Yao Lin

Bernard Williams contends that philosophy is part of a broader humanistic enterprise of “making sense of” ourselves and our activities, including the activity of science. Whereas the scientific enterprise purports to offer an absolute conception of the world as it is (independently of any local perspective on it), the humanistic enterprise cannot disengage itself from the contingent history of our ideas upon which it operates. While I agree with Williams that philosophy should be more attentive to history, his account of philosophy, from which he derives this conclusion, is fatally flawed, being unable to meet three perennial challenges to any principled defense of philosophy as a discipline: i.e. the questions of authority, incubativity and peculiarity. Those challenges can be met only if we understand philosophy not as a humanistic discipline that is part of the broader humanistic enterprise, but as a distinctively normative discipline that tasks itself with finding answers to explicitly or implicitly normative questions, in contrast to various scientific and humanistic disciplines of descriptive inquiry. In this paper, I argue for the equivalence of philosophicality with normativity, explicate the theoretical and practical implications of the normative account of philosophy, and defend it against potential objections.

Using Wang Anshi's Reform as a case study, Yuhua Wang's "Blood is Thicker Than Water" (American Political Science Review, 2022) argues that geographically dispersed kinship networks incentivize political elites to support the building of a strong state, whereas geographically concentrated kinship networks undermine state building. In this paper, I improve the sample with the help of additional historical records, and show that the reported correlation fails to replicate when either the control issue or the outlier issue is considered. I then propose two alternative hypotheses on the role of kinship network dispersal in Wang Anshi's Reform, based on two common explanations of its partisanship geography in Chinese historical scholarship, i.e. status-competition and policy-adaptiveness. After examining those hypotheses respectively, I reflect on the limits of quantitative history this case illustrates.

This paper redresses the neglect of interregimatic solidarity—solidarity between collective anti-oppression struggles in purportedly antithetical regimes—in transnational feminist scholarship. I argue that authoritarian and demostatist regimatic contexts of oppression give rise to regimatically distinct oppressive kinds, which track their regimatic subjects of oppression respectively, and that this fact significantly increases the risk of interregimatic missolidarization in lieu of interregimatic solidarity. In response, we need to cultivate antiauthoritarian resilience, which is both an epistemic virtue and a moral virtue. Epistemically, it helps us navigate a world characterized by the dynamics of authoritarian spillover, demostatist sellout, imperial standoff and capitalist scaleup, comprehend how regimatic oppressions are interconnected, and appreciate the practical import of interregimatic solidarity. Morally, antiauthoritarian resilience helps us discern and discard moral parochialism and cynical moralism, both impeding the exercise of interregimatic solidarity. I conclude with tentative thoughts on when, for whom and to what extent interregimatic solidarity is morally obligatory, if its realization depends on cultivating the virtue of antiauthoritarian resilience.

While I find Huaping Lu-Adler’s excavation of Kant’s long-overlooked linguistic Orientalism both enlightening and thought-provoking, I disagree with her diagnosis of its theoretical and practical relevance. On the one hand, while I agree that Kant’s positionality renders all his writings and teachings presumptively impactful, there is reason to doubt that his peculiar construction of the linguistic Oriental Other had much actual impact on his disciples. On the other hand, while I agree that the Kantian ideal of public reason is inapt for rectifying the linguistic-epistemic injustices of global knowledge production, I disagree on why it is so. In particular, I argue for a shift in theoretical and practical focuses, from linguistic biases and prejudices, to the structural epistemic constraints of linguistic diversity, as well as to other political-structural conditions shaping global knowledge production.

In a typical fantasy universe, distribution of supernatural capacities across the population is extremely unequal. The Bending World is no exception. A minority of people are born benders, while the majority are born nonbenders. Granted, no bender appears to be (super)powerful enough to subdue all other benders at once, and political assassinations do occur in the Bending World. The reincarnation of the Avatar can be seen as an instance of the more general problem of leadership succession, a concern in both our world and the Bending World. In time, democracy will crumble in the face of persistent supernatural inequality – whether giving way to another zealous experiment in support of watchful bloodbending “de‐benders,” or being overthrown by someone who happens to be the most powerful bender in the world. All in all, the Bending World is – much more so than ours – a bent world.

This paper calls for a paradigm shift in studying academic dependency, towards the paradigm of brokered dependency. Using Chinese academia as an example, I demonstrate how the neocolonial condition of academic dependency is always mediated through blockage-brokerage mechanisms. The two most salient blockage-brokerage mechanisms of dependency in the Chinese context are linguistic barrier and authoritarian malepistemization, and the effects of the latter consist of three layers: institutional, informational and incorporational. On top of their domestic impacts, those mechanisms jointly exacerbate spectacularized postcoloniality in anglophone-hegemonic global academic publishing. The paradigm of brokered dependency not only represents a more nuanced approach to the study of academic dependency, but also underscores the fact that the dismantling of the neocolonial condition cannot be conceived and pursued in isolation from comprehending and confronting the authoritarian condition, especially when the latter pertains under the disguise of anticolonialism.

In the world of Avatar: The Last Airbender (ATLA) and The Legend of Korra (LOK) —let’s call it the Bending World—some people (“benders”) are endowed with telekinetic superpowers to maneuver surrounding objects without physical interaction, by mentally steering (“bending”) one of the four classical “elements of nature” composing the objects: air, fire, water, and earth. Perhaps, in a world where the fundamental laws of nature are radically different from those of our world, the fundamental conditions and manifestations of politics should be radically different too. That, of course, is not to deny that political bodies familiar to us are depicted in ATLA and LOK: tribes, monarchies, autonomous townships, city-states, loose federations, colonial empires, and democracies. Despite those familiar depictions, however, it’s worth contemplating how the existence of supernatural power might fundamentally alter the norms and rationales of politics—and how it might in turn help us better understand our own political reality.

