William Wians

P. Hasper and R. Arnzen have mounted a spirited defense of what they call the categorical reading of Physics VIII 1.250b13 against a hypothetical reading of the text put forward by Silvia Fazzo in Aristotelica 3. The crucial phrase in Ross’s text reads ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται. Fazzo has argued in favor of ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, a variant derived from a manuscript designated as J (Vind. Phil. gr. 100), the oldest manuscript of the Physica. On Fazzo’s reading, with ἀλλ’ εἰ, Aristotle is completing a hypothetical pair of options rather than making a categorical assertion that motion is eternal. My question in this note is a methodological one. When interpretive stakes are considerable, when should a more plausible interpretation of a text’s larger argumentative context lead us to endorse a variant reading, even when the variant is at odds with a larger extant textual tradition? Having argued that Physics VIII 1displays a thoroughgoing dialectical structure, I conclude that emendation of 250b13 has in its favor that it makes clearer that Aristotle is framing a dichotomy between two mutually exclusive options, just as his theory of dialectical reasoning toward principles would dictate. In this case at least, interpretive considerations of the larger argumentative structure should be given special weight in evaluating textual variants.

Among the three kinds of theoretical knowledge, Aristotle distinguishes between physics and metaphysics—what he calls Second and First Philosophy. Aristotle’s physics studies changing things, things that change in any of several ways according to an inner principle that governs their alterations and their underlying stability—fundamentally, things that come into being and pass away. What Aristotle calls First Philosophy studies substances that are immovable and unchanging, eternal objects including primarily but not exclusively Aristotle’s god. Aristotle’s distinction between Second and First Philosophy constitutes a decisive difference between Aristotle and earlier philosophers. My main claim will be that Aristotle “discovered” First Philosophy through critical reflection on the universalizing or totalizing assumption of his predecessors. By “universalizing assumption” I mean that according to Aristotle, his predecessors assumed either explicitly or implicitly that they were enquiring into τὸ πᾶν, the all, the totality of everything that exists. Aristotle claims that they were wrong in this assumption. All sciences seek knowledge of principles and causes (archai and aitia). But an investigation of beings that come into existence and pass away is essentially different from the philosophical investigation of immovable, unchanging being. To understand why, one must nevertheless begin by studying changing beings—in large part to come to recognize the insufficiency of Second Philosophy to investigate being as such. Aristotle’s discovery was that the original project of Greek philosophy—the study of the whole—requires both Second and First Philosophy.

_Physics_ VIII 1 presents a multi-stage argument concluding that there was not, nor ever will be, a time when there was not nor will not be motion (_Phys_. VIII 1.252b5-6). In this paper I shall argue that chapter’s argument is dialectical in a precise way. My claim will be that _Physics_ VIII 1 is apodeictically conditioned – its structure must be understood in terms of the theory of science in the _Posterior Analytics_ and the methods for establishing principles in the _Topics. Physics_ VIII 1 is not demonstrative in a straightforward deductive way, but is structured with the nature of a scientific _genos_ and requirements for scientific knowledge always in mind. Aristotle begins by asking about the eternality of motion, posing a pair of conceptual opposites that form a mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive dichotomy. But the initial statement of the dichotomy turns out to require substantial unpacking, leading eventually to a single remaining option, that motion in the cosmos is eternal. But the status of this conclusion itself turns out to be problematic. Put in terms of Aristotle’s theory of science, all _phusiologoi_ made motion a posit or hypothesis, whether they regarded motion as eternal or not. Though Aristotle has rejected one option, at a deeper level, he finds all previous accounts lacking. Because motion is fundamental to all coming-to-beand-passing-away, what is at stake is the status and adequacy of a principle governing the whole science of nature (_tên theôrian pasan_; 250b17). In this way, the chapter prepares for the subsequent investigation into the principles of cosmic motion.

