Yafeng Shan

The functional approach to scientific progress has been mainly developed by Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper, Laudan, and more recently by Shan. The basic idea is that science progresses if key functions of science are fulfilled in a better way. This chapter defends the function approach. It begins with an overview of the two old versions of the functional approach by examining the work of Kuhn, Laudan, Popper, and Lakatos. It then argues for Shan’s new functional approach, in which scientific progress is defined as an increase of usefulness of exemplary practices.

Recently there has been an increasing interest in metaphilosphy. The aim of philosophy has been examined. The development of philosophy has also been scrutinised. With the development of new approaches and methods, new problems arise. This collection revisits some of the metaphilosophical issues, including philosophical progress and the aim of philosophy. It sheds new light on some old approaches, such as naturalism and ordinary language philosophy. It also explores new philosophical methods (e.g., digital philosophy of science, conceptual engineering, and the practice-based approach to logic) and their prospects.

This paper provides a critical review of the debate over philosophical foundations of mixed methods research and examines the notion of philosophical foundations. It distinguishes axiology-oriented from ontology-oriented philosophical foundations. It also identifies three different senses of philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. The weak sense of philosophical foundations (e.g. pragmatism) merely allows the possibility of the integration of both quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs. The moderate sense of philosophical foundations (e.g. transformativism) provide a good reason to use mixed methods in (at least some) social scientific research. The strong sense of philosophical foundations (e.g. dialectical pluralism) justifies a normative thesis that mixed methods research should be encouraged in (at least some) social scientific research.

Evidential Pluralism maintains that in order to establish a causal claim one normally needs to establish the existence of an appropriate conditional correlation and the existence of an appropriate mechanism complex, so when assessing a causal claim one ought to consider both association studies and mechanistic studies. Hitherto, Evidential Pluralism has been applied to medicine, leading to the EBM+ programme, which recommends that evidence-based medicine should systematically evaluate mechanistic studies alongside clinical studies. This paper argues that Evidential Pluralism can also be fruitfully applied to the social sciences. In particular, Evidential Pluralism provides (i) a new approach to evidence-based policy; (ii) an account of the evidential relationships in more theoretical research; and (iii) new philosophical motivation of mixed methods research. The application of Evidential Pluralism to the social sciences is also defended against two objections.

Recently there has been an increasing interest in metaphilosphy. The aim of philosophy has been examined. The development of philosophy has also been scrutinised. With the development of new approaches and methods, new problems arise. This collection revisits some of the metaphilosophical issues, including philosophical progress and the aim of philosophy. It sheds new light on some old approaches, such as naturalism and ordinary language philosophy. It also explores new philosophical methods (e.g., digital philosophy of science, conceptual engineering, and the practice-based approach to logic) and their prospects.

Philosophical progress is one of the most controversial topics in metaphilosophy. It has been widely debated whether philosophy makes any progress in history. This paper revisits the concept of philosophical progress. It first identifies two criteria of an ideal concept of philosophical progress. It then argues that our accounts of philosophical progress fail to provide such an ideal concept. Finally, it argues that not only do we not have a good concept of philosophical progress, we also do not need a concept of philosophical progress in order to arrive at a good understanding of the history of philosophy.

Karl Popper was one of the most influential and productive philosophers of science of the twentieth century. However, Popper’s legacy on contemporary philosophy of science is surprisingly thin. Although his writings are still a must-read in any introductory philosophy of science course, there is no lively Popperian philosophy of science. His falsificationism is not viewed as a plausible account of scientific development. Nor is his solution to the problem of induction regarded as a successful or promising move. It is evident that Popper’s influence on contemporary philosophy of science is fading. In this chapter, I argue that Popper’s legacy should be more than a chapter of a philosophy of science textbook. His philosophy of science is sharply directed at very central issues and still illuminating new directions in the philosophy of science.

This volume revisits and explores Popper’s legacy for contemporary philosophy of science. It develops Popper’s important insights on the methodology and nature of science and investigates new directions in the philosophy of science inspired by Popper’s work. Karl Popper (1902–1994) is regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century. He famously proposed that falsifiability is a genuine virtue of science and the criterion of the scientific status of a theory. Based on this, he developed a systematic account of scientific method and scientific development, namely, falsificationism. Moreover, Popper wrote on a variety of topics, including evolutionary biology, methodological individualism, and probability. However, Popper’s legacy on contemporary philosophy of science is surprisingly thin. This volume develops a Popperian philosophy of science for the twenty-first century. The chapters examine the problem of induction, the demarcation problem, the notion of verisimilitude, critical rationalism, methodological individualism, and the relevance and implications of Popper’s ideas for the philosophy of the natural and social sciences from new perspectives. Karl Popper and the Open Future of the Philosophy of Science will appeal to scholars and graduate students interested in the history and philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, and twentieth-century philosophy.

