Willow Angelette

Consideration of the moral and ethical consequences of competing scientific and social theories often proceeds on the assumption that such discourses are or ought to be rational. The concept of incommensurability, however, threatens this assumption. Literature on the Incommensurability thesis consists mostly in explanation of the concept itself and the degree of damage it portends for the rationality of science. Most often this work is done via historical case studies. Exemplary is Thomas Kuhn’s The Copernican Revolution. Historical studies do sometimes provide us with great insights, but their worth is limited by the backward-looking nature of anecdotes and single case investigations. The current work looks toward new and prospective methods of investigation. Through the lens of a novel and experimental approach to incommensurability the author asks, “What are the prospects for an inter-theoretic language in the social sciences?” In particular, there is a focus on the contentious claim by some that it is perfectly fine and even beneficial to have social, business or intimate relations with clients.

Volume II of "To Hours in the Service of Allah" continues and expands upon the poetic journey through themes of life, death, the naive and the profound. The poems of volume II interconnect closely with those of the first volume so as to enhance the readers experience through an almost epic style that emerges only when one has read through both volumes. One begins to appreciate that there is here an unfolding story of flawed heroes and troubled villains. Unlike traditional epic poetry and taking a stylistic cue from the later Wittgenstein, the author encourages readers is to assemble the story in what ever order they may.

In this collection of moving and sometimes frightening poems, Puerto-Rican Philosopher W. Angelette provides glimpses into a world where she navigates artfully through the seams binding life, death, the naive and the profound. Professor Angelette steps away from the precise style of argument found in her philosophy of science essays that explore the nature of rationality in order to immerse us in "lived" experiences, independent of the philosophers' artificial structures. From this more immediate perspective one is freed to explore the Truths laid bare through the lives of the characters of her poems.

Crate of Bones is an illustrated collection of poems that follows the adventures of a collection of characters who determine to uncover the secret true history of the death of Socrates. They must find the crate that contains the bone of the great philosopher and the story of how he came to pass. The stories together comprise an epic poem. However, it does not follow a traditional linear pattern in time. The poems begin with one of our main characters captured in a desert encampment and imprisoned by a religious radical who insists that he 'come to god' or die.

Sarah Waller proposes that cognitive therapists and philosophical counselors ought to consider the feelings of the client of paramount importance in belief system change rather than the rationality of the belief system. I offer an alternative strategy of counseling that reinstates the place of rational belief revision while still respecting the importance of emotions. Waller claims that, because of the problem of under-determination, the counseling goal of rational belief revision can be trumped by the goal of improved client affect. I suggest that, if we consider a different ontology for the domain of counseling - one whose objects are dialogues (the goal of counseling becomes greater information of dialogues), we can accommodate a place for emotions in rational belief revision. I then note some limitations of the new proposal and the possibility of incommensurability in the comparison of our different views.

It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivists’ hallmark of rational choice. Since standard cognitive therapists sometimes ask us to choose sets of beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of greater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of choice goes beyond rationality. I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy is not made if one allows a broadening of what to count as rational cognitive therapy. The rationality of therapy consists in how well it achieves its goal. My claim is that at least one goal is, or ought to be, greater information value of the client’ dialogues. Among other things, information values encode affect. Understanding reason in this way effectively transforms our understanding of rationality in a way that may be incommensurable with the standard view. If these radically divergent approaches to cognitive therapy are incommensurable, there is no way to discover that we are still talking about the same thing. So, a challenge for this competing view is to say on what basis the term cognitive therapy may be projectable. I identify some constraints on this project and sketch a possible solution.