Woomin Park

Nina Emery has argued that when indeterministic law explains its instances, the law grounds its instances, and what does the grounding (put simply, a ground) does not necessitate what is grounded (put simply, a groundee), thereby challenging grounding necessitarianism. In contrast, Elanor Taylor has argued that such a counterexample to grounding necessitarianism actually rejects explanatory realism. Both cannot be true at the same time, and the question of which of the conclusions is correct is left open without further discussion. In this essay, I examine this question in the light of their arguments, with the aim of arguing against Taylor’s way toward rejecting explanatory realism. Taylor’s view that grounding necessitarianism is self-evident leads her to conclude that explanatory realism seems untenable. However, I challenge Taylor’s rejection of explanatory realism by arguing that the most fundamental rationale for viewing grounding necessitarianism as self-evident—that a ground is a complete metaphysical explanans of its groundee—does not align with that indeterministic laws explain their instances.

The aim of this paper is to argue that Moore's paradox demonstrates the essential indexical, thus challenging Cappelen and Dever’s perspective (Cappelen and Dever 2013), which denies the philosophical significance of the first-person by rejecting that there is an essential indexical. They believe that the well-known cases of the essential indexical, such as Perry’s messy shopper, do not reveal essential indexicality, since each of these cases has a Frege counterpart that is essentially the same, with the only difference being substitution failures involving third-person expressions instead of indexical expressions. However, this paper points out that Moore's paradox arises only when an agent refers to oneself with an indexical expression, asserting something like “P, but I do not believe P.” Therefore, contrary to Cappelen and Dever’s view, there is no corresponding Frege counterpart to Moore's paradox.