Given that HPS is now an active and vibrant programme in contemporary philosophy of science, it is a bit surprising that there is no similar programmes in the philosophy of social science. The chapter makes the case for a new direction of research, History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences (HPSS), especially by promoting a historical approach to the philosophy of the social sciences. It shows that HPSS is fruitful and sheds new light on many central issues on the nature, development, and methodologies of the social sciences. I argue that there are three obvious benefits of doing HPSS. First, an in-depth analysis of the classic work on the nature and methodology of the social sciences helps inform contemporary social science research. Second, careful historical case studies will help reassess the important debates in the philosophy of the social sciences as well as the methodological disputes between social scientists. Third, a careful historical examination of the origins and development of the social sciences sheds light on the distinctive features and methodologies of the social sciences.

This book argues for a new direction of research, namely ‘History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences’ (HPSS). By adding a historical approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, the editor and authors show how fruitful HPSS is and simultaneously sheds new light on many central issues concerning the nature, development, and methodologies of the social sciences. This book revisits some classic works on the nature and methodology of the social sciences as well as offering a careful historical examination of the origins and development of a selection of social sciences and their distinctive methodologies. By reassessing the important debates in the philosophy of the social sciences as well as the methodological disputes between social scientists, the book provides a valuable resource to researchers and advanced students, but also to general readers.

This paper provides a critical review of the debate over the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research and examines the notion of philosophical foundations. It distinguishes axiology‐oriented from ontology‐oriented philosophical foundations. It also identifies three different senses of philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. The weak sense of philosophical foundations (e.g., pragmatism) merely allows the possibility of the integration of both quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs. The moderate sense of philosophical foundations (e.g., transformativism) provide a good reason to use mixed methods in (at least some) social scientific research. The strong sense of philosophical foundations (e.g., dialectical pluralism) justifies a normative thesis that mixed methods research should be encouraged in (at least some) social scientific research.

It has been over 60 years since Ernst Mayr famously argued for the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. In the following decades, Mayr’s proximate-ultimate distinction was well received within evolutionary biology and widely regarded as a major contribution to the philosophy of biology. Despite its enormous influence, there has been a persistent controversy on the distinction. It has been argued that the distinction is untenable. In addition, there have been complaints about the pragmatic value of the distinction in biological research. Some even suggest that the distinction should better be abandoned. In contrast, Mayr had consistently maintained the significance of the proximate-ultimate distinction in biology. There are also other attempts to defend the distinction. The paper examines the debate by taking an integrated History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) approach and argues for a functional approach to causal concepts in scientific practice.

Despite his enormous influence on the philosophy of science, Kuhn seems to have been unfairly treated by philosophers. His work was often oversimplified, misinterpreted, and quickly dismissed. The legacy of Kuhn for contemporary philosophy of science seems to be unfortunately thin. This book revisits his legacy for the history and philosophy of science and reflects on the prospect of the Kuhnian philosophy of science. It explores Kuhnian or neo-Kuhnian approaches to central issues in twenty-first philosophy of science. It also rereads Kuhn's published and unpublished work and reassesses its philosophical significance and historical context.

Among biologists and philosophers, there is an ongoing debate over the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. Some argue that our current evolutionary biology is in need of (at least) some substantial revision or nontrivial extension, while others maintain that the Modern Synthesis remains the foundational framework for evolutionary biology. It has been widely debated whether the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis provides a more promising framework than the Modern Synthesis. The nature and methodological implications of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis were also examined. This paper offers an integrated historical and philosophical examination of the debate over the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. It reviews the development of evolutionary biology of the twentieth century. It argues that there are substantial conceptual and theoretical differences between the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, but they are not incommensurable paradigms in the Kuhnian sense. It also argues for a functional approach to the debate over these two frameworks of evolutionary theory.

Thomas Kuhn is widely considered as one of the most important philosophers of science in the 20th century and his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is regarded as one of the most influential works in the philosophy of science. This book not only revisits his legacy in the history and philosophy of science but also explores and reflects on the prospect of the Kuhnian philosophy. Moreover, it includes the edited text of Kuhn’s ‘Does Knowledge Grow?’, which was never published before. Comprised of 15 newly written chapters by leading Kuhn scholars and philosophers of science across the globe from ten countries, this book is of great interest to researchers and advanced students, but also to general readers.

The epistemic theory of causality views causality as a tool that helps us to predict, explain and control our world, rather than as a relation that exists independently of our epistemic practices. In this chapter, we first provide an introduction to the epistemic theory of causality. We then outline four considerations that motivate the epistemic theory: the failure of standard theories of causality; parsimony; the epistemology of causality; and neutrality. We illustrate these four considerations in the contexts of the social sciences and the cognitive sciences. We argue that the epistemic theory provides a very natural account of causality across these contexts.

Philosophical analyses of causation have been centred on the question of what causation is. More precisely speaking, philosophers tend to address four different issues: metaphysical (what is causation out there?), epistemological (how can a causal claim be established and assessed?), conceptual (what does the word ‘cause’ mean?), and methodological (what methods ought one to use in order to establish and assess causal claims?). This chapter argues that the practical issue of causation (what is a causal claim for in practice?) is highly relevant to the metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual, and methodological issues of causation. Any philosophical enquiry into causation without an examination of this practical issue is incomplete. In other words, a promising approach to causation ought to take all of the metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual, methodological, and practical issues into account.

Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) is widely considered as one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, while his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) is regarded as one of the most influential works in the philosophy ofscience. At the same time, however, his place within philosophy of science remains ambiguous. On the one hand, despite the popularity of SSR, there is no proper ‘Kuhnian school of thought’ in HPS. On the other hand, the interest towards Kuhn does not seem to fade away and the number of publications about his work does not seem to decrease. We suggest that there are at least three different ways to go ‘beyond SSR’: (i) by scrutinising the development of Kuhn’s thought, from his pre- to his post-SSR writings; (ii) by contextualising Kuhn in the philosophical milieu of his time, thus interpreting his view as emerging from the intellectual exchanges he had with contemporary philosophers; (iii) by reinterpreting and developing some of his most known ideas, in ways that perhaps Kuhn himself was not able to contemplate.

A variety of philosophical positions have been proposed and developed to motivate, justify, and guide mixed methods research. This chapter provides a brief overview of the main positions in the debate over the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. It shows that ‘philosophical foundations’ means differently while different positions provide ‘philosophical foundations’ in different senses. It also highlights the significance of the collaboration between researchers and philosophers in the examination of the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research.

Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods Research provides a comprehensive examination of the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. It offers new defences of the seven main approaches to mixed methods (the pragmatist approach, the transformative approach, the indigenous approach, the dialectical approach, the dialectical pluralist approach, the performative approach, and the realist approach) written by leading mixed methods researchers. Each approach is accompanied by critical reflections chapter from philosophers’ point of view. The book shows the value of the use of mixed methods from a philosophical point of view, and offers a systematic and critical examination of these positions and approaches from a philosophical point of view. The volume also offers a platform to promote a dialogue between mixed methods researchers and philosophers of science, and provides foundations for further research and teaching of this hotly debated topic.

Causation is one of the most controversial topics in philosophy. There is a wide range of philosophical accounts of causation, for example, the regularity account, the probabilistic account, the counterfactual account, the interventionist account, which can be all classified as ‘difference-making’ accounts; and the mechanistic account. Many argue that only one of these accounts is correct as there is only one type of causal relation (causal monism), while others maintain that there are multiple types of causation (causal pluralism). In addition, there are eliminativists argue that science has no need of causation at all, while primitivists maintain that causation is unanalysable. Recently, the difference-making and mechanistic approaches have dominated recent philosophical discussion of causation. Other approaches and positions have been insufficiently discussed and assessed, especially in the context of philosophy of science. This volume explores and examines alternative approaches to causation. It revisits causal primitivism and causal eliminativism in the context of recent literature. It further explores the pluralistic approach, the fictionalist approach, the inferentialist approach, and the informational approach. It also examines the application of the dispositional approach, the epistemic approach, and the powerful particulars approach to the natural and social sciences. Overall, the volume is complementary to the recent discussion on the difference-making and mechanistic approaches and sheds new light on the metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual and methodological issues on causation. As such, it provides foundations for further research and teaching of this hotly debated topic.

Bird’s new book, Knowing Science, provides an exemplar of how to do epistemology and philosophy of science together. While I wholeheartedly appreciate his attempt to bridge the gap between epistemology and philosophy of science and find his project promising, I am not convinced by the central thesis of the book that knowledge plays a central role in science. In this article, I focus on Bird’s epistemic account of scientific progress, which is the view that the nature of scientific progress is the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Contra Bird, I argue that scientific progress cannot be fully characterised as the accumulation of scientific knowledge.

‘History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it,’ Winston Churchill is famously said to have quipped. That he never seems to have actually made this comment is beside the point, since the message is important: past events never speak for themselves. Facts do not settle like rocks in a dry river, but are moved, displaced, and replaced by waters that continue to gush. The currents and their temperates are sensetative to mores, signs of their times. And the keepers of the waters, more often than not, are historians. This special issue is devoted to new directions in the historiography of genetics, a field that has seen particularly lively drift, swirl, and surge in recent decades.

Scientific revolution has been one of the most controversial topics in the history and philosophy of science. Yet it has been no consensus on what is the best unit of analysis in the historiography of scientific revolutions. Nor is there a consensus on what best explains the nature of scientific revolutions. This chapter provides a critical examination of the historiography of scientific revolutions. It begins with a brief introduction to the historical development of the concept of scientific revolution, followed by an overview of the five main philosophical accounts of scientific revolutions. It then challenges two historiographical assumptions of the philosophical analyses of scientific revolutions.

Social scientists often draw on a variety of evidence for their causal inferences. There is also a call to use a greater variety of evidence in social science research. This topical collection examines the philosophical foundations and implications of evidential diversity in the social sciences. It assesses the application of Evidential Pluralism in the context of the social sciences, especially its application to economics and political science. It also discusses the concept of causation in cognitive science and the implications of evidential diversity for the social sciences.