William J. Talbott

"In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses that framework to propose a new way of understanding rational belief. His proposal makes epistemology relevant to the real world, which he illustrates with a new theory of racial, gender and other kinds of prejudice, a new diagnosis of the sources of the inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, and insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth. Talbott's new model of rational belief is not a model of a theorem prover in mathematics. It is a model of a good learner. Being a good learner requires sensitivity to clues, the maginative ability to generate alternative explanatory narratives that fit the clues, and the ability to select the most coherent explanatory narrative. Sensitivity to clues requires sensitivity not only to evidence that supports one's own beliefs, but also to evidence that casts doubt on them. One of the most important characteristics of a good learner is the ability to correct mistakes. Talbott articulates nine principles that help to explain the difference between rational and irrational belief. Talbott contrasts his approach with the approach of historically important philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Kuhn. He also contrasts his approach with a variety of contemporary approaches, including pragmatism, Bayesianism, and naturalism. He responds to the main criticisms of his method from the experimental philosophy literature"--

Allen Buchanan’s ‘The Heart of Human Rights’ addresses the moral justification of the international legal human rights system. Buchanan identifies two functions of the ILHRS: a well-being function and a status egalitarian function. Because Buchanan assumes that the well-being function is sufficientarian, he augments it with a status egalitarian function. However, if the well-being function is utilitarian or prioritarian, there is no need for a separate status egalitarian function, because the status egalitarian function can be subsumed by the utilitarian or prioritarian well-being function.

The author uses a series of potential counterexamples to argue against attempts by Bergmann and Plantinga to articulate a distinction between malignant and benign epistemic circularity and, more radically, to argue that epistemic circularity per se is no fallacy, and the concept of epistemic circularity plays no role in the explanation of why some instances of epistemic circularity are irrational. The author contrasts an inferential framework, in which circularity is a problem, with an equilibrium framework, in which the concept of circularity plays no useful role and argues that defeasible reasoning can only be understood in an equilibrium, not an inferential, framework. The author uses an example of reasoning about the reliability of one’s own memory to explain how seemingly malignant epistemic circularity can be rational in an equilibrium framework. The author discusses the relevance of this conclusion to two contemporary issues: the cogency of Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism and the evolutionary naturalists’ challenges to non-naturalist moral realism—and, indeed, to all forms of non-naturalist normative realism.

This chapter replies to some standard objections to consequentialist moral principle, including the problem of expensive tastes, and R. Dworkin’s circularity objection. The chapter compares the main principle with Rawls’s resource-based theory of primary goods and the capabilities theories of Nussbaum and Sen. It then compares the main principle with J. S. Mill’s utilitarian principle and Rawls’s maximin expectation principle. This requires a further development of the idea of life prospects. The chapter then shows that both Mill’s and Rawls’s principles have a distributional blindspot and explains why the main principle does not. As a heuristic for making determinations of the equitable promotion of life prospects, the chapter defines an expanded original position that makes it possible to extend the application of the main principle extend beyond the application of Rawls’s principles to include those with special health care needs and those with severe mental or physical impairments. The chapter explains why the main principle is prioritarian, rather than egalitarian or sufficientarian. It explains how the application of the main principle to social practices solves the problem of descriptive relativity. Finally, he explains his reasons for classifying the main principle as a consequentialist principle of moral improvement.

This chapter shows how the main principle points the way to a solution to the two deepest mysteries in moral philosophy, one metaphysical and one epistemological. The metaphysical mystery is to explain why moral norms and principles always seem to have exceptions. The epistemological mystery is to explain how human beings could come to recognize exceptions to the very moral norms and principles that were used in their moral training. The solution to the metaphysical mystery is to see that moral reasoning has a reference class logic, modeled by conditional probability. The solution to the epistemological mystery is to see that moral training can produce practical wisdom, understood as implicit sensitivity to the main principle. The chapter also reviews the historical discovery of the paradox of direct consequentialism to explain why the main principle does not endorse a change to using it as a ground-level moral principle. The chapter then compares the book's account of legal improvement with R. Dworkin’s account of law as integrity on the issue of retroactivity in the civil law.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident..." So begins the U.S. Declaration of Independence. What follows those words is a ringing endorsement of universal rights, but it is far from self-evident. Why did the authors claim that it was? William Talbott suggests that they were trapped by a presupposition of Enlightenment philosophy: That there was only one way to rationally justify universal truths, by proving them from self-evident premises. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the authors of the U.S. Declaration had no infallible source of moral truth. For example, many of the authors of the Declaration of Independence endorsed slavery. The wrongness of slavery was not self-evident; it was a moral discovery. In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, J.S. Mill, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned how to adopt a distinctively moral point of view from which it is possible to make universal, though not infallible, judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral point of view has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic rights. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is neither imperialistic nor relativistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots. Talbott's book speaks to not only debates on human rights but to broader issues of moral and cultural relativism, and will interest a broad range of readers.

