William Seeley

To analyze the relations between art and science, philosophers and historians have developed different lines of inquiry. A first type of inquiry considers how artistic and scientific practices have interacted over human history. Another project aims to determine the contributions that scientific research can make to our understanding of art, including the contributions that cognitive science can make to philosophical questions about the nature of art. We rely on contributions made to these projects in order to demonstrate that art and science are codependent phenomena. Specifically, we explore the codependence of art and science in the context of a historical analysis of their interactions and in the context of contemporary debates on the cognitive science of art.

Artworks are attentional engines. They are artifacts intentionally designed to direct attention to what we might call their artistically salient features. The artistically salient features of a work are those aspects of their formal-compositional structure that carry information about what they express, their point, purpose, or meaning. These aspects of a work reflect the range of compositional strategies and choices an artist has employed to produce their work. Critically, artists deploy exogenous and endogenous perceptual strategies tailored to direct attention and reveal what they mean to express. Painters, for instance, manipulate the perceptual salience of different areas of the canvas to directly engage perceptual systems, e.g. manipulating contrasts in the tonal properties, hue value, or scale of spatial frequency information. However, shared art critical knowledge can also be exploited to indirectly engage endogenous attentional processes, shape perception, and guide a consumer’s understanding of what is expressed in a work. The range of exogenous and endogenous perceptual strategies an artist employs shape what an artifact affords a consumer as an artwork. Access to these affordances depends upon the structure of the works, the structure of perceptual systems, and an understanding of the broad range of art critical and cultural practices that define the artworld for a community at a time. In this chapter I will employ a diagnostic recognition framework and a biased competition theory of selective attention to develop a model for understanding the way artists exploit exogenous and endogenous perceptual strategies in their works and map the complex environment of an artwork.

What is it about art that can be so captivating? How is it that we find value in the often odd and abstract objects and events we call artworks? William P. Seeley proposes that artworks are attentional engines. They are artifacts that have been intentionally designed to direct attention to critical stylistic features that reveal their point, purpose, or meaning. In developing this view, Seeley argues that there is a lot we can learn about the value of art from interdisciplinary research focused on our perceptual engagement with artworks. Recent breakthroughs in cognitive science and behavioral science can explain how we recognize artworks and how we differentiate them from more quotidian artifacts. Seeley pushes this line of reasoning, showing how cognitive science can help reveal the way artworks function as a unique source of value. Cognitive systems integrate this information into our experience of art, guiding attention and shaping what we perceive. Our understanding and appreciation of artworks is therefore carried in our perceptual experience of them. Attentional Engines explores the pitfalls and potential of this interdisciplinary strategy for understanding art. It articulates a cognitivist theory of art grounded in perceptual psychology and neuroscience and demonstrates its application to a range of puzzles in the philosophy of the arts. This includes questions about the nature of depiction, the role played by metakinesis in dance appreciation, the nature of musical expression, and the power of movies. The provocative interdisciplinary theories Seeley presents will appeal to scholars and students interested in aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of art, cognitive science, and anyone with a burning curiosity about how artworks work.

The olfactory system was traditionally thought to lack a thalamic relay to mediate top-down influences from memory and attention in other perceptual modalities. Olfactory perception was therefore often described as an outlier among perceptual modalities. It was argued as a result that olfaction was a canonical example of a direct perception. In this paper we review functional and anatomical evidence which demonstrates that olfaction depends on both direct pathway connecting anterior piriform cortex to orbitofrontal cortex and an indirect thalamic circuit connecting posterior piriform cortex and orbitofrontal cortices to the olfactory system. We argue that the indirect corticothalamic circuit has the structure to potentially mediate mediates top-down influences of memory and attention in olfactory perception. This suggests that olfaction is not an outlier after all.

Visual stylometry is a new interdisciplinary research field that sits at the junction of digital humanities, empirical aesthetics, and computer science. Research in this field employs image analysis algorithms to study key aspects of artistic style. The nature of artistic style is the subject of ongoing debate within art history and philosophy of art. Computational and statistical methods in visual stylometry allow researchers to quantify and compare aspects of artistic style over the course of the career of an individual artist, among artists who share in a common artistic style, and across different schools of art. The results of these studies provide clues to the image features that enable viewers to categorize works as belonging to different artistic styles. We have developed a system that can act as an open access laboratory for visual stylometry. This approach is powerful enough to support advanced academic research in computer science, cognitive science, art history, and the philosophy of art while at the same time providing a user friendly interface accessible to students and researchers with little or no computer science background. Our framework is designed around the idea of scientific workflows. Scientific workflows allow users to build executable analyses in the same way they would draw a flowchart, by dragging objects representing data sets and image analysis procedures onto the work-space and drawing links between them. These workflows and data sets can be exported using open standards as web objects that can then be shared or modified by other users. Our platform, Workflows for the Analysis of Images in Visual Stylometry (WAIVS), has the potential to promote computational literacy and data analytic skills among humanities students, to introduce science students to research in art and the humanities, to explore the nature of artistic style and its role in our understanding of artwork, and to help researchers in cognitive science understand how viewers perceptually categorize, recognize, and otherwise engage with artworks.

