William R. O'Shea

This research paper investigates habit and temporality in G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy, in response to recent Deleuzian criticisms that Hegel has misunderstood empiricism by simplifying the nature of sensations. The paper begins with an exegesis of Deleuze’s critique of Hegel’s view of empiricism namely that Hegel neglects the importance of non-conceptual difference for understanding the nature of sense-experience. It then shows that Deleuze’s own empiricism remains incomplete without positing habit as a principle of relations, and, in turn, that habit on Hegel’s account mediates difference at the organic level. This means that habit shows how something prior to the establishment of consciousness is operative in experience, and, for the purpose of this paper, this aspect of habit helps to explain how it is possible that consciousness can experience time. More broadly, I contend that this pre-conscious operation of habit is key to understanding Hegel’s views on sense-experience and empiricism, which subverts the idea that Hegel has “reduced” sensations to their conceptual articulation.