Xiao Li

Proponents of neo-Aristotelian mereology consider the concept of a “slot” pivotal for understanding the parthood relation. According to this view, an entity constitutes a part of a whole only in virtue of filling a mereological slot within that whole. Recently, Sattig (2021) has proposed that slot-filling can be defined through other metaphysical concepts, particularly grounding and essence. In this paper, I first distinguish between two conceptions of mereological slot: parthood slot restrictive with respect to and hylomorpic slot parthood slot hylomorphic slot. Then I argue that his definition is over, which poses no restriction to the kinds of entities involved. And more importantly, his definition is over-general concerning both parthood slot and, in the sense of encompassing cases other than slot-filling. Additionally, I argue that the failure of this definition stems from a misguided direction of reduction: without sufficient conditions to distinguish parthood relationship, which is one way of grounding, from other ways, the attempt to reduce slot-filling into grounding is inherently over-general.

It is widely assumed that grounding resembles causation, and some argue that, like causation, grounding is subject to a _proportionality_ constraint. According to this view, a good grounding explanation should identify a ground that is neither too general nor too specific with respect to the groundee. In this paper, I challenge that position. I begin by highlighting a confusion underlying a general argument for proportionality in grounding. I then critically examine two existing approaches to articulating the constraint, both of which tie proportionality to a notion of _difference-making_. One account develops this notion in counterfactual terms, while the other appeals to the process of abstraction. I argue that both approaches are inadequate. Finally, I offer a general objection to the imposition of any proportionality constraint on grounding, drawing on a structural feature of grounding itself. The result of this paper deepens our understanding of grounding by revealing a non-parallel between grounding and causation.

A combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality takes intrinsic properties to be independent of accompaniment: a property is intrinsic only if it is possible for a lonely or an accompanied thing to have it or lack it (I). Cameron argues that the combinatorial analysis in Langton & Lewis (1998) faces an epistemic circularity, which makes (I) suspicious. In this paper, I examine two approaches to free the combinatorial analyses from the circularity and find them all fail. Then I provide an outline of an argument for (I) by appealing to the grounding analyses of intrinsicality, which shows an advantage of the grounding analyses over the combinatorial ones.