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William L. Harper
University of Western Ontario
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    55
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 More details
  • University of Western Ontario
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
  • University of Western Ontario
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
University of Rochester
PhD, 1974
Homepage
London, ON, Canada
Areas of Interest
Game Theory, Misc
  • All publications (55)
  •  387
    Consilience and Natural Kind Reasoning (in Newton's Argument for Universal Gravitation) in An Intimate Relation. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science
    Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 116 115-152. 1989.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsHistory of Physics
  •  254
    Michael Friedman on Kant and Newton
    Dialogue 39 (2): 279-. 2000.
    Isaac NewtonKant: Metaphysics and Epistemology, MiscKant: Science, Logic, and Mathematics, Misc
  •  246
    Inferences from phenomena in gravitational physics
    with Robert DiSalle
    Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 54. 1996.
    Newton's methodology emphasized propositions "inferred from phenomena." These rest on systematic dependencies that make phenomena measure theoretical parameters. We consider the inferences supporting Newton's inductive argument that gravitation is proportional to inertial mass. We argue that the support provided by these systematic dependencies is much stronger than that provided by bootstrap confirmation; this kind of support thus avoids some of the major objections against bootstrapping. Final…Read more
    Newton's methodology emphasized propositions "inferred from phenomena." These rest on systematic dependencies that make phenomena measure theoretical parameters. We consider the inferences supporting Newton's inductive argument that gravitation is proportional to inertial mass. We argue that the support provided by these systematic dependencies is much stronger than that provided by bootstrap confirmation; this kind of support thus avoids some of the major objections against bootstrapping. Finally we examine how contemporary testing of equivalence principles exemplifies this Newtonian methodological theme
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsPhilosophy of Physics, Miscellaneous
  •  219
    Bayesian learning models with revision of evidence
    Philosophia 7 (2): 357-367. 1978.
    Bayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  173
    Mixed strategies and ratifiability in causal decision theory
    Erkenntnis 24 (1). 1986.
    Causal Decision Theory
  •  112
    Kant on space, empirical realism and the foundations of geometry
    Topoi 3 (2): 143-161. 1984.
    Kant: Philosophy of MathematicsKant: SpaceValue TheoryValue Theory, MiscellaneousAutonomy
  •  109
    Model selection, simplicity, and scientific inference
    with Wayne C. Myrvold
    Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3). 2002.
    The Akaike Information Criterion can be a valuable tool of scientific inference. This statistic, or any other statistical method for that matter, cannot, however, be the whole of scientific methodology. In this paper some of the limitations of Akaikean statistical methods are discussed. It is argued that the full import of empirical evidence is realized only by adopting a richer ideal of empirical success than predictive accuracy, and that the ability of a theory to turn phenomena into accurate,…Read more
    The Akaike Information Criterion can be a valuable tool of scientific inference. This statistic, or any other statistical method for that matter, cannot, however, be the whole of scientific methodology. In this paper some of the limitations of Akaikean statistical methods are discussed. It is argued that the full import of empirical evidence is realized only by adopting a richer ideal of empirical success than predictive accuracy, and that the ability of a theory to turn phenomena into accurate, agreeing measurements of causally relevant parameters contributes to the evidential support of the theory. This is illustrated by Newton's argument from orbital phenomena to the inverse-square law of gravitation.
    Theoretical VirtuesBayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  100
    Rational belief change, Popper functions and counterfactuals
    Synthese 30 (1-2). 1975.
    This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
    Subjunctive Conditionals, MiscBayesian Reasoning, MiscPopper: Philosophy of ProbabilityUpdating Prin…Read more
    Subjunctive Conditionals, MiscBayesian Reasoning, MiscPopper: Philosophy of ProbabilityUpdating Principles
  •  99
    Papier mâché problems in epistemology: A defense of strong internalism
    Synthese 116 (1): 27-49. 1998.