This chapter applies the Millian epistemology to ground a robust, inalienable right to freedom of expression and to ground the other autonomy rights, as necessary for the process of the social process of the free give-and-take of opinion. The chapter considers a variety of exceptions to freedom of expression, including product advertising and political advertising. He uses the examples of Google and Wikipedia to provide empirical confirmation for Mill’s claims about the social process of the free give-and-take of opinion. He also shows how the Millian case for freedom of propositional expression can be extended to cover nonpropositional expression in art and literature. The chapter shows that the Millian argument does not limit freedom of expression to reasonable views. The chapter argues that the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive views, which plays a large role in Rawls’s theory and in contemporary discussions of human rights, cannot support the weight that it is intended to bear. This leads to an extended discussion of intolerant subversive advocacy, in which the chapter argues that neither Habermas’s nor Rawls’s theory can explain why the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the Smith Act in Dennis v. U.S. was erroneous. The chapter also explains why Mill’s social process epistemology does not undermine his political philosophy. The author concludes by explaining why the main principle would endorse a human right to freedom of expression.

In this chapter, Talbott explains how the Proof paradigm, a model of top-down reasoning, has led to a serious misunderstanding of how moral judgments are epistemically justified. Talbott develops an alternative equilibrium model of moral reasoning based on the work of Mill, Rawls, and Habermas and uses it to show how bottom-up reasoning could have led to the discovery of human rights. Talbott uses the U.S. Constitution to illustrate the idea that guarantees of basic human rights are components of a self-improving self-regulating system for promoting justice. The system does not have to begin with self-evident or even true principles of justice. Bottom-up reasoning can lead to changes that make it more just over time.

In this chapter, Talbott explains the development of women’s rights as a response to the cultural universal of paternalistically justified patriarchal norms that severely limit opportunities for women. Talbott uses evolutionary psychology to explain why norms that severely limit opportunities for women are cultural universals and to show how it is possible to question even culturally universal justifications from the moral standpoint. Talbott uses the evidence of violence against women and the examples of footbinding and female genital cutting to explain how social enforcement can make oppressive norms stable and can even motivate voluntary compliance with them. Talbott also explains how certain kinds of paternalist justifications for patriarchal norms can be self-reinforcing. Talbott explains how the development of women’s rights fits the model of the extension of rights to white, male property owners, then to white male non-property-owners, then to males in other racial and ethnic groups. In each case, the extension of rights is a guarantee of a sphere of autonomy, in a sense to be explained in the next chapter. Talbott gives the example of the Senegalese organization Tostan as a model of how to advocate universal human rights, and thus autonomy, without being a moral imperialist. Talbott concludes with an explanation of why cultural relativism about internal norms is too wishy-washy.

This chapter compares a system of human rights guarantees of security with libertarian natural rights. Security rights are a solution to a collective action problem that would arise in a state of nature with libertarian natural rights, the internal security problem. To be endorsed by the main principle, a solution to that problem requires guarantees of procedural rights, which have no analog in natural rights. The chapter discusses various problems that have been thought to be fatal to consequentialism: the problem of intentionally punishing the innocent, and the related problem of inadvertently punishing the innocent, which is a challenging one for nonconsequentialists; strict criminal liability; and organ harvesting. The discussion of inadvertently punishing the innocent leads to a consideration of the doctrine of double effect. The chapter concludes the chapter with a comparison of his account with Judith Thomson’s trade-off idea, illustrated by the trolley cases.

This author shows how the main principle would endorse a new ground-level principle of weak legal paternalism, the most reliable judgment standard, and compares this standard with the most influential nonconsequentialist standard, Joel Feinberg’s voluntariness standard. The most reliable judgment standard will permit legal paternalism if it is reasonable to believe that the subject will or would come to unequivocally endorse it. The chapter illustrates the difference between his and Feinberg’s standards with hypothetical examples of drug and suicide prohibitions. The chapter explains his consequentialist account of autonomy and shows how that account fits the legal standard of autonomy. However, it does not fit the standard statement of the insanity defense. The chapter explains why the insanity defense should be revised.

This chapter introduces the project of this book, the consequentialist project for human rights, historically by relating it to J. S. Mill’s consequentialist project for autonomy rights and the early Rawls’s consequentialist project for liberal rights. The project is to identify a consequentialist principle of moral improvement, the main principle, to explain why it is superior to other nonconsequentialist principles, and to use it to explain why government guarantees of fourteen robust, inalienable human rights would be a moral improvement in any society anywhere on earth.

