Yang Xiao

This book is about the philosophical, historical, and interpretative aspects of Mencius. It explores his influence, reception, and relevance in China from the third century BCE to the present, as well as offers comparative studies of Mencius and major figures in the history of Chinese and Western philosophy. With 34 accessible articles written by leading philosophers and scholars, the Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius provides both broad pictures and in-depth discussions regarding the work of one of the most important and influential Chinese philosophers. It covers his normative ethics, meta-ethics, political philosophy, epistemology and moral psychology. The last section of the volume, “Mencius and Western Philosophers: Comparative Perspectives,” explicitly puts him in dialogue with major Western philosophers. The Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius serves as an essential volume for college students, graduate students, and scholars who study and teach Mencius as well as Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy in general.​

This dissertation deals with the following three questions which will likely be classified as questions in different areas of specialization, the philosophy of action, comparative-historical studies, and ethics respectively: What is the essence of voluntary action? Do classical Chinese philosophers have the concept of voluntary action? What role does the concept of the will play in ethics? ;In this dissertation I argue for two related theses. As an answer to question 1, my first thesis is that the essence of voluntary action is not the will. This thesis is the basis for my argument against a relativist answer to the question 2. Some scholars have argued that classical Chinese philosophers do not have the concept of voluntary action, because they do not have the concept of the will. Their argument is based on a false answer to question 1), i.e., the false idea that the essence of voluntary action is the will, which is exactly the opposite of my first thesis. So if my first thesis is true, their arguments would collapse. ;My second thesis is my answer to question 3 "If the will is not invented for a theory of voluntary action, what is it invented for?" My answer is the following: for a large class of cases---usually historical figures such as the early Wittgenstein, Augustine, Confucius and Mencius---in which we find the concept of the will, the will is invented for ethical purposes. ;The dissertation consists in two parts. Part I is my argument for the first thesis. My argument is based on the later Wittgenstein's work. I also show the limits of his arguments and how to fix them. In Part II, I show in details how the actual histories of the inventions of the concept of the will vary greatly from Augustine to the early Wittgenstein, and to Confucius and Mencius. The significance of the dissertation is that this diverse picture will help us imagine new possible forms of ethical life, which is, I believe, the purpose of historical-comparative studies. Or, indeed, the purpose of philosophy

Ideal interpretation is understanding a text in the best possible way. It is usually used when the text has a canonical status, such as the Bible or the U.S. Constitution. We argue that Zhu Xi’s view about interpreting the Four Books and Ronald Dworkin’s view about constitutional interpretation are examples of ideal interpretation and that their basic principles are similar. Each holds, roughly, that their target text contains moral truth; that the author’s mind requires the mediation of learning; that the purpose of interpretation is not only to lead the reader to the moral truth but to become a better person; that all propositions are about the same moral truth or about political justice; that the interpretation ultimately must come from oneself, purged of prejudices; and that the only correct interpretation is one that captures the original meaning.