Wouter Kalf

This chapter commences part II of this book, which is about what error theorists should do with normative ethics. This chapter introduces the now what question: error theory, and now what should we do with our moral discourse that we use to talk about ethics? It lists the assessment criteria for every prescriptive metaethical theory that aims to answer this question and proceeds to argue that every prescriptive metaethical theory currently discussed in the literature is implausible. These theories are: revolutionary fictionalism, revolutionary expressivism, conservationism, and abolitionism. A new theory that I find plausible will be discussed in the next chapter.

This chapter considers the substitutionist answer to the now what question, according to which we should substitute our current moral discourse, which pragmatically presupposes categorical moral reasons of rationality that do not exist, for a schmoral discourse that pragmatically presupposes schmoral reasons of rationality, which do exist. It argues that this view is plausible given the assessment criteria for prescriptive metaethical theories formulated in the previous chapter. The chapter also argues that a propagandist, Government House reformulation of substitutionism is not plausible, and that substitutionism does not collapse into a naturalist realist moral success theory.

The first premise in the generic argument for moral error theory is that moral judgements carry a non-negotiable commitment to a particular claim ‘N’. Traditionally, moral error theorists have interpreted this as the claim that moral judgements conceptually entail the claim that there exist objectively prescriptive properties, irreducibly normative moral reasons, or categorical moral reasons of rationality. This chapter argues that this traditional defence of the generic argument’s first premise fails. Both Mackie’s and Joyce’s arguments for this premise fail, and, more generally, every version of this view faces the externalism and pervasiveness objections, which I argue cannot be solved by conceptual entailment moral error theorists.

The metanormative view defended in this book entails that in making practical decisions we do not have to take moral but only prudential and epistemic considerations into account, though we should use schmoral judgements in our thought and talk because this is the best way to satisfy our fundamental desirefundamental desire to live in a world with mutual cooperation. This chapter argues that this metanormative view allows us to solve the problem of what justice in the distribution of resources consists in. It does this by arguing that this is a problem in normative ethics, that neither Rawls nor Nozick has a plausible theory of distributive justicedistributive justice, and that the substitutionist’s solution is to combine the best elements of these theories into a new theory.

This chapter explains that there is an alternative formulation of the first premise in the generic argument for error theory, which does not use conceptual entailment but presupposition instead. It argues that semantic presupposition error theory is implausible, but that pragmatic presupposition error theory is plausible. The claim that is pragmatically presupposed by moral discourse is that there exist categorical moral reasons of rationality. The chapter further argues that this formulation of error theory has convincing replies to the externalism and pervasiveness objections that were problematic for conceptual entailment error theory, and that additional objections that have been wielded against it also fail. Finally, the chapter argues that the preceding discussion also provides sufficient evidence to believe the third and fourth premises in the generic argument.

This chapter formulates the most general argument for moral error theory, which error theorists need to precisify by undertaking specific commitments about moral semantics and moral metaphysics before they can use it in defence of their position. It then lists the commitments that the version of error theory that will be defended in this book undertakes. In addition to explaining what the argument for error theory will look like, this chapter explains two further questions that will be asked, and answered, in this book. These are the now what questionnow what question and the question as to whether my version of error theory enables us to solve an important problem in normative ethics. Finally, this chapter lists three theses that will be assumed in this book without argument.

This chapter defends the premise that moral discourse’s non-negotiable commitmentnon-negotiable commitment claim, which is that there exist categorical moral reasons of rationality, is false. The existence of a categorical moral reasoncategorical moral reason of rationality depends on whether rationality yields such reasons, but rationality does not yield such reasons. Rationality does yield categorical epistemic reasons, so the companions-in-guilt objectioncompanions-in-guilt objection to error theory is unconvincing. The chapter then argues that other objections to error theory, such as the objection that we mustn’t believe a philosophical theory if we cannot believe it in our most commonsensical moments and that we cannot believe error theory in our most commonsensical moments, fail. It closes by formulating the entire specific argument for error theory that has been defended so far in this book.

This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with 'schmoral' judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls 'the fundamental desire'; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation.

Moral error theorists face the now what question. How, if at all, ought they to adjust their moral practice after having discovered the error? Various answers have emerged in the literature, including, but not limited to, revisionary fictionalism, revisionary expressivism, and revisionary naturalism. Recently, François Jaquet has argued that there are only two available answers to the now what question, since every extant answer except revisionary fictionalism collapses into abolitionism. This paper provides a response. First, it argues that revisionary naturalism does not collapse into abolitionism. The argument is that abolitionists can neither utter schmoralist naturalist replacement judgments that contain moral terms nor eliminativist naturalist replacement judgments that do not contain moral terms. This means that abolitionists cannot utter replacement judgments at all. Since revisionary naturalists can utter replacement judgments, their view does not collapse into abolitionism. Second, the paper gives reason to believe that this result extends beyond revisionary naturalism to the other revisionary metaethical theories, and that this is good news for moral error theory.