    I attempt to persuade the reader that externalism admits of no plausible interpretation. I argue that reliability is a concept with very different contours from epistemic justification, and that attempts to explicate justification in terms of reliability must fail. I address several other forms of externalism, and also mixed forms of justification. I then argue that externalist theories of justification cannot close the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I suggest that a fourth conditio…Read more
    I attempt to persuade the reader that externalism admits of no plausible interpretation. I argue that reliability is a concept with very different contours from epistemic justification, and that attempts to explicate justification in terms of reliability must fail. I address several other forms of externalism, and also mixed forms of justification. I then argue that externalist theories of justification cannot close the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I suggest that a fourth condition on knowledge is required, regardless of whether justification is internalist or externalist. I argue that with such a fourth condition a strong internalist theory of justification is adequate to the task that remains in making true belief knowledge. Additionally, strong internalism is more satisfying to our intuitions than externalism and mixed forms of justification.
    Epistemic Internalism and Externalism
  •  96
    Kant's empirical realism and the second analogy of experience
    Synthese 47 (3). 1981.
    Kant: Transcendental IdealismKant: TimeKant: Causation
  •  91
    Bayesian chance
    with Sheldon J. Chow and Gemma Murray
    Synthese 186 (2): 447-474. 2012.
    This paper explores how the Bayesian program benefits from allowing for objective chance as well as subjective degree of belief. It applies David Lewis’s Principal Principle and David Christensen’s principle of informed preference to defend Howard Raiffa’s appeal to preferences between reference lotteries and scaling lotteries to represent degrees of belief. It goes on to outline the role of objective lotteries in an application of rationality axioms equivalent to the existence of a utility assi…Read more
    This paper explores how the Bayesian program benefits from allowing for objective chance as well as subjective degree of belief. It applies David Lewis’s Principal Principle and David Christensen’s principle of informed preference to defend Howard Raiffa’s appeal to preferences between reference lotteries and scaling lotteries to represent degrees of belief. It goes on to outline the role of objective lotteries in an application of rationality axioms equivalent to the existence of a utility assignment to represent preferences in Savage’s famous omelet example of a rational choice problem. An example motivating causal decision theory illustrates the need for representing subjunctive dependencies to do justice to intuitive examples where epistemic and causal independence come apart. We argue to extend Lewis’s account of chance as a guide to epistemic probability to include De Finetti’s convergence results. We explore Diachronic Dutch book arguments as illustrating commitments for treating transitions as learning experiences. Finally, we explore implications for Martingale convergence results for motivating commitment to objective chances
    Chance-Credence PrinciplesBayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  80
    Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen
    with Alan Hajek
    Dialogue 36 (1): 91-. 1997.
    The Nature of BeliefDegrees of Belief
  •  67
    Newton’s Methodology and Mercury’s Perihelion Before and After Einstein
    Philosophy of Science 74 (5): 932-942. 2007.
    Newton's methodology is significantly richer than the hypothetico-deductive model. It is informed by a richer ideal of empirical success that requires not just accurate prediction but also accurate measurement of parameters by the predicted phenomena. It accepts theory-mediated measurements and theoretical propositions as guides to research. All of these enrichments are exemplified in the classical response to Mercury's perihelion problem. Contrary to Kuhn, Newton's method endorses the radical t…Read more
    Newton's methodology is significantly richer than the hypothetico-deductive model. It is informed by a richer ideal of empirical success that requires not just accurate prediction but also accurate measurement of parameters by the predicted phenomena. It accepts theory-mediated measurements and theoretical propositions as guides to research. All of these enrichments are exemplified in the classical response to Mercury's perihelion problem. Contrary to Kuhn, Newton's method endorses the radical transition from his theory to Einstein's. The richer themes of Newton's method are strikingly realized in a challenge to general relativity from a new problem posed by Mercury's perihelion. †To contact the author, please write to: Talbot College, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7; e-mail: wlharp@uwo.ca.
    Isaac NewtonClassical MechanicsHistory of PhysicsHypothetico-Deductive MethodGeneral RelativityScien…Read more
    Isaac NewtonClassical MechanicsHistory of PhysicsHypothetico-Deductive MethodGeneral RelativityScientific Revolutions
  •  59
    Do the EPR correlations pose a problem for causal decision theory?
    with Adam Koberinski and Lucas Dunlap
    Synthese 1-12. 2017.