There is a standard skeptical concern within philosophy of art that causal explanations in psychology and neuroscience apply equally to our engagement with art that is done well and art that is done poorly and so do not contribute to our understanding of the normative dimension of artistic appreciation. This skeptical concern is often used to challenge the relevance of psychology and neuroscience to our understanding of art. I sketch a crossmodal model for perception which demonstrates that those affective processes responsible for encoding the biological and instrumental value of a stimulus play a critical productive role in perceptual processing. I argue that the ensuing model for affective perception dissolves these skeptical philosophical concerns.

The neuroscience of dance is a vibrant, fast growing field which embodies the promise of a genuine and productive interdisciplinary rapprochement between neuroscience and art. The strength of this field lies in the way it ties the experience of dance to sensorimotor processes that underwrite our ordinary perceptual engagement with the environment. Motor simulation and mimicry enhance our capacity to interpret the goals, motives, and emotions of others. Recent studies demonstrate that these same processes enable us to recognize abstract dance movements as intentional actions with emotionally expressive and semantic content constitutive of their meaning. In what follows I examine this research with an eye to the potential contribution neuroscience can make to our understanding of dance as an artform.

Artworks are attentional engines, or artifacts intentionally designed to direct attention to formal features that are diagnostic for their artistically salient aesthetic, expressive, and semantic content. This is nowhere more true than the movies. Moving pictures are constructed from a suite of formal and narrative devices carefully developed to capture, hold, and direct our attention. These devices are tools for developing content by controlling the way information is presented throughout the duration of our engagement with a movie. In this respect moving pictures are analogous to visual routines used to direct and bias attention in natural behavior - they are artifacts used to deliver information on the fly as it is needed for the development of the narrative. This article reviews some of the fundamental devices movie makers use to discharge this function - such as variable framing and criterial prefocusing – and discusses their relation to our underlying cognitive, affective, and neurological architecture. These formal devices are designed to guide and control salient aspects of viewers behavioral responses to mass market movies. Therefore, we argue that it is no surprise to discover that that they are fine tuned to the architecture of emotion, perception, and cognition.

The philosophy of art and empirical aesthetics are, to all outward appearances, natural bedfellows, disciplines bound together by complimentary methodologies and the common goal of explaining a shared subject matter. Philosophers are in the business of sorting out the ontological and normative character of different categories of objects, events and behaviors, squaring up our conception of the nature of things, and clarifying the subject matter of different avenues of intellectual exploration via careful conceptual analyses of often complex conventional practices. Psychologists have developed careful empirical methods for measuring and modeling behavior, methods that are fruitfully used in practice to test and evaluate hypotheses derived from our conception of the nature of our own cognitive and emotional engagement with the world. So, for all appearances, philosophy and psychology are grounded in complimentary research methods directed at the common task of sorting and testing theories about the nature of art and artistic practices, e.g. what is an artwork, what is the nature of the productive practices involved in creating these kinds of artifacts, or what is the nature of a consumer's artistic engagement with these artifacts. Unfortunately appearances can be deceptive. Despite common calls for rapprochement the two disciplines rarely meet. There are methodological and ideological reasons for this rift, and they are, not surprisingly, related. In what follows I will explore and evaluate some of the central sources of resistance on both sides this divide, introduce a model for the possibility of rapprochement, and briefly sketch the promise and pitfalls of current research in two areas, dance and film, where an active attempt at bridging the divide between philosophy and empirical aesthetics is underway

Empirical aesthetics and philosophy of art are often framed as disciplines in conflict with one another. Psychologists working in empirical aesthetics argue that philosophical theories of art reflect the evaluative biases of critics and experts and so fail as objective accounts of artistic practice. Philosophers argue that the causal-psychological explanations appealed to in empirical aesthetics can not account for the role normative conventions play in appreciative judgements, and so fail to differentiate artworks and artistic practices from ordinary artifacts and behaviors. I argue that this putative conflict can be dissolved by paying attention to the productive role shared normative conventions play in our perceptual engagement with works of fine art. I sketch a hierarchical theory derived from a biased competition account of selective attention that can be used to model these cognitive influences in our engagement with artworks.

