Xiuyuan An

The Extended Virtues (EV) theory challenges the traditional notion that an individual’s character traits stem solely from one’s mental state and posits that external factors also play a big part in how we characterize virtues. In critiquing the philosopher Robert Howell’s version of EV, the article advocates for EV by examining the essential constituents of virtues. It emphasizes the necessity of consistent moral decision-making and argues that virtues are better characterized through the active engagement of agents rather than being passively influenced by external conditions. The article also envisions future ethical scenarios where virtues are dynamically integrated with technology and social systems.

The cognitive experience view of thought (CEV) holds that thinking is an experience that has phenomenal character, and the content of thought is determined by its cognitive phenomenology. However, Adam Pautz (2013) argues that CEV implies the possibility of mix-and-match cases, as posited in the recombination argument. This argument suggests that a single cognitive-phenomenal property could potentially be combined with various sensory-phenomenal and functional properties. Consequently, Pautz asserts that specific mix-and-match instances are impossible, ultimately undermining the viability of CEV. This paper argues against Pautz’s argument by pointing out that his argument rests on a false premise and the correct inference is that mix-and-match cases are metaphysically possible. Firstly, this paper follows Lennon’s (2022) reconstruction of Pautz’s recombination argument, showing that it is the distinctness of these three kinds of mental properties that allows them to be separated and coexist with each other, thus defending recombination. Secondly, I focus on some special cases of colour experience to further defend the modal independence of cognitive phenomenology. Thirdly, this paper pushes forward the debate of cognitive experience: even in cases of colour that might seem modally dependent on sensory-phenomenal properties, the possibility of mix-and-match cases can be defended. It reveals that mental representations can be exchanged to cope with more challenging circumstances. As a result, it is plausible to conclude that the mind’s capacity is not limited by rationalization and that there are additional alternatives for representing and understanding mental content.

According to the extended mind thesis (EM) and other enactivism proposals, the extended conscious mind thesis (ECM) asserts that the material substrate of conscious mental states can extend beyond the boundary of the brain and into the environment. However, EM does not entail ECM. We examine the arguments for and against ECM, focusing on the supporting side's reasoning for the parity principle argument and sensorimotor interaction. We contend that their reasoning is flawed, and that they cannot guarantee the enactive effect in explaining all of the characters of consciousness. As a result, we suggest that we need a consensus on the theory of consciousness, one that can meet the conceivability and reflexivity criteria of consciousness, as a theoretical prerequisite for exploring ECM while also assisting us in understanding the nature of mind.

The question of how we can be certain that we have an epistemic justification for our self-knowledge has been among a central debate in philosophy of mind. The basic idea of the immunity to error through misidentification thesis (IEM) in explaining self-knowledge is that certain self-ascriptions of mental states concerning first-person content are not prone to error for the self-conscious ‘I’-thoughts. One of the accounts that supports that claim is agentialism. According to this view, we can have beliefs and intentions about ourselves because we exercise agency over them. However, irrational factors such as emotional interference, inconsistent subject affiliation, and different views on the mind leading to different self-references can call this claim to the subject’s rational agency into question. This paper examines the agentialism, identifies its flaws, and presents two alternative strategies to support a rationalist account of self-knowledge—which is generally weaker than agentialism. It argues that the agential approach to self-knowledge is too demanding on the subject’s consciousness thus a more moderate approach is required to satisfy both first-person authority and the epistemic reliability of self-knowledge.