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13A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in NarrativeIn Janyce M. Wiebe & William J. Rapaport (eds.), A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in Narrative, Association For Computational Linguistics. 1988.Narrative passages told from a character's perspective convey the character's thoughts and perceptions. We present a discourse process that recognizes characters' thoughts and perceptions in third-person narrative. An effect of perspective on reference in narrative is addressed: References in passages told from the perspective of a character reflect the character's beliefs. An algorithm that uses the results of our discourse process to understand references with respect to an appropriate set of …Read more
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132Is Artificial General Intelligence Impossible?Cosmos+Taxis 12 (5+6): 5-22. 2024.In their Why Machines Will Never Rule the World, Landgrebe and Smith (2023) argue that it is impossible for artificial general intelligence (AGI) to succeed, on the grounds that it is impossible to perfectly model or emulate the “complex” “human neurocognitive system”. However, they do not show that it is logically impossible; they only show that it is practically impossible using current mathematical techniques. Nor do they prove that there could not be any other kinds of theories than those in…Read more
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213Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological OntologyGrazer Philosophische Studien 26 (1): 61-95. 1985.This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology"--the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Aussersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.
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253Critical Review of Minds, Brains and ScienceNoûs 22 (4): 585-609. 1988.Critical Review of Searle's Minds, Brains and Science
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10Meinong and the Principle of Independence. Its Place in Meinong's Theory of Objects and Its Significance in Contemporary Philosophical LogicJournal of Symbolic Logic 51 (1): 248-252. 1986.
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519Computers Are Syntax All the Way Down: Reply to BozşahinMinds and Machines 29 (2): 227-237. 2019.A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.
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503Syntax, Semantics, and Computer ProgramsPhilosophy and Technology 33 (2): 309-321. 2020.Turner argues that computer programs must have purposes, that implementation is not a kind of semantics, and that computers might need to understand what they do. I respectfully disagree: Computer programs need not have purposes, implementation is a kind of semantic interpretation, and neither human computers nor computing machines need to understand what they do.
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12Gordon Plotkin and Colin Stirling. A framework for intuitionistic modal logics. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 399–406 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 669. 1988.
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18Stanley J. Rosenschein and Leslie Pack Kaelbling. The synthesis of digital machines with provable epistemic properties. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 83–98 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 664. 1988.
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22Gerhard Lakemeyer. Steps towards a first-order logic of explicit and implicit belief. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 325–340 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 668. 1988.
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14Fred Landman. Pegs and alecs. An abridged version of LIII 656. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 45–61 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 662-663. 1988.
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24Jim Des Rivières and Hector J. Levesque. The consistency of syntactical treatments of knowledge. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 115–130 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 665-666. 1988.
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24Raymond M. Smullyan. Logicians who reason about themselves. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 341–352 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 668-669. 1988.
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14Leora Morgenstern. A first order theory of planning, knowledge, and action. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 99–114 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 664-665. 1988.
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10Jaakko Hintikka. Reasoning about knowledge in philosophy: the paradigm of epistemic logic. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 63–80 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 663-664. 1988.
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13Kurt Konolige. What awareness isn't: a sentential view of implicit and explicit belief. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 241–250 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 667-668. 1988.
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9Joseph Y. Halpern. Reasoning about knowledge: an overview. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 1–17 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 660-661. 1988.
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16Brian Cantwell Smith. Varieties of self-reference. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 19–43 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 661-662. 1988.
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130Computers Are Syntax All the Way Down: Reply to BozşahinMinds and Machines 29 (2): 227-237. 2019.A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.
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278Meinongian Semantics and Artificial IntelligenceHumana Mente 6 (25): 25-52. 2013.This essay describes computational semantic networks for a philosophical audience and surveys several approaches to semantic-network semantics. In particular, propositional semantic networks are discussed; it is argued that only a fully intensional, Meinongian semantics is appropriate for them; and several Meinongian systems are presented.
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88What is a Computer? A SurveyMinds and Machines 28 (3): 385-426. 2018.A critical survey of some attempts to define ‘computer’, beginning with some informal ones, then critically evaluating those of three philosophers, and concluding with an examination of whether the brain and the universe are computers.
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1288How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese RoomMinds and Machines 16 (4): 381-436. 2006.A computer can come to understand natural language the same way Helen Keller did: by using “syntactic semantics”—a theory of how syntax can suffice for semantics, i.e., how semantics for natural language can be provided by means of computational symbol manipulation. This essay considers real-life approximations of Chinese Rooms, focusing on Helen Keller’s experiences growing up deaf and blind, locked in a sort of Chinese Room yet learning how to communicate with the outside world. Using the SNeP…Read more
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728A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in NarrativeIn Janyce M. Wiebe & William J. Rapaport (eds.), A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in Narrative, Association For Computational Linguistics. pp. 131-138. 1988.Narrative passages told from a character's perspective convey the character's thoughts and perceptions. We present a discourse process that recognizes characters'.
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46Meinong, Defective Objects, and (Psycho-)Logical ParadoxGrazer Philosophische Studien 18 (1): 17-39. 1982.Alexius Meinong developed a notion of defective objects in order to account for various logical and psychological paradoxes. The notion is of historical interest, since it presages recent work on the logical paradoxes by Herzberger and Kripke. But it fails to do the job it was designed for. However, a technique implicit in Meinong's investigation is more successful and can be adapted to resolve a similar paradox discovered by Romane Clark in a revised version of Meinong's Theory of Objects due t…Read more
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110Unsolvable Problems and Philosophical ProgressAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 19 (4). 1982.Philosophy has been characterized (e.g., by Benson Mates) as a field whose problems are unsolvable. This has often been taken to mean that there can be no progress in philosophy as there is in mathematics or science. The nature of problems and solutions is considered, and it is argued that solutions are always parts of theories, hence that acceptance of a solution requires commitment to a theory (as suggested by William Perry's scheme of cognitive development). Progress can be had in philosophy …Read more
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110How minds can be computational systemsJournal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4): 403-419. 1998.The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Test± passing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this…Read more
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1412Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be ComputingInternational Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems 2 (1): 32-71. 2012.In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, I argue that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. I also argue that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are s…Read more
Buffalo, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Computation, Misc |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
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