    We argue that causal decision theory is no worse off than evidential decision theory in handling entanglement, regardless of one’s preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics. In recent works, Ahmed and Ahmed and Caulton : 4315–4352, 2014) have claimed the opposite; we argue that they are mistaken. Bell-type experiments are not instances of Newcomb problems, so CDT and EDT do not diverge in their recommendations. We highlight the fact that a Causal Decision Theorist should take all lawlike cor…Read more
    We argue that causal decision theory is no worse off than evidential decision theory in handling entanglement, regardless of one’s preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics. In recent works, Ahmed and Ahmed and Caulton : 4315–4352, 2014) have claimed the opposite; we argue that they are mistaken. Bell-type experiments are not instances of Newcomb problems, so CDT and EDT do not diverge in their recommendations. We highlight the fact that a Causal Decision Theorist should take all lawlike correlations into account, including potentially acausal entanglement correlations. This paper also provides a brief introduction to CDT with a motivating “small” Newcomb problem. The main point of our argument is that quantum theory does not provide grounds for favouring EDT over CDT.
    Quantum Nonlocality, MiscEvidential Decision TheoryCausal Decision Theory
  •  57
    Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives
    with Ellery Eells
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1). 1991.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Decision-Theoretic Frameworks, MiscCausal Decision Theory
  •  52
    Comments on I. J. good
    Synthese 30 (1-2). 1975.
    Value Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  51
    On Newton’s method: William L. Harper: Isaac Newton’s scientific method: Turning data into evidence about gravity and cosmology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 360pp, $75 HB (review)
    with Nick Huggett, George E. Smith, and David Marshall Miller
    Metascience 22 (2): 215-246. 2013.
    Isaac Newton
  •  51
    Knowledge and luck
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (3): 273-283. 1996.
    Epistemic Luck
  •  47
    Letters to the Editor
    with Sandra Lee Bartky, Marilyn Friedman, Alison M. Jaggar, Richard H. Miller, Abigail L. Rosenthal, Naomi Scheman, Nancy Tuana, Steven Yates, Christina Sommers, Philip E. Devine, Harry Deutsch, Michael Kelly, and Charles L. Reid
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 65 (7). 1992.
    Feminist Philosophy, Misc
  •  41
    Kant on incongruent counterparts
    In James Van Cleve & Robert E. Frederick (eds.), The Philosophy of Right and Left, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 263-313. 1991.
    Consider your right hand and a mirror image duplicate of it. Kant calls such pairs incongruent counterparts. According to him they have the following puzzling features. The relation and situation of the parts of your hand with respect to one another are not sufficient to distinguish it from its mirror duplicate. Nevertheless, there is a spatial difference between the two. Turn and twist them how you will, you cannot make one of them occupy the exact boundaries now occupied by the other. In his 1…Read more
    Consider your right hand and a mirror image duplicate of it. Kant calls such pairs incongruent counterparts. According to him they have the following puzzling features. The relation and situation of the parts of your hand with respect to one another are not sufficient to distinguish it from its mirror duplicate. Nevertheless, there is a spatial difference between the two. Turn and twist them how you will, you cannot make one of them occupy the exact boundaries now occupied by the other. In his 1768 paper, ‘Concerning the Ultimate Foundations of the Differentiation of Regions in Space’, Kant uses these claims to argue against relational accounts of space and goes on to argue that the difference between incongruent counterparts depends on a relation to absolute space as a whole. In his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation he argued that this difference could not be captured by concepts alone but required appeal to intuition. In the Prolegomena (1783) and again in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) Kant appealed to these puzzling features of incongruent counterparts to support his transcendental idealism about space.
    Kant: Transcendental IdealismKant: Metaphysics and Epistemology, MiscKant: SpaceKant: Philosophy of …Read more
    Kant: Transcendental IdealismKant: Metaphysics and Epistemology, MiscKant: SpaceKant: Philosophy of Mathematics
  •  39
    Objective evidence and rules of strategy: Achinstein on method: Peter Achinstein: Evidence and method: Scientific strategies of Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 177pp, $24.95 HB
    with Kent W. Staley, Henk W. de Regt, and Peter Achinstein
    Metascience 23 (3): 413-442. 2014.
    Evidence, MiscScientific MetamethodologyScientific Method, MiscellaneousIsaac NewtonPhilosophy of Ph…Read more
    Evidence, MiscScientific MetamethodologyScientific Method, MiscellaneousIsaac NewtonPhilosophy of Physics, MiscellaneousJustification of InductionPhilosophy of Science, General Works
  •  39
    The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance
    Journal of Philosophy 80 (6): 367-376. 1983.
