William Edelglass

In the current academic climate, teaching is often seen as secondary to research. Teaching Philosophy seeks to bring teaching philosophy higher on the academic agenda.An international team of contributors, all of whom share the view that philosophy is a subject that can transform students, offers practical guidance and advice for teachers of philosophy. The book suggests ways in which the teaching of philosophy at undergraduate level might be facilitated. Some of the essays place the emphasis on individual self discovery, others focus on the wider political context, many offer practical ideas for enhancing the teaching of philosophy through exercises that engage students in often unconventional ways. The integration of students' views on teaching provides a necessary reminder that teaching is not a one-way process, but a project that will ultimately succeed through cooperation and a shared sense of achievement amongst participants

This chapter shows how some forms of Buddhist ethics share features with Western moral philosophies, especially virtue ethics and consequentialism. Interpreting various forms of Buddhist ethics with the aid of diverse Western moral theories can increase our understanding. The author suggests that no one Western meta‐ethical theory provides an adequate theoretical framework for grasping moral thinking in any of the major traditions of Buddhism and, a fortiori the vast and heterogeneously diverse tradition of Buddhism as a whole. Instead of translating Buddhist moral thinking into Western categories, scholars will understand Buddhist ethics better if approached, in the end, on its own terms, an approach that leads to a richer and more fertile philosophical dialogue.

The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy is an outstanding reference source to the principal philosophers in the diverse Buddhist traditions of India, from the early Pāli writings to the twentieth century. The Handbook provides thorough coverage of the most significant figures, texts and debates that animate Buddhist philosophy. A key feature is the attention given to the ideas and works of particular Buddhist thinkers, placing the author at the centre of inquiry. Forty chapters by an international team of contributors are divided into eight clear sections, each of which includes an introduction by the editors: Buddhas as Philosophers Poet Philosophers Abhidharma Philosophers Philosophical Founders Early Period Philosophical Commentators (fifth - eighth century) Middle Period Philosophical Commentators (eighth - ninth century) Late Period Philosophical Commentators (tenth - twelfth century) Modern Philosophers. Essential reading for students and researchers in Eastern and comparative philosophy and especially Buddhist philosophy, The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy will also be of interest to those studying Buddhism in religious studies and related subjects.

This book provides a set of introductions to each of the world's major non-European philosophical traditions. It offers the non-specialist a way into unfamiliar philosophical texts and methods and the opportunity to explore non-European philosophical terrain and to connect their work in one tradition to philosophical ideas or texts from another. Sections on Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, East Asian philosophy, African philosophy, and recent trends in global philosophy are each edited by an expert in the field. Each section includes a general introduction and a set of articles written by scholars, designed to provide a broad overview of a major topic or figure.

This essay arose from a collaborative project exploring the meaning of apophatic discourse in different religious traditions. I focus on the paradox of language as both liberating and ensnaring that resonates across the great diversity and heterogeneity of Buddhist traditions. Apophatic discourse is a widespread response to this paradox, as it is motivated by a recognition of the limits of words and concepts even as it seeks to point to that which is beyond these limits. The questions of whether there is a nonconceptual reality beyond the limits of words and concepts, and if so, what it might be, and why, precisely, language and reason are incapable of articulating nonconceptual reality, and what the role of language might be in leading beyond itself, are all sources of considerable debate among Buddhist thinkers. What is shared by figures with different responses to these questions is an understanding of apophasis as a form of Buddhist practice. The aim of Buddhist apophatic practice is to disrupt our natural linguistic attitude, in which we are beguiled by language, presupposing that our words and concepts somehow correspond with the ultimate nature of reality. How is apophatic discourse—enacting an awareness of the limits of language—meaningful if it cannot actually describe that which it is about? Buddhist apophatic discourses, such as ontological doctrines of ineffability, negations, and silence, are not simply pointing to ultimate reality, but are meaningful as transformative practices in the context of an interpretive community with shared soteriological goals and doctrines. Thus, even as apophatic discourse is ever transcending positive claims, it depends on kataphatic discourse to have any specific meaning.

