William Grant Ray

This article offers a narrative of moral development for Kantian practical philosophy. It does so by bringing together elemental features of the two most prominent traditions concerned with the moral psychology of moral development: the Freudian-psychoanalytic tradition, which is principally concerned with an authority relation (the parent-child relation), and the Piagetian stage theory tradition, which is principally concerned with an equality relation (the peer relation). The fundamental Freudian insight is that our ability to subject impulsiveness to rule is explained by our introjecting the parental figure as an authoritative aspect of the psyche, the superego. David Velleman suitably revised this insight to be fit for Kantian purposes: our idealization of the parent supports their introjection not just as superego but as ego-ideal and thus represents a genuine standard of practical reason. But the parental relation cannot be the whole story because of the paternalistic nature of that relation: moral persons are self-legislative, and the authority of the parent is licensed by a recognition of the child as less than self-legislative. The fundamental Piagetian insight, making up for this lack, is that peer relations, constituted by acts of co-legislation, are predicated on the reciprocal recognition of self-legislation (e.g., children’s games require and respect the authoritative assent of each). But Piaget denies necessary, positive contributions from the parental relation—authority cannot give way to equality without contradiction. In showing how authority can give way to equality, as providing its necessary basis, this article brings together parents and peers as essential contributors to development.

The social contract tradition, I conjecture, is constituted by an understanding of peoples as persons. I explore this conjecture in investigating one substantial contribution to the tradition: Rousseau's. It is in the systematic consideration of the nature of persons, defined with respect to autonomy that the heart of his social contract theory may be understood. I argue that 'arguments from principle' in Rousseau originate from (1) considering the autonomy of individual citizens, and (2) considering the autonomy of the whole of the people as a person. The first produces a constraint on the content of laws (that they are oriented to the common good), and the second produces a constraint on the form of laws, or the way they may be permissibly given (that legislative right remains always the people's alone, and that its transfer, in despotism or representation, is collective enslavement). The latter allows us to understand Rousseau's principled argument for democracy. A crucial insight for political philosophy: further than personhood delimiting how citizens may be treated or relate to each other, personhood may delimit also the shape of social-institutional organization (namely, in conformance with one's conception of what it takes for the social totality to be a person).