Xiaochen Qi

Fine’s reformulation of McTaggart’s paradox may be the most important development in the philosophy of time in recent years. After reformulating this paradox as a contradiction among four principles, Fine identifies four possible theories that can avoid it. This paper focuses on two of them: standard realism and fragmentalism. Fine argues that one advantage of fragmentalism over standard realism is its ability to offer a better account of temporal passage. I argue that this argument fails. On the one hand, standard realism can adequately capture the passage of time by the primitive tense, but only if the tense is understood as describing the tensed way reality is constituted, rather than referring to tensed facts that constitute reality. It is this tensed constitution of reality that captures temporal passage. On the other hand, fragmentalism fails to account for temporal passage because, within its framework, the constitution of reality is fundamentally tenseless.

Fine’s discussion of McTaggart’s paradox and tense realism may be the most significant progress in the philosophy of time in recent years. Fine reformulates McTaggart’s paradox and develops a novel realist theory called fragmentalism. According to Fine, one major advantage of fragmentalism is its ability to account for the connection between reality and tensed truths. I will argue that fragmentalism cannot give an adequate account of this connection. The reason is that while external relations between fragments are required by this kind of account, these relations are not allowed in fragmentalism.

Fine’s discussion of McTaggart’s paradox and tense realism may be the most significant progress in the philosophy of time in recent years. Fine reformulates McTaggart’s paradox and develops a novel realist theory called fragmentalism. According to Fine, one major advantage of fragmentalism is its ability to account for the connection between reality and tensed truths. I will argue that fragmentalism cannot give an adequate account of this connection. The reason is that while external relations between fragments are required by this kind of account, these relations are not allowed in fragmentalism.