Metaethical realists believe that moral facts exist, but they disagree among themselves about whether moral facts have ontological import. Robust realists think that they do. Quietist realists deny this. I argue that quietist realism faces a new objection; viz., the moral determination objection. This is the objection that general moral facts (or moral principles) must determine specific moral facts (or which actions in the world are right and wrong) but that general moral facts cannot do this if they lack ontological import. I also argue that some robust realists can answer the moral determination objection. This gives these robust realists an edge over quietist realism.

Current academic philosophy is being challenged from several angles. Subdisciplinary specialisations often make it challenging to articulate philosophy’s relevance for the societal questions of our day. Additionally, the success of the ‘scientific method’ puts pressure on philosophers to articulate their methods and specify how these can be successful. How does philosophical progress come about? What can philosophy contribute to our understanding of today’s world? Moreover, can it also contribute to resolving urgent societal challenges, such as anthropogenic climate change? This edited volume evaluates the place of philosophy in the age of science. It addresses three related sub-themes: philosophical progress, philosophical method and philosophy’s societal relevance. Fourteen authors engage with these sub-themes, focusing on the topics of their philosophical expertise, such as the philosophy of religion, evolutionary ethics and the nature of free will. In doing so, they explore their methods of enquiry, and look at how progress in their research comes about.

Moral error theorists think that moral judgments such as ‘stealing is morally wrong’ express truth-apt beliefs that ascribe moral properties to objects and actions. They also think that moral properties are not instantiated. Since moral error theorists think that moral judgments can only be true if they correctly describe moral properties, they think that no moral judgment is true. The belief problem for moral error theory is that this theory is inconsistent with every plausible theory of belief. I argue that moral error theorists can solve the belief problem. My argument is twofold. First, the belief problem rests on a false presupposition about how moral error theorists reason over time. Once we get clear on how would-be error theorists in fact reason towards the error theory and how, once they are error theorists, they subsequently reason about what they should do with their erroneous moral thought and talk, the belief problem evaporates. Second, even if my first argument fails and error theorists do face the belief problem, then we can still identify a plausible theory of belief that is consistent with moral error theory.

This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with ‘schmoral’ judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls ‘the fundamental desire’; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation.

This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with ‘schmoral’ judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls ‘the fundamental desire’; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation.

John P. Burgess has remarked that Mackie: “even though he talks of the need to invent morality … does not seem to think that this proposal could be worked into a revisionary meta-ethic”. In the first part of my paper, I argue that Mackie did propose a revisionary meta-ethic (conceptual reformism), and that Mackie was not a preservatist, abolitionist, or semantic pluralist. I also argue that interpreting Mackie as a conceptual reformist enables us to overcome a number of standard objections to his error theory. The upshot is that we should take seriously the idea that Mackie was a conceptual reform moral error theorist.

According to moral error theory, moral discourse is error-ridden. Establishing error theory requires establishing two claims. These are that moral discourse carries a non-negotiable commitment to there being a moral reality and that there is no such reality. This paper concerns the first and so-called non-negotiable commitment claim. It starts by identifying the two existing argumentative strategies for settling that claim. The standard strategy is to argue for a relation of conceptual entailment between the moral statements that comprise moral discourse and the statement that there is a moral reality. The non-standard strategy is to argue for a presupposition relation instead. Error theorists have so far failed to consider a third strategy, which uses a general entailment relation that doesn’t require intricate relations between concepts. The paper argues that both entailment claims struggle to meet a new explanatory challenge and that since the presupposition option doesn’t we have prima facie reason to prefer it over the entailment options. The paper then argues that suitably amending the entailment claims enables them to meet this challenge. With all three options back on the table the paper closes by arguing that error theorists should consider developing the currently unrecognised, non-conceptual entailment claim

On many interpretations of Spinoza’s political philosophy, democracy emerges as his ideal type of government. But a type of government can be ideal and yet it can be unwise to implement it if certain background conditions obtain. For example, a dominion’s people can be too ‘wretched by the conditions of slavery’ to rule themselves. This begs the following question. Do Spinoza’s arguments for democracy entail that all political bodies should be democracies at all times (the received view), or do they merely entail that we should only have a democracy when the right sort of background conditions are in place (the challenging view)? This paper argues that a new interpretation of one of the four versions of the rationality argument for democracy as it features in the Tractatus entails that the received view is correct. The paper also explains away part of the appeal of the challenging view by arguing that none of the other versions of the rationality argument supports the received view. It closes by arguing that a slightly modernised version of the rationality argument can be important for contemporary political philosophy

Perhaps the actual world does not contain moral properties. But might moral properties be impossible because no world, possible or actual, contains them? Two metaethical theories can be argued to entail just that conclusion; viz., emotivism and error theory. This paper works towards the strongest formulation of the emotivist argument for the impossibility of moral properties, but ultimately rejects it. It then uses the reason why the emotivist argument fails to argue that error-theoretic arguments for the impossibility of moral properties face the same conclusion. Finally the paper argues that these arguments for the possibility of moral properties might have consequences for our thinking about their actuality, regardless of whether we accept emotivism or error theory.