Xiang Yu

When parents request life-sustaining treatments for children who suffer from profound neurocognitive disabilities or are at the end of life, the typical ethics advice for clinicians is to accommodate the request. It can be unclear what interests such children have, and being unable to assess those interests, a clinician will tend to honor parents’ requests to continue treatments if the associated pain can be palliated. But how is the clinician not participating in using a profoundly vulnerable child merely to satisfy parental interests? In what sense can their actions be experienced as worthwhile? These circumstances can be morally distressing for clinicians, and recent efforts to justify the practice according to a relational potential standard seem problematic. We therefore propose an alternative meaningfulness standard, which builds on a notion of bestowed worth to explain how a clinician's duty to treat in these cases can be meaningful, and why it need not entail using the child as a mere means.

According to the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, your life goes well to the extent that your desires are satisfied, and your life goes badly to the extent that your desires are frustrated. Some have objected to this theory by arguing that there are some cases of depression in which the person is negative in well-being even though they altogether lack desires. In this paper, I give a solution to this problem. I first argue that the problem arises only in cases of affectless depression in which the person has no affective experiences, and that once we realize this, the force of the objection is weakened. I then argue that, even in cases of affectless depression, depressed people plausibly have dispositional desires—ones defined by dispositions to act or feel in certain ways—that are masked by their depression, and that the frustration of these masked desires is bad for them.

Kirk Lougheed argues that active euthanasia (here ‘euthanasia’) is impermissible for people who are extremely sick and cannot exercise their vital force because (1) exercising vital force does not require volition but only being an object of caring relationships and (2) African philosophy entails other-regarding deontological duties to stay alive. In this commentary, we point out an implication of Lougheed’s view that is morally problematic and offer a revision that avoids this implication. We also argue for an additional advantage of this revision.

According to the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, your life goes well to the extent that your desires are satisfied. This theory faces the problem of prudential neutrality: it apparently cannot avoid saying that, from the point of view of prudence or self-interest, you ought to be neutral between satisfying an existing desire of yours and replacing it with an equally strong desire and satisfying the new desire. It also faces the problem of remote desires: it regards as directly relevant to your well-being even desires whose objects are intuitively too irrelevant to (or ‘remote’ from) your life to affect your welfare. In this article, I argue that desire theorists can answer both objections by appealing to hidden desires – ones that it is psychologically realistic to attribute to the agents in the cases on which the two problems are based, even though they are not mentioned in descriptions of those cases.