Yanlin Liao

Virtue argumentation theory is a new approach to argumentation research that injects the virtue perspective that has emerged in contemporary ethics and epistemology research into argumentation analysis and evaluation. The virtue approach is an important methodology in philosophical research. This book is one of the books in the pragmatic logic library series. It consists of 12 representative papers in the field of virtue argumentation research. It aims to explore the reconstruction of ancient Chinese logic with Western virtue argumentation theory, and at the same time let the virtue thought of Chinese philosophy play a unique role in the systematic construction of virtue argumentation theory, laying the foundation for further communication and dialogue between Chinese and Western argumentation theories.

Recent disputes on the negative considerations of conduction give rise to the legitimacy crisis of conduction. Adler argues that the definition of conduction implies two incompatible claims which make conduction impossible. The crux of the impossibility of conduction argued by Adler can be summarized as a question: is it possible that the conclusions of conductive arguments are unqualified while the negative considerations remain viable? For this question, Xie & Xiong and Xie provide the rhetorical solution, which claims that the negative considerations only have the rhetorical roles so they are not viable at all in the arguments. On the contrary, Blair presents the logical solution, which contends that the negative considerations have logical roles so they can weaken the strength of argument. This chapter first reconstructs Adler’s argument as well as the variant of it and then presents the criticism of the rhetorical and the logical solutions. Although Blair’s logical solution can resolve Adler’s challenge by transferring the qualification of conclusions to the qualification of argument strength, it does not completely defend the legitimacy of conduction. In order to better defend the legitimacy of conduction, the logical roles of the negative considerations are needed to be fully justified. In this connection, I provide a new proposal which focuses on the criteria of argument strength. From non-conductive defeasible arguments to conductive arguments, the criteria of argument strength will be changed from one item to two items. This change is caused by the existence of negative considerations, which shows the logical roles of negative considerations. Therefore, the legitimacy of conduction can be fully justified.

Recent disputes :57–79, 2013; Mizrahi in Inform Logic 36:238–252, 2016; Mizrahi in Argumentation 32:175–195, 2018; Seidel in Inform Logic 34:192–218, 2014; Seidel in Inform Logic 36:253–264, 2016; Hinton in Inform Logic 35:539–554, 2015) on the strength of arguments from expert opinion give rise to a potential legitimacy crisis of it. Mizrahi :57–79, 2013; Inform Logic 36:238–252; Argumentation 32:175–195, 2018) claims that AEO are weak arguments by presenting two independent arguments. The first argument is that AEO are weak arguments because empirical studies show that expert opinions p do not make p significantly more likely to be true. The second argument is that AEO are weak arguments because empirical studies show that expert opinions are susceptible to the kinds of cognitive biases that novice opinions are susceptible to. In this paper, I intend to argue that Mizrahi’s two arguments both fail because of inconsistency, irrelevance, and insufficiency. Nevertheless, Mizrahi’s arguments help to evaluate AEO better by expanding the relevant critical questions.

The orthodox view holds that analogical arguments are a distinctive type of argument, while the eliminative view and its enhanced variant proposed in this paper contend that analogical arguments can be reducible to non-analogical arguments by eliminating the similarities proposition. This paper shows that the existing defense for the orthodox view fails to tackle the challenge posed by the eliminative view and its enhanced variant. The new defense for the distinctiveness of analogical arguments argues that an analogical argument is composed of both a conductive and principle-based argument. Consequently, analogical arguments remain irreducible, as the similarities proposition is not eliminated.

This paper aims to further explore the potentiality of integrating key insights from virtue argumentation theory into pragma-dialectics to establish a virtuous pragma-dialectics. Drawing methodological inspiration from Gascón’s work, this paper introduces the “conditions-implications framework.” Firstly, it argues that virtues offer novel perspectives on the second-order conditions of critical discussion. Specifically, it illustrates that excessive emotional attachment and identity prejudice hinder the reasonable engagement of arguers at both individual and socio-cultural levels, and virtues play a pivotal role in overcoming these irrational factors. Furthermore, integrating virtue insights into pragma-dialectics leads to two important theoretical implications: (1) an expanded fallacy theory—revealing the connection between argumentative vices and fallacies, expanding fallacies from a unilateral to a bilateral issue; (2) an expanded strategic maneuvering theory—virtue contributes to maintaining the delicate balance between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness. The virtue approach is anticipated to act as a facilitator rather than an obstruction to the future advancement of pragma-dialectics.

This paper critically examines the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of visual arguments and proposes a resolution to this issue. Using a type-theory framework, the legitimacy of visual arguments is addressed through two key sub-problems. First, the paper argues that visual arguments exist, with their existence grounded in dynamic existentialism. Second, it contends that visual argumentation theory can expand argumentation theory in both descriptive and normative aspects. The paper advocates for a moderate defense of visual arguments, offering a stronger foundation for future research in the field. Résumé: Cet article examine de manière critique le débat actuel sur la légitimité des arguments visuels et propose une solution à ce problème. En s'appuyant sur la théorie des types, la légitimité des arguments visuels est abordée à travers deux sous-problèmes clés. Premièrement, l'article soutient l'existence des arguments visuels, fondée sur l'existentialisme dynamique. Deuxièmement, il soutient que la théorie de l'argumentation visuelle peut élargir la théorie de l'argumentation, tant sur le plan descriptif que normatif. L'article prône une défense modérée des arguments visuels, offrant ainsi une base plus solide aux recherches futures dans ce domaine.