This essay reviews four recent texts—two anthologies and two monographs—designed for environmental ethics or environmental philosophy courses. I describe the different approaches the authors and editors have chosen, and why, depending on the teaching context, one or another of these books may be the best choice for a particular group of students. The final pages briefly discuss elements I often weave into my own environmental philosophy courses, including drawing on the resources of particular places for teaching environmental philosophy, doing environmental art, and the kinds of practices developed by Joanna Macy and Christopher Uhl to explore what it means to live in a time of ecological crisis

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Between Two Worlds: East and West: An AutobiographyWilliam EdelglassBetween Two Worlds: East and West: An Autobiography. By J. N. Mohanty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. x + 134.The British philosopher Anthony Quinton once described J. N. Mohanty as "The one and only x who is a specialist in Navya-Nyāya, Husserl, and Frege." Between Two Worlds: East and West is the extraordinary story of Mohanty's career as a student, teacher, and scholar of Indian and German philosophy. Told against the backdrop of the struggle for Indian Independence, the trauma of partition, the intellectual and cultural glory of Calcutta, postwar Germany, and the United States of the last generation, Mohanty's story is a page-turner filled with fascinating anecdotes from his own life as well as the lives of the many remarkable thinkers and public figures he has encountered. It is also a story of the concrete historical situations that enabled Mohanty's singular contribution to philosophy: the decades of study with some of India's most learned paṇḍits, the opportunities offered during his years as a student in Göttingen, and his close collegial relationships with Aron Gurwitsch, Hans Jonas, and Hannah Arendt. Though he set out to write an autobiography that was explicitly not a philosophical text, Mohanty observes that "since my life has been primarily dedicated to the pursuit of philosophical ideas, the connection of the story of my life to my philosophical interests was almost unavoidable" (p. ix). In addition to brief discussions of some of the philosophical questions he has pursued in his previous writings, Mohanty here reflects on cultural identity, the life of the mind, and religion and spirituality, as well as social and political questions.Born in 1928, Mohanty enjoyed a pleasant and comfortable childhood supported by the loving attention of an extended family. (In this story families are adaptable, ever incorporating others into the love and care of a network grounded in mutual support, shared food, and conversation.) The family home was in the small village of Nilakaṇṭhapur (the seat of the blue-necked god, i.e., Śiva), where Mohanty's [End Page 139] father had been raised. His father had left the village for a successful career as a judge under the British Raj, bringing both social prominence and moderate wealth. But his father's career required periodic moves, and it was the village to which they regularly returned that Mohanty considered home. It is a pleasure to read Mohanty's descriptions of the cycle of the seasons, village life, local customs, family characters, and the rambling house with its temple and many rooms. Mohanty still thinks of himself as a "village boy," and these pages are written with much tenderness and enough historical background to contextualize his descriptions.Unlike his father, Mohanty was not educated in the village school. He himself was born in the regional capital of Cuttack and educated at the English government school in town. Mohanty has fond recollections of his teachers and the special school holidays, including the sports festivals, the single religious holiday observed by the school—the worship of the goddess of learning, Saraswati—and the distribution of prizes for academic distinction. Mohanty would inevitably receive numerous prizes. Later, at his matriculation from high school, Mohanty achieved the highest scores in all of Orissa, and stood first in the university following his studies of mathematics, logic, and Sanskrit in Cuttack. Upon completion of his study of philosophy and law at Presidency College (Calcutta), Mohanty again stood first in the First Class, and then again for his graduate work at Calcutta University. Mohanty's schooling was augmented with lessons from private tutors at home that preceded or followed the regular school hours. "Every morning," Mohanty writes, he and his siblingswould recite conjugations and declensions of Sanskrit verbs and nouns loud enough to be heard outside the house; we would compete to do it first. The pandit [Nilakantha Misra, Mohanty's first Sanskrit teacher] taught me all the grammar that I learnt later. He also taught this ten-year-old boy the primer of logic Tarkasaṃgraha, and Kalidāsa's Raghuvaṃśaṃ. (p. 6)Mohanty...

This paper provides an analysis of suffering and compassion in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas describes compassion as ‘the nexus of human subjectivity’ and the ‘supreme ethical principle’. In his early texts, suffering discloses the burden of being, the limits of the self, and thus the approach of alterity. Levinas’s later phenomenology of suffering as passive, meaningless, and evil, functions as a refutation of rational explanations of suffering. I argue that Levinasian substitution, the traumatic election to an excessive responsibility, is the compassionate suffering that Levinas terms the nexus of human subjectivity. For Levinas, ethics is the compassionate response to the vulnerable, suffering Other

William Edelglass - Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.1 154-155 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by William Edelglass Colby College John D. Dunne. Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy. Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004. Pp. xix + 467. Paper, $39.95. The diverse traditions of Buddhist thought in South Asia shared a belief that the Buddha's enlightenment was constituted by insight into the nature of reality. In addition to moral training and mental stability, "seeing things the way they really are" was considered necessary to achieve liberation from suffering. For this reason, Buddhist traditions in South Asia devoted much energy to philosophical analysis, contesting each other's claims concerning what exactly constituted the "right view" . Because non-Buddhist philosophical traditions also..

