Wróblewski Zbigniew

Edward Osborne Wilson sformułował hipotezę biofilii, według której biofilia jest tendencją do skupiania się na życiu i procesach podobnych do życia. Status tej hipotezy jest kontrowersyjny zarówno w naukach przyrodniczych, społecznych i środowiskowych, jak i w etyce ekologicznej. Na płaszczyźnie metodologicznej stawiany jest m.in. zarzut niefalsyfikowalności; etycy ekologiczni krytykują hipotezę za jej antropocentryczne implikacje. W artykule proponujemy filozoficzną interpretację biofilii jako formy biomorfizmu, według którego pojęcie bytu substancjalnego, wartości i normy moralności jest oparte na paradygmacie bytu żywego.

The central issue in the debate on animal minds is the issue of mindreading. This complicated cognitive ability belongs to the key elements of social cognition — as a form of adapting to specific circumstances connected with living in groups, it enables the reading of the mental states of other individuals, e.g. intentions, desires, and beliefs as well as the adaptation of one’s own behavior to this information. The primary purpose of the article is to present the main philosophical controversies which arise in the discussion of whether this ability can be attributed to animals; if so, then to what extent. Philosophical discussions concentrate on methodological issues: alternative interpretational models of animal behavior, anthropomorphism, experimental protocols, and gradeability of mindreading as well as the nature of the mind.

The article presents the typological and conceptual tools used by Henryk Skolimowski to describe and explain the relation between man and nature. Skolimowski claims that the main determinant of this relation is the way man sees nature, i.e., the vision of nature which prevails in his culture and times. In other words, decisive for our relation to nature is cosmology. The first part of the article outlines the fundamental functions of the cosmological model which are to interpret daily and scientific experiences, to establish the type of actions which relate to man and nature. The second part concerns the structure of worldview which is based on a cosmological model. The structure of worldview embraces a cosmological model presenting the general structure of nature, eschatology understood as a realm of human life and cosmic goal, and ethicsdetermining human behaviour.

There exists a fundamental division in ecological ethics between its anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric versions. The anthropocentric position is a chief point of reference for discussions about the theoretical foundations of EE. Other versions of EE define themselves as rejecting the anthropocentric justification of human obligations with respect to the environment and base their norms on the internal values of non-human beings. Such non-anthropocentric ontological justifications are provided by various forms of the teleology of nature which interpret the normative concept of nature and establish relations between facts, values, and norms. In the paper I present two conceptions of the teleology of nature that may be used to explain the ontological references of non-anthropocentric EE and to develop and deepen the anthropological version

The aim of the article is to present the strategy of rehabilitation of the teleology in the conception of Robert Spaemann, Reinchard Löw and Hans Jonas. That strategy takes into account a few aspects: (1) the analysis of general conception of explanation in which the character of questions activating the process of explanation is taking into consideration, (2) the analysis of the conception of the teleological and causal explanations (according to the Hempel-Oppenheim model), (3) determination of the pragmatic background of the controversies concerning teleology, (4) determination of the domain and aims of teleological and causal interpretations.

The aim of this article is to give a philosophical analysis of inter-theoretical relations between the popular science and philosophy of nature and to formulate and the criteria of evaluation of correctness of such relations. The analysis is grounded in the domain of contemporary evolutionism. The main hypothesis is the following: The scientific theories do not imply philosophical theses directly. Nevertheless, they frequently appear in popular works as allegedly following scientific theories.. For example, papers on the theory of human evolution derive metaphysical theses from certain types of naturalism or spiritualism. These popular, metaphysically loaded, pseudo-scientific theories work as the traps. While using them, it is impossible to realize the cognitive aspirations of scientific theories (the error of metaphysical aspirations) that are suggested in their popular elaborations (the error of naive extrapolations). Metaphysical aspirations of the popular science result from the social demand for the philosophy of life. The main purpose of metaphysical interpretations is to turn the "scientific world" into the world of everyday life. This can be done in the frame of so-called hobby-philosophies, which are implicite loaded with serious metaphysical premises. Philosophy of nature is an open forum for the interpretations of scientific theories. Philosophy of nature takes into considerations theoretical as well as practical human attitudes towards the nature