William Hunt

This paper presents an explanation of how Guilio Tononi’s integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) can be used to justify libertarian free will. His theory places emphasis on the intrinsic power of the conscious state, and the existence of such a power provides the libertarian with the means needed to defend their position in the face of sustained criticism, be it a priori or evidential. My argument commences with an explication of my understanding of libertarian free will, beginning with a definition comprising several criteria. I engage with these criteria to some degree, placing emphasis on the central criterion; that is, the intrinsic power of self-determination. From there I turn to Tononi’s theory to demonstrate how it can provide an ontological explanation of this power. IIT is a relatively new theory, and as such there are criticisms of it which I address; notwithstanding, it is a theory in progress, and its future looks promising, not only as an explanation of consciousness, but also by providing credibility to the committed libertarian.

This argument for free will is a probabilistic one based upon two conjectures: first, that of consensus; namely, that a large majority of people believe that they and others have free will and second, that a priori proofs against the existence of free will either fail or remain questionable. If these two conjectures hold, an inductive argument follows on the basis of beliefs founded upon justified auxiliary assumptions, assumptions that ensure a well-defined probabilistic relationship between the evidence of consensus and the proposition free will exists in an elaborated form. I will then demonstrate, through subjective Bayesian confirmation theory, that such evidence probabilistically confirms this proposition. Moreover, if one’s prior degree of belief in the existence of free will is not very low - prior that is to consideration of the evidence - then, provided this evidence is factual, it is likely that one’s resultant degree of belief in the veracity of the proposition is not only rational, but also compelling.