Xinyi Zhan

Guo Xiang 郭象 made an innovative development of the Zhuangzian no-self view. This paper analyzes Guo’s conception of the self through the lens of contemporary metaphysics, arguing that his rejection of the conventional understanding of the self for ordinary people corresponds with presentist four-dimensionalism. By asserting that the previous self is not the present self, Guo rejected the notion of an enduring self across time. This idea corresponds with the four-dimensionalist account of persistence. By claiming that the previous self has already vanished, Guo denied the existence of the past self. This view supports a presentist claim that only present things exist. In the presentist four-dimensionalist framework, we can understand how Guo provided a more radical interpretation of the Zhuangzian no-self view better: the presentist four-dimensionalist conception of the self deconstructs both the enduring self and the past self, thereby expanding the no-self view to include ordinary people.

Mind uploading—the transference of mind from a biological brain to a computer— offers the alluring possibility of immortality. This paper provides a novel challenge to mind uploading, focusing on the distinction between abstract objects and concrete individuals. Uploads are abstract objects, while currently, persons are concrete indi- viduals. This presents a dilemma: if the mind is concrete, uploading it to a computer is impossible. Alternatively, if mind uploading is feasible, the resulting abstract upload cannot be numerically identical to the original person. Furthermore, by dif- ferentiating survival from persistence, this paper argues that concrete persons might survive as abstract uploads, but only in a highly restricted sense, without preserving their numerical identity. Despite these philosophical hurdles, practical reasons for considering mind uploading as life nears its end still need to be acknowledged.

The feeling brings the "Hard Problem" to philosophy of mind. Does the subjective feeling have a non-ignorable impact on Intelligence? If so, can the feeling be realized in Artificial Intelligence (AI)? To discuss the problems, we have to figure out what the feeling means, by giving a clear definition. In this paper, we primarily give some mainstream perspectives on the topic of the mind, especially the topic of the feeling (or qualia, subjective experience, etc.). Then, a definition of the feeling is proposed through a thought experiment, the "semi-transparent room". The feeling, roughly to say, is defined as "a tendency of changing input representations by representing its inner state". Also, a formalized definition is given. The definition does not help to verify "having the feeling", but it helps to provide evidence. Based on the definition, we think these are the hard problems of intelligence — whether the "innate" feeling plays an important role in Intelligence, whether the difference between the "simulated" feeling and the "innate" feeling will have a significant influence on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), and, if so, where the "innate" feeling comes from and how to make an artificial agent possess it.

Anti-criterialists argue that there are no criteria that ensure personal persistence. However, this perspective is criticized for resulting in an unacceptable consequence that undermines our intuitions, daily beliefs, and direct introspective awareness of personal persistence. I defend anti-criterialism by responding to this objection and arguing that none of these aspects are undermined by anti-criterialism. The flawed objection against anti-criterialism reveals the excessive ambition of criterialism in seeking criteria for personal persistence with metaphysical necessity, which goes beyond our abilities and needs. As beings living in the actual world, we are not able to consider what happens to personal persistence in remote possible worlds. Moreover, to judge whether a person persists or not in daily life, we do not need a criterion that ensures personal persistence in all situations. Anti-criterialism acknowledges the complexity and variability of personal persistence and offers a more realistic and practical approach to understanding personal identity.

Weak judgmentalism of emotions posits that emotions necessarily involve judgments. However, a standard critique of weak judgmentalism is that it cannot adequately account for the rationality of recalcitrant emotions, which persist despite the agent holding beliefs that conflict with them. This leads to the seemingly counter-intuitive conclusion that recalcitrant emotions are as irrational as logical mistakes. In response to this critique, I make two arguments. First, I distinguish between low-level and high-level beliefs, and argue that having two beliefs with contrary contents at different levels can be rational to some extent. Therefore, weak judgmentalism can explain why recalcitrant emotions are not as irrational as logical mistakes. Second, I argue that recalcitrant emotions involve mental conflicts, while normal emotions do not. By framing the issue in this way, weak judgmentalism can also explain why recalcitrant emotions are not as rational as normal emotions.