•  76
    Moral Testimony: Another Defense
    Filosofia Unisinos 25 (2): 1-12. 2024.
    According to some pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an action in which the agent does not think about moral questions by herself, and thus it is unacceptable. I argue for optimism by giving some reasons to display moral agents are still depending upon their own in many cases of moral testimony. Specifically, I argue that testimony is a form of social cooperation: the division of epistemic labor. My strategy is as follows: First, I give a principle to show when an agent could reasonably tru…Read more
  •  385
    A Defense of Presentist Time Travel
    Filozofia Nauki 30 (4): 101-117. 2022.
    Presentism usually holds that only present entities exist. In contrast to presentism, eternalism holds that past, present, and future entities all exist. According to some philosophers, presentism is intuitively incompatible with time travel. In this paper, I defend the compatibility between presentism and time travel by arguing for a plausible account of causation in the presentist framework. To achieve my goal, I respond to an objection to presentist time travel that is based on the nonexisten…Read more
  •  17
    World Citizenship and Global Health
    In Himani Bhakuni & Lucas Miotto (eds.), Justice in Global Health: New Perspectives and Current Issues, Routledge. pp. 15-37. 2023.
    In this chapter, I argue for a weak notion of equal world citizenship, which implies that individuals in the world ought to live as equal world citizens in a significant sense, and then discuss its implications in global health.
  •  627
    Why Be a Relational Egalitarian?
    Philosophical Forum 55 (1): 3-26. 2024.
    Relational egalitarians claim that a situation is just only if everyone it involves relates to one another as equals. It implies that relational egalitarians believe the ideal of “living as equals” (for short) is desirable, and furthermore, necessary for justice. In this paper, I distinguish three accounts of the desirability of the ideal: the instrumental value account, the non‐instrumental value account, and the non‐consequentialist account. I argue that the former two accounts cannot provide …Read more