•  5
    Om iets te negeren, moet je het negeren
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 112 (4): 403-406. 2020.
  •  92
    What we all know: Community in Moore's 'A Defence of Common Sense'
    Journal of the History of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    I defend an account of Moore’s conception of Common Sense – as it figures in 'A Defence of Common Sense' – according to which it is based in a vision of the community of human beings as bound and unified by a settled common understanding of the meaning of our words and statements. This, for Moore, is our inalienable starting point in philosophy. When Moore invokes Common Sense against idealist (and skeptical) philosophers, he is reminding them that they too are bound by this common understanding…Read more
  •  74
    Why did Frege reject the theory of types?
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 1-20. 2020.
    I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege seems to neglect. To come to a better understanding of Frege’s …Read more
  •  42
    Some problems with the Anti-Luminosity-Argument
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3): 538-559. 2020.
    I argue that no successful version of Williamson's anti‐luminosity‐argument has yet been presented, even if Srinivasan's further elaboration and defence is taken into account. There is a version invoking a coarse‐grained safety condition and one invoking a fine‐grained safety condition. A crucial step in the former version implicitly relies on the false premise that sufficient similarity is transitive. I show that some natural attempts to resolve this issue fail. Similar problems arise for the f…Read more