Yanai Sened

Epistemic virtue theory has run into the problem of passive perceptions—forms of knowledge achieved through a process so trivial that it seems wrong to argue that it relies on virtue. In defense of epistemic virtue, I argue that even such simple forms of knowledge rely on virtue. I address the critique, focusing on its formulation by Jason Baehr, by first examining some of its intuitive appeal, some of which comes from an implicit assumption that virtue cannot be ubiquitous. I dismiss this critique as misrepresenting the core commitments of general virtue theory. I then establish a causal account linking virtue and passive perception through the process of habituation. To achieve the ability to acquire knowledge passively, one has to employ epistemic virtue to habituate oneself as a good perceiver. I show that this is especially evident in cases where supposedly passively-achieved knowledge becomes harder to achieve, such as under time-stress or when living with disability. Finally, I demonstrate that the stakes of this discussion are not merely semantic but are important for an idea of epistemic responsibility. People have responsibilities to know certain things, and those responsibilities sometimes require habituating oneself to be a better passive perceiver.

Anger is often criticized for its lack of instrumental value. In Myisha Cherry’s The Case for Rage, she responds to such critiques by arguing for ‘Lordean rage’, anger that is uniquely productive for fighting against injustice. Unlike Cherry, I bite the bullet and argue that, even if anger tends to fail in achieving its goals, there are good instrumental reasons to remain angry. Anger should be seen as an emotion that encourages incurring costs and risks to achieve a goal that has been thwarted, and whether or not one should remain angry depends on details about the risks, costs, likelihood of success and desirability of the goal. My paradigm example is anger at systemic injustice. I argue that, while anger against systemic injustice is unlikely to achieve its goal, that says more about systemic injustice than it does about anger. I argue that abandoning anger could discourage fighting systemic injustice. I further argue that anger often arises when one has faith that a better world is possible and understands our world as unjust for not being that world. Abandoning anger could weaken one’s resolve in fighting that injustice.