•  34
    James’s Evolutionary Argument
    Disputatio 6 (39): 229-237. 2014.
    This paper is a commentary on Joseph Corabi’s “The Misuse and Failure of the Evolutionary Argument”, this Journal, vol. VI, No. 39; pp. 199-227. It defends William James’s formulation of the evolutionary argument against charges such as mishandling of evidence. Although there are ways of attacking James’s argument, it remains formidable, and Corabi’s suggested revision is not an improvement on James’s statement of it.
  •  11
    >Henry Stapp (4:53am, 8/24/97) gave some very helpful clarification on >some questions I had asked. As clarifications should, his post leads to >some further questions. Some of them probably import classical ways of >thinking into QM contexts in an inappropriate way; but I think others >will be like me in not knowing *how* we are to avoid such >inappropriateness, so I am going to ask the questions that *seem* to me >to be important
  •  4
    Perception, Affect, and Epiphenominalism: Commentary on Mangan's "Sensation's Ghost"
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10. 2004.
    This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism.
  •  18
    Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3): 534-562. 2005.
    Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic ‘what…Read more
  •  54
    Hidden Nature Physicalism
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1): 71-89. 2016.
    Hidden nature physicalists hold that an experiential quality and its hidden nature are the same property – even though they agree that our experiences are of experiential qualities but are not, in the same sense, experiences of their hidden natures. This paper argues that physicalists must be committed to ultimately giving accounts that involve no non-extensional relations, and that this commitment leads to an inability to explain how our experiences could be of experiential qualities, but not o…Read more
  •  7
    The Fictitious Audience of 1 Peter
    with Stephen R. Llewelyn
    Heythrop Journal 61 (6): 939-950. 2020.
    Recent scholarship has argued that Simon Peter is not the author of 1 Peter, whilst maintaining that the addressees in 1:1 are the real recipients of the letter. We contend that both the stated author and the stated audience are part of the author’s deception. We propose instead that the author may have simply argued that this text was an older letter from Peter. This proposal is consistent with the widely‐held view that pseudepigraphical letters were not knowingly accepted in early Christian ci…Read more
  •  28
    Ethical Considerations in Flexible Work Arrangements
    Business and Society Review 110 (2): 213-224. 2005.