Yanxi Li

Building on attribution theory, this study investigates the antecedents of corporate annual report text manipulation from the perspective of managerial performance pressure. Using a data set comprising 15,076 samples from companies listed on China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets between 2009 and 2021, we reveal that as management faces performance pressure, they tend to increase content about external environmental risk and policy uncertainty in annual reports due to actor–observer bias. When incorporating Confucian cultural factors into the research framework, the study found that the strength of Confucian culture mitigates the correlation between the pressure of management performance and annual report manipulation. However, the level of marketization where a corporation is located can undermine the ethical norms upheld by Confucian culture. In additional analysis, we also discovered that the longer the duration of performance pressure, the greater the extent of manipulation within the annual reports initiated by the management. Interestingly, the social performance pressure generated from ESG performance also positively influences annual report textual manipulation, compared to operational performance pressure. This study explores the impact of management performance pressure on information disclosure decisions from the perspective of performance attribution, not only extending the boundaries of attribution theory but also providing guidance for policymakers to enhance the supervision of annual report disclosures and for capital market investors to optimize investment decisions.

The Organization Department of the Communist Party of China announced the Opinions on Further Regulation on Party and Political Leaders and Cadres Working Part-Time in Enterprises to force the resignation of government officials holding the position of independent director in listed companies. This paper empirically examines the impact of the GID resignation on firm performance using a difference-in-differences model, which is an exogenous event with a “natural experiment.” The study finds that after the promulgation of the Opinions, firms that lose some of their political resources and their corporate performance decreases significantly compared to firms that do not experience GID resignations. A good external governance environment, while somewhat weakening, is not sufficient to offset the negative impact of the loss of political resources on firm performance. This paper further explores the mechanism by which the GID resignation affects firm performance: one important way in which the resignation of GIDs cause the loss of political resources on which the firm's development depends is that the loss of the firm's tax benefits after GID resignation directly leads to a decline in performance; it also leads to a reduction in the firm's financial subsidy income and a reduction in the amount of bank loans, but both of these do not have a significant effect on the decline in firm performance. The study suggests that GIDs play more of a resource-providing “official” role than an “independent director's” supervisory and advisory role in Chinese listed companies. The findings of this paper reveal the phenomenon of “Political-Business Spin” in China, which has some implications for developing countries, represented by China, to improve the independence of the board of directors and the corporate governance.