Essays on Greek philosophy and literature from Homer and Hesiod to Aristotle. In Logoi and Muthoi, William Wians builds on his earlier volume Logos and Muthos, highlighting the richness and complexity of these terms that were once set firmly in opposition to one another as reason versus myth or rationality versus irrationality. It was once common to think of intellectual history representing a straightforward progression from mythology to rationality. These volumes, however, demonstrate the value of taking the two together, opening up and analyzing a range of interactions, reactions, tensions, and ambiguities arising between literary and philosophical forms of discourse, including philosophical themes in works not ordinarily considered in the canon of Greek philosophical texts. This new volume considers such topics as the pre-philosophical origins of Anaximander’s calendar, the philosophical significance of public performance and claims of poetic inspiration, and the complex role of mythic figures (including perhaps Socrates) in Plato. Taken together, the essays offer new approaches to familiar texts and open up new possibilities for understanding the roles and relationships between muthos and logos in ancient Greek thought. “This is a stellar effort. The essays are all of extremely high quality and interest. The scholarship is rigorous and the content is innovative. The conception of the book is highly original, well-grounded, and well-thought-out. William Wians’s work as a scholar and as an editor has been consistently first-rate, and with this volume he has surpassed himself.” — Rose M. Cherubin, George Mason University.

Matthew Walker’s book argues that contemplation is not useless as “traditionally” claimed, but serves the crucial function of guiding what Walker frequently refers to as human life activities, most importantly the self-maintenance of the human organism. By this phrase, he includes the full range of psychic functions essential to a perishable organism, extending down to nourishment and reproduction. As such, contemplation not only becomes the central organizing principle of Aristotle’s ethics, but also must be understood in connection with Aristotle’s natural philosophy.The book’s early chapters strike me as following something like the order of the De anima, leading from what is perhaps...

The dissertation examines Aristotle's method in his three great treatises on biology--the History of Animals, the Parts of Animals, and the Generation of Animals. It argues that these works exhibit a dialectical method, based on the techniques and methods developed in Aristotle's Topics. In particular, Aristotle applies a dialectical method to the difficult task of justifying the principles of biology. ;Finding a dialectical method in the biology suggests a new solution to a well-known conflict between Aristotle's theory of science and his scientific practice. His Posterior Analytics pictures a science as a body of necessarily true propositions joined by syllogistic deductions, and implies that scientific method would be rigidly formal and demonstrative. But the biology follows a different course, it seems, for it contains no demonstrations, studies the perishable and changing, and is guided by a far more inductive method of procedure. But if there is a portion of Aristotle's full theory of science to which the biology does adhere, then the tension can be considerably eased. ;The dissertation is in two parts. Part One centers on the theory of science, and a special problem arising from it, which I have called the problem of classification. Chapter I argues that the theory of science requires classification of a definite character. Chapter II claims that the works on biology fail to classify in this way. Chapter III argues that dialectic is a crucial component of the theory, able to seek out and test scientific principles, and thus provides a new avenue into Aristotle's method in biology. ;Part Two explores the use of dialectic in the biology. Chapter IV of the dissertation argues that, in a variety of important ways, the Generation of Animals operates dialectically. Chapter V extends this analysis to the Parts of Animals, and Chapter VI does the same for the History of Animals. A concluding chapter summarizes my argument and takes a final look at the tension between theory and practice

I shall argue that, according to Aristotle, the knowledge we may attain is profoundly qualified by our status as human knowers. Throughout the corpus, Aristotle maintains a separation of knowledge at the broadest level into two kinds, human and divine. The separation is not complete—human knowers may enjoy temporarily what god or the gods enjoy on a continuous basis; but the division expresses a fact about humanity's place in the cosmos, one that imposes strict conditions on what we may know, with what degree of certainty, and in what areas. While passages bearing on human knowledge are familiar, looking at them collectively and in comparison with certain other well known Aristotelian doctrines may significantly affect how we understand the goals of his philosophy and why our hopes for reaching them must be limited.