The growing general interest in understanding how neuroscience can contribute to explanations of our understanding and appreciation of art has been slow to find its way to philosophy of literature. Of course this is not to say that neuroscience has not had any influence on current theories about our engagement, understanding, and appreciation of literary works. Colin Martindale developed a scientific approach to literature in his book The Clockwork Muse (1990). His prototype-preference theory drew heavily on early artificial neural network research. Jenefer Robinson has appealed to results from affective neuroscience in her discussion of our emotional engagement with literary works (see Robinson, 2005). More recently literary critics have tried to extend cognitive literary theory in the direction of neuroscience (Ashton, 2005; Byatt, 2006; Young, 2010). This line of research traces its origin to commentary on a 1995 a paper by Herbert Simon in the Stanford Humanities Review (Franchi and Güzeldere, 1995). So, although there hasn't been much going on that could justifiably be called a neuroscience of literature, discussions of neuroscientific research have woven their way into the fabric of some aspects of philosophy of literature and literary theory. Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of resistance to the creeping insurgence of neuroscience into both fields. I will challenge this skepticism in what follows. In section 1, I will sketch a model for research at the crossroads of philosophy and neuroscience of art and suggest how it can be applied to the philosophy of literature. In Section 2, I will introduce situation models and discuss the role they have been hypothesized play in discourse comprehension and narrative understanding outside of literature. In Section 3, I will explore some ways that situation models can contribute to discussions of narrative understanding, appreciation, and the artistically salient features that differentiate literature as a category of art from non-art literary forms like newspaper columns, magazine articles, or biographies.

Recent findings in affective and cognitive neuroscience underscore the fact that traumatic memories are embodied and inextricably integrated with the affective dimensions of associated emotional responses. These findings can be used to clarify, and in some cases challenge, traditional claims about the unrepresentability of traumatic experience that have been central to trauma literary studies. The cognitive and affective dimensions experience and memory are closely integrated. Recollection is always an attenuated form of embodied reenactment. Further, situation models for narrative comprehension show us that these same neurobiological processes that underwrite narrative understanding. This, in turn suggests that literary texts can be used as a resource for representing, reenacting, and understanding traumatic experience and might serve as external regulatory resources for reenacting, shaping, and thereby coping with traumatic memory.

Recent interdisciplinary research in visual stylometry employs digital image analysis algorithms to study the image features and statistics that underwrite our experience of artworks. This research brings psychologists, computer scientists, and art historians together to explore the formal image qualities that define artistic style. We introduce the field of visual stylometry, discuss it's implications for our understanding of both the nature of categories of art and the role artistic style plays in our engagement with artworks. We then discuss the results of our research employing entropy analyses and discrete tonal analyses to classify paintings by school (Impressionism/Hudson River School) and medium/technique (Wyeth/egg-tempura/watercolor).

Recent advances in out understanding of the cognitive neuroscience of perception have encouraged cognitive scientists and scientifically minded philosophers to turn their attention towards art and the problems of philosophical aesthetics. This cognitive turn does not represent an entirely novel paradigm in the study of art. Alexander Baumgarten originally introduced the term ‘aesthetics’ to refer to a science of perception. Artist’s formal methods are a means to cull the structural features necessary for constructing clear perceptual representations from the dense flux of sensory information in conscious experience. therefore, he interpreted artist’s formal methods as tools for studying the structure of perception. Art was a field whose interests coincidentally overlapped with aesthetics. In what follows I examine three approaches to cognitive science and aesthetics that rest on a tacit assumption of Baumgarten’s program. I argue that whereas this new research can explain how viewers perceptually recover the content of artworks, it does not explain what makes those works aesthetically interesting. Therefore, the challenge for cognitive science and aesthetics is to tie the perceptual practices of artists and viewers to their more narrowly construed aesthetic, or artistic, practices. What is needed to establish this link is an interpretation of Baumgarten’s original definition of aesthetics that treats attention to the way the formal structure of an artwork works to convey its content as a source of aesthetic interest. Unfortunately this interpretation is not transparently established by explanations of the perceptual practices of artists and viewers. I conclude that it remains an open question whether this research can contribute to philosophical aesthetics.

Psychological studies (Proffitt, 2006) have demonstrated that what one sees is influenced by one's goals, physiological state, and emotions. These studies demonstrate that there is a positive correlation between the physical demands (energetic cost) and perceived valence (emotional cost) of a task and the appearance of slant and egocentric distance in the environment. The studies are compelling. However, one can question whether their results are due to changes in the way participants perceived the orientation and extent of their environment or are instead artifacts of the way they judged the difficulty of expected tasks in particular contexts. We asked participants to sketch the rough spatial layout of several paintings as accurately as possible. In this type of task participants continuously compare what they have drawn against what they perceive. Therefore, participants performance can be interpreted as a means to directly measure of the spatial metric of perception. We chose two paintings by Andrew Wyeth as target images: “Christina's World” and “Winter, 1946.” Participants were asked to draw the spatial arrangement of the key features of the scene depicted in the target painting twice: prior to being presented with biographical information about the subject of the painting condition; and then again after being told the biographical information that altered the perceived task demands or emotional valence of the events they depicted. We predicted that participants' drawings would differ in the two conditions indicating that: change in the energetic or emotional costs of the depicted action would cause them to perceive the depicted orientation of hills as steeper and distance between key landmarks as longer. Results from the energetic cost condition support this prediction. We will discuss our results and the suggestion that these types of effects reflect a role for motor simulation in perception (Witt, 2005).