J. Baird Callicott claims that moral pluralism leads to relativism, skepticism, and the undermining of moral obligations. Buddhist ethics provides a counterexample to Callicott; it is a robust tradition of moral pluralism. Focusing on one of the most significant texts in Buddhist ethics, Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, I show how it draws on a multiplicity of moral principles determined by context and skillful means (upāya kauśalya). In contrast to Callicott’s description of pluralism as detrimental to moral life, I suggest that South Asian Buddhist traditions provide a model of moral reasoning that is both robust and flexible, a model appropriate for the many kinds of moral obligations that arise in the context of environmental ethics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?William EdelglassThe Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Edited by Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. viii + 398.As early as Bhāvaviveka (sixth century), Indian Buddhist doxographers situated important philosophers in schools and sub-schools characterized by adherence to distinct views, thereby providing a coherent, hierarchical presentation of the Buddha's teaching. In Tibet this practice continued and gained considerable importance: the pedagogical and hermeneutical significance of ordering texts occasioned widespread doxographical literary production.1 The doxographical projects, in which the systematic understanding of unchanging 'tenets' was privileged over the singular views of individual authors, were highly contested. Much of the disagreement was due to the multiplicity of interpretations bound to arise during a millennium of intellectual exchange. Doxographical hierarchy set the parameters of intellectual discourse, and thus the classification of tenets was not simply a matter of historical interest. Traditions were constructed in such a way that one's own thought would conform to an acceptable view, to say nothing of the complex relationship between political power and religious doctrine in Tibet. Despite the contested status of Tibetan doxographical categories, the classifications and distinctions that order much contemporary Western scholarship on Mahāyāna Buddhism in India were inherited from Tibet. Until recently, even the best research often uncritically employed dominant Tibetan classifications as basic interpretive categories and was thus able to bring order to an enormous body of literature.The most philosophically significant and vigorously contested classification in Tibetan doxography is the distinction between the Rang rgyud pa and the Thal 'gyur ba (sanskritized by modern scholars as 'Svātantrika' and 'Prāsaṅgika', respectively). The original locus of the discussion is three Indian commentaries on Nāgārjuna's (second century) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Buddhapālita (fifth-sixth centuries), in what is the oldest extant commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by a known author, followed Nāgārjuna's reductio ad absurdam form of argumentation, leading from the opponent's premise to an untenable consequence (prasaṅga, thal 'gyur). Shortly thereafter Bhāvaviveka claimed that for every prasan.ga argument in Nāgārjuna's text there is an unstated positive argument, and he criticized Buddhapālita for not utilizing the new methods of Buddhist logic to demonstrate the validity of Madhyamaka thought. Bhāvaviveka argued that Mādhyamikas ought to present formal probative (prayoga; sbyor ba) and autonomous (svatantraprayoga; rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) arguments and argued that inferential reasoning was necessary to establish the Madhyamaka view of emptiness. Candrakīrti (seventh century) then defended Buddhapālita, insisting that prasaṅga arguments were the only fitting method for a Mādhyamika because they do not require the affirmation of inherent nature. Roughly five centuries later, although Madhyamaka had already been divided according to a variety of classifications in India and Tibet, some Tibetan scholars retroactively characterized Bhāvaviveka as the founder of the Svātantrikas and Candrakīrti as the [End Page 415] founder of the Prāsaṅgikas. Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the most famous proponent of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, believed this debate was about more than methodological or epistemological questions: because autonomous argumentation requires inherently existing objects, even if only conventionally, he claimed that Svātantrikas were crypto-realists who deviated from Nāgārjuna's radical understanding of emptiness.Tsong kha pa's analysis of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, and therefore Madhyamaka philosophy in general, came to dominate Western scholarly research. However, in the last few decades there has been considerable exploration of the forces and influences that contributed to the emergence of conflicting Tibetan doxographical systems.2 This research program has been significantly furthered with the publication of The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Because the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is a Tibetan conceptual construction based on Indian commentaries, an understanding of the issues involved requires a careful analysis of the Indian sources, an investigation of the growth of the various doxographies in Tibet...