-
120Things We Must Never Do (if Any)Phenomenology and Mind 24 164-181. 2023.Are there things that we must never do, no matter how untypical the circumstances and “unorthodox” our deontic ideas might be? In this essay I try to make evident that acts I call “pure sadist acts” satisfy this description. I discuss several examples of such acts and alert to their being not always easy to distinguish from certain others. Norms prohibiting such acts I call “true”, and I suggest that other, less suggestive, norms might also be (derivatively) true, if the pertinent acts stand in …Read more
-
2Searlean “Is” and “Ought” RevisitedIn Paolo Di Lucia & Edoardo Fittipaldi (eds.), Revisiting Searle on Deriving “Ought” From “Is”, Springer Verlag. pp. 59-87. 2021.This essay is an assessment of Searle’s arguments for the derivability of an obligation from a fact set out in his 1964 and 1968. It draws on a number of authoritative authors both old and recent. It is not, nor does it attempt to be, an erudite review of the very large literature on the topic in question. Rather, it focuses on certain fine points of the Searlean derivation, points that, while striking, have largely gone unnoticed in the current literature. The bottom line is, not unexpectedly, …Read more
-
77On a value of eccentricityRivista di Estetica 56 55-63. 2014.This essay attempts to define a value (not «the» value) of what, in it, comes to be called an «eccentric». In a largely standardized and stereotyped society like ours of the present times, a society where a human being can be creative but only within certain predefined limits, diverse groups exert all kinds of pressure on an individual, and with growing geographical as well as social mobility these kinds of pressure, intertwined and superimposed, give rise to overdue stress and situations of psy…Read more
-
Philosophy and ideology : The case of PolandIn János Kristóf Nyíri & Barry Smith (eds.), Philosophy and Political Change in Eastern Europe, Hegeler Institute. 1993.
-
27Is “being” predicated in only one sense, after all?Logic and Logical Philosophy 6 (n/a): 241. 1998.In this essay, I argue that for sentences of form “A is B” there isa distinction between identity and “mere” predication to be made, and thatLeśniewski’s Ontology puts us in a better position to make this distinctionthan first-order predicate logic. I also gesture at how Ontology could helpus to decide questions of identity. The nub of the matter seems to be a“primordial” sense of the copula that Ontology has at its basis
-
New Considerations on The 'Liar' ParadoxFilozofia Nauki 2. 2004.In this article the author argues that the 'Liar' Paradox sentence: "This sentence is false" is neither true nor false because it does not express any proposition or "Satz" in the sense of Bernard Bolzano. The difficulty left open is that by a similar line of reasoning also the sentence "This sentence is true" would not express any proposition, yet it is sometimes taken to be true (on the strength of a theorem by Loewe)
-
24Czy i dlaczego Arystotelej ski słaby wolą nie wybiera?Roczniki Filozoficzne 65 (3): 5-32. 2017.G.E.M. Anscombe znalazła w Etyce nikomachejskiej Arystotelesa pewną niekonsekwencję: Arystoteles zdaje się twierdzić, że cokolwiek wynika z namysłu, jest wyborem, i że słaby wolą może się skutecznie namyślać, ale i że — z drugiej strony — on nie wybiera. Anscombe znajduje rozwiązanie tej sprzeczności: Arystoteles powinien był, jej zdaniem, zaznaczyć, że by z namysłu wynikał wybór, to, ze względu na co się namyślamy, musiałby sam być przedmiotem uprzedniego wyboru. Badam to rozwiązanie i znajduję…Read more
-
56An example of the “synthetic a priori”: On how it helps us to widen our philosophical horizonsSemiotica 2013 (194): 63-76. 2013.