This chapter introduces a consequentialist meta-theoretic sufficient condition for a change in moral practices to be a moral improvement, the main principle. The chapter introduces the main principle by considering a series of examples of exceptions to libertarianism, especially to norms against coercion. The chapter also considers various purported counterexamples to consequentialist principles, including Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain example. The chapter presents the main principle as a multiple time-slice end-state principle of moral reciprocity and explains the key terms, though he can’t define here.

In this chapter, Talbott considers the Hobbesian social contract defense of autocracy as necessary to solve its citizens’ collective action problems. He argues that human beings are able to form stable rights-respecting democracies that solve their collective action problems, because while human beings are not angels, neither are they devils. He reviews Sen’s research on famines and psychological research on the ultimatum game and related games to show that most people are willing to incur at least small costs to promote fairness. Therefore, rights-respecting democracies are able to solve the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem to become more just over time. They are self-improving, self-regulating systems. Examples of movements of non-violent resistance illustrate the process. The chapter concludes with a complete list of the basic human rights.

In this reply to his three critics, Talbott develops several important themes from his book, Which Rights Should Be Universal?, in ways that go beyond the discussion in the book. Among them are the following: the prescriptive role of human rights theory; the need to guarantee an expansive list of basic rights as a basis for a government to be able to claim recognitional legitimacy; the futility of trying to define human rights in terms of what there can be reasonable disagreement about; and the problems for any proceduralist account of human rights. Talbott also further elaborates his consequentialist defense of basic human rights and his arguments against cultural relativism about human rights

In his path-breaking recent book, Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman brings academic epistemology to bear on important real world issues in information technology, the media, science, law, politics, and education. Though the project that Goldman undertakes ramifies in many directions, the motivating idea is simple. Knowledge is important. Social institutions and practices can and should be evaluated on how well or how poorly they contribute to knowledge of propositions of interest. This is Goldman’s criterion of veritistic value, which, he acknowledges, is only one of the criteria for evaluating social practices. Taken as a whole, this book is one of the most effective explanations in the philosophical literature of why truth matters, both theoretically and in practice.

This chapter uses the main principle to explain why economic rights should be regarded as human rights. Property rights, contract rights, and other economic rights are a solution to the productive investment CAP. Property and contract rights are not defined a priori, but should be defined in a way that they will, as a practice, do the best job of equitably promoting life prospects. The chapter uses the main principle to explain the moral appropriateness of the contours of property rights to both tangible and intangible property; exceptions to contracts, including unconscionability, implied warranties, strict liability, mandatory disclosure, bankruptcy; the replacement of caveat emptor with caveat venditor in win-win contracts; market economies; negative income tax; voluntary consent to economic and other transactions; prohibitions on slavery contracts; minimum wage legislation. The chapter contrasts his account with fair starting-point theories of justice, including Ronald Dworkin’s theory. He also contrasts his account with Richard Posner’s account of the common law in terms of economic efficiency.

This chapter briefly reviews the evolution in decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court of what was originally identified as a privacy right but is now correctly identified as a liberty right against legal paternalism. The chapter uses the main principle to trace the contours of what this right should include: right to religious freedom; a right to sexual freedom; a right to reproductive freedom; a right to refuse medical treatment, including a right to refuse extraordinary care and to be removed from life support; a right to marry that includes same sex marriage; a right to suicide and assisted suicide in certain end-of-life situations. The chapter also explains why there should be human rights to spatial privacy and informational privacy.

In this chapter, Talbott considers various interpretations of the term “human rights.” He proposes an account of basic human rights as the necessary legal guarantees for a government to be legitimate, even if not necessarily just, and explains why his proposal is an improvement over Rawls's account. He contrasts his response to moral relativism with the defensive response taken by other advocates of universal human rights, exemplified by Waldron. Talbott articulates a new way of understanding human rights claims as epistemically modest but metaphysically immodest. He identifies two ways of being a moral imperialist and claims that his defense of universal human rights will avoid both kinds of moral imperialism.

This chapter contrasts his consequentialist account of democratic rights with prominent nonconsequentialist accounts, including those of Rawls, Habermas, Barry, and Waldron. He explains why majority rule itself requires a consequentialist rationale. To illustrate that the rationale for democratic rights is consequentialist, the chapter proposes an alternative to democratic rights, election by deliberative poll, that would be an improvement under the main principle, were it not for the potential for abuse. Democratic rights are a solution to a CAP. To be endorsed by the main principle, democratic rights must equitably promote the life prospects of all compliers and nonresponsible noncompliers. The chapter argues that group rights or cultural rights are not fundamental rights, but rather rights that are instrumental to protecting the individual rights of members of minorities against majorities. The chapter shows that the main principle can explain why human rights, including democratic rights, should be inalienable. This is a puzzle on many nonconsequentialist views. The chapter describes one kind of problem that no form of government, not even democracy, is very good at solving, the time lag problem. Finally, the chapter discusses the inappropriateness of the U.S. Supreme Court’s overturning campaign finance reform laws on free speech grounds.