Xavier Aranda Arredondo

La filosofía de la mente contemporánea se encuentra en un cruce inevitable entre la filosofía del lenguaje, la epistemología, y las neurociencias, de tal suerte, ha complejizado problemáticas que en Hegel estarían resueltas de una manera diferente. Por ejemplo, el concepto de Geist no sólo engloba el problema de la subjetividad, además lo hace sin la separación predominante en la filosofía contemporánea entre mente y cuerpo. También, Hegel cuenta con un criterio epistémico claro para la reconstrucción racional de las ciencias (la Idee presentada al final de la Ciencia de la Lógica), mediante el cual realiza una descripción de lo mental (situada en la sección del Espíritu Subjetivo en la Enciclopedia de las Ciencias Filosóficas), que entra en conflicto en con los avances de las neurociencias, siendo difícil de comprender bajo una epistemología que aún no resuelve la discusión sobre el reduccionismo como criterio de vinculación inter teorética o un compromiso metafísico. Bajo el entendido anterior, la presentación se propone exponer una filosofía de la mente Hegeliana atendiendo las necesidades intelectuales del presente, donde dicha teoría no sólo podría presentarse de acuerdo con la exposición del Espíritu subjetivo, sino que tendría que reconstruirse a partir de pasajes clave en la Fenomenología del Espíritu (como una introducción al emplazamiento teórico), la Ciencia de la Lógica (en específico la superación entre subjetividad y objetividad en la Doctrina del Concepto), además de matizar algunos pasajes cruciales para la Enciclopedia.

The following paper will provide an attempt to philosophically ground the study of games, finding the conditions for a general concept of ‘game’, where such conditions must be able: 1) to delimit what a game is (distinct from another while preserving the same universal features), 2) to provide a demarcative notion (which defines what a game is but also what a game isn’t), and 3) to explain how a game can be constitutive of meaning (that is a kind of content), such that can be subject of analysis independently of an specific context (whilst always presupposing a context that is). The current approach to this philosophical grounding will take inspiration from contemporary epistemology, and philosophy of mind and language. Starting from the analogy of ‘language as a game’ I’ll provide an argument to reverse it so there’s a way to understand ‘game as a language’ and apply several philosophical concepts valid to language analysis. Therefore, my aim is to show that to ground the notion of game, and by extension a general study of games, there is no possible a priori starting point, so a holistic non-reductive approach is a requiremente as well. I’ll show this by underlining the obstacles of choosing an a priori starting point (focused on norms or agency), proposing to understand the constitutive relation between rules and agents as immanent.

The pragmatist philosopher W. Sellars, in his essay "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man", proposed that it would be science, through its theoretical work, that could account for the place of human beings in the world by integrating the conceptual framework of human beings and their relations into a common ontology. We propose to use large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT 3.5, as the most explicit attempt at a theory that could integrate such a conceptual framework of human beings. Given Sellars's interest in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, we will critique the ambitions of LLMs in Sellars's terms, and the possibility of them moving from models of language to models of knowledge. Our critique will focus on the possibility of a criterion of unity (such as the use of tools that aid inferential reasoning) to avoid hallucinations, as well as the main driver behind the possible transition to models of knowledge. We will point out that this effort lies in the position that Hegel calls subjective idealism, which shows that a principle of explanation cannot be predictive. This will lead to the impossibility of integrating the common ontology proposed by Sellars.

Hegel’s philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) is impossible to separate from the rest of his system, in which nature is shown as a reflection of the idea (Idee) as presented in the logic (in the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften). The system composed by logic, nature, and spirit, represents a dialectical relation in which logic as the universal, nature as the particular, and spirit as the singular, mediate through one another and develop as immanent and constitutive parts of the system as a whole. Yet, the goal of the philosophy of nature is not unrelated to a philosophy of science in the contemporary sense. The latter aims to solve (among other problems) the problem of dualism between the conceptual scheme/the world and the demarcation of science (and knowledge), where the crucial difference is that the Hegelian philosophy of nature benefits from having an answer to these in the form of the absolute idea (die absolute Idee). In a contemporary sense, the constitution of these problematics would follow an abductive reasoning where the Hegelian idea (Idee) would solve these crucial problems for philosophy of science. The following paper will attempt to provide some guiding points for such a project and suggest the assumptions necessary for its development, with the sole purpose of underscoring the similarities and differences between the Hegelian philosophy of nature and a contemporary philosophy of science.