines, his political position