According to the metalinguistic (or, as it is sometimes called, ‘name’ or ‘coreference’) view of the content of identity statements, to say that a is identical to b is to say that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are two names for one thing. This view has not proven popular. One of the most frequently made objections is the one commonly attributed to Frege, that this would make the discovery of an identity a linguistic discovery, which it generally isn’t. When we discover that, say, Hesperus is Phosphorus, we discov…
Read moreAccording to the metalinguistic (or, as it is sometimes called, ‘name’ or ‘coreference’) view of the content of identity statements, to say that a is identical to b is to say that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are two names for one thing. This view has not proven popular. One of the most frequently made objections is the one commonly attributed to Frege, that this would make the discovery of an identity a linguistic discovery, which it generally isn’t. When we discover that, say, Hesperus is Phosphorus, we discover something about astronomy, not about how the words ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are used. As I will, however, argue, this objection is not the silver bullet it is often made out to be. Even upon the metalinguistic view, to learn that Hesperus is Phosphorus is to learn something about astronomy: it is to learn something about the number of celestial bodies. If it is insisted, in reply to this, that the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus was exclusively an astronomical one, then we would be wise to demur, on a variety of grounds.