    Formal Epistemology
  •  35
    Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility
    with Allan Gibbard
    In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, D. Reidel. pp. 125-162. 1978.
    Causal Decision TheoryBayesian Reasoning, MiscPossible-World Theories of Counterfactuals
  •  35
    Newton's Classic Deductions from Phenomena
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990. 1990.
    I take Newton's arguments to inverse square centripetal forces from Kepler's harmonic and areal laws to be classic deductions from phenomena. I argue that the theorems backing up these inferences establish systematic dependencies that make the phenomena carry the objective information that the propositions inferred from them hold. A review of the data supporting Kepler's laws indicates that these phenomena are Whewellian colligations-generalizations corresponding to the selection of a best fitti…Read more
    I take Newton's arguments to inverse square centripetal forces from Kepler's harmonic and areal laws to be classic deductions from phenomena. I argue that the theorems backing up these inferences establish systematic dependencies that make the phenomena carry the objective information that the propositions inferred from them hold. A review of the data supporting Kepler's laws indicates that these phenomena are Whewellian colligations-generalizations corresponding to the selection of a best fitting curve for an open-ended body of data. I argue that the information theoretic features of Newton's corrections of the Keplerian phenomena to account for perturbations introduced by universal gravitation show that these corrections do not undercut the inferences from the Keplerian phenomena. Finally, I suggest that all of Newton's impressive applications of Universal gravitation to account for motion phenomena show an attempt to deliver explanations that share these salient features of his classic deductions from phenomena.
    European Philosophy17th/18th Century PhilosophyIsaac Newton
  •  34
    Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science
    Studia Logica 37 (2): 213-219. 1978.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicPhilosophy of ProbabilityApplications of Probability
  •  32
    Response to Kent Staley’s Comments on William Harper’s “Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method”
    Modern Schoolman 87 (3/4): 315-319. 2010.
    Isaac Newton
  •  32
    Decisions, Games and Equilibrium Solutions
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988. 1988.
    This paper includes a survey of decision theories directed toward exploring the adequacy of alternative approaches for application to game theoretic reasoning, a review of the classic results of von Neumann and Morgenstern and Nash about equilibrium solutions, an account of a recent challenge to the idea that solutions should be equilibria, and, finally, an explicit reconstruction and defense (using the resources of causal decision theory) of the classic indirect argument for equilibrium solutio…Read more
    This paper includes a survey of decision theories directed toward exploring the adequacy of alternative approaches for application to game theoretic reasoning, a review of the classic results of von Neumann and Morgenstern and Nash about equilibrium solutions, an account of a recent challenge to the idea that solutions should be equilibria, and, finally, an explicit reconstruction and defense (using the resources of causal decision theory) of the classic indirect argument for equilibrium solutions.
    Decision-Theoretic Frameworks, MiscCausal Decision TheoryPreferences in Decision Theory
  •  31
    Kant and the Exact Sciences
    with Michael Friedman
    Philosophical Review 104 (4): 587. 1995.
    This is a very important book. It has already become required reading for researchers on the relation between the exact sciences and Kant’s philosophy. The main theme is that Kant’s continuing program to find a metaphysics that could provide a foundation for the science of his day is of crucial importance to understanding the development of his philosophical thought from its earliest precritical beginnings in the thesis of 1747, right through the highwater years of the critical philosophy, to hi…Read more
    This is a very important book. It has already become required reading for researchers on the relation between the exact sciences and Kant’s philosophy. The main theme is that Kant’s continuing program to find a metaphysics that could provide a foundation for the science of his day is of crucial importance to understanding the development of his philosophical thought from its earliest precritical beginnings in the thesis of 1747, right through the highwater years of the critical philosophy, to his last unpublished writings in the Opus postumum. In the course of articulating this theme, Friedman has made extensive use of detailed historical information about their scientific and mathematical background to illuminate Kant’s texts. Over and over again, such information is used to suggest interesting and quite subtle interpretations for texts that may have seemed puzzling or just wrong-headed.
    Kant: Philosophy of ScienceKant: Philosophy of Mathematics
  •  31
    Rational Conceptual Change
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976. 1976.
    Conceptual Change in ScienceRationalityInductive LogicBayesian Reasoning
  •  28
    A note on universal instantiation in the Stalnaker Thomason conditional logic and M type modal systems
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4). 1974.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic of Conditionals
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