In “Confucianism and Same-Sex Marriage,” published recently in Politics and Religion, Professor Tongdong Bai argues for a “moderate Confucian position on same-sex marriage,” one that supports its legalization and yet endeavors “to use public opinion and social and political policies to encourage heterosexual marriages, and to prevent same-sex marriages from becoming the majority form of marriages” (Bai 2021:146). Against the backdrop of downright homophobia prevalent among vocal Confucians in mainland China today, Bai claims that his pro-legalization rendition “show[s] a different version of Confucianism that challenges the received perception of Confucianism that it is deeply conservative, a perception that often lies at the core of the rejection of its contemporary relevance, especially by the so-called ‘liberals’ in China and elsewhere” (Bai 2021:133). Furthermore, Bai claims that his moderate Confucianism is normatively preferrable to “the typical liberal or individualist position” of a marriage equality supporter, because the specter of polygamy – the conservative trope of invoking polygamy as a reductio ad absurdum against same-sex marriage – imposes “a serious challenge” to liberals but not to moderate Confucians (Bai 2021:146, 153). Both of Bai’s claims falter upon scrutiny, however. Granted, it is applaudable that Bai tries to dissuade his more conservative Confucian colleagues from opposing the legalization of same-sex marriage. But as Section 1 of this Response will show, the alternative rendition of Confucianism he presents, along with the way he presents it, is premised on a highly contested conception of what shared Confucian values are; does injustice to Confucians who embrace marriage equality more unreservedly (i.e., without caveats à la Bai); fails to produce new arguments that “enrich the theoretical basis for same-sex marriage” (Bai 2021:133); and, ironically, reinforces – rather than “challenges” – the “received perception” of Confucianism as deeply conservative. Meanwhile, Section 2 will show that Bai’s comparison between liberalism and moderate Confucianism relies both upon an apparent unfamiliarity with the extensive and nuanced liberal discussions on polygamy, and upon fallacious methods of assessing comparative normative valence. Finally, Section 3 will offer some concluding thoughts from the perspective of decolonial theory, examining the dynamic of spectacularized postcoloniality that propels the production and consumption of dubious theoretical projects like Bai’s. As it turns out, this case serves not only as a cautionary tale of how not to conduct comparative normative theorizing, but also as a cautionary tale of how not to let the spectacle of postcoloniality derail the pursuit of academic decolonization.

This article examines the puzzling phenomenon that many Chinese liberal intellectuals fervently idolize Donald Trump and embrace the alt-right ideologies he epitomizes. Rejecting ‘pure tactic’ and ‘neoliberal affinity’ explanations, it argues that the Trumpian metamorphosis of Chinese liberal intellectuals is precipitated by their ‘beacon complex’, which has ‘political’ and ‘civilizational’ components. Political beaconism grows from the traumatizing lived experience of Maoist totalitarianism, sanitizes the West and particularly the United States as politically near-perfect, and gives rise to both a neoliberal affinity and a latent hostility toward baizuo. Civilizational beaconism, sharing with its nationalistic counterpart -- civilizational vindicativism -- the heritages of scientific racism and social Darwinism imported in late-Qing, renders the Chinese liberal intelligentsia receptive to anti-immigrant and Islamophobic paranoia, exacerbates its anti-baizuo sentiments, and catalyzes its Trumpian convergence with Chinese non-liberals.

This article is the first in a two-paper series, which offers a comprehensive and systematic review of, and response to, various anti-MeToo arguments made by MeToo skeptics. Taking the U.S. and China as examples, the first section overviews the local contexts of anti-sexual-assault/harassment movements, and the respective issues and challenges they each confront. It then summarizes the three primary objectives of the MeToo movement (accountability, empowerment and reform) and the three ideal-typical critiques advanced by MeToo skeptics (the Mobs Critique, the Damsels-in-Distress Critique, and the Puritans Critique). The second through fourth sections will address various versions of the Mobs Critique and the fifth section the Damsels-in-Distress Critique, whereas the Puritans Critique will be left for the forthcoming second article in the series. More specifically, the second and third sections of this article discuss how MeToo skeptics misappropriate the notions of “presumption of innocence” and “trial by public opinion” respectively. As it turns out, the caricature of the MeToo movement (as well as other movements aiming at swaying the public opinion) as the tyranny of mobs jeopardizing the rule of law reflects nothing but the skeptics’ own misconceptions of what the rule of law is and what we should learn from our historical experiences. The fourth and fifth sections respond, respectively, to the “argument from false accusations” and the “argument from self-victimization.” By reviewing conclusions of existing empirical researches and analyzing the conceptual and normative confusions underlying those arguments, I show how sex and gender biases distort implicitly yet systematically our cognitions of sexual assault and harassment. Because of the systematicity of such distortions, isolated resistances cannot effectively address the problems of sexual assault and harassment; by contrast, public opinion movements, such as MeToo, are exactly the kind of collective action crucial to the transformation of sociocultural ideas, and to the development of new institutions of effective remedy. 本文是计划中一系列两篇文章的上篇，旨在对MeToo运动质疑者的各种常见观点及论述加以较为全面系统的辨析及回应。第一节以美国与中国为例，梳理反性侵扰运动的地方脉络，及在各自脉络中发展出的问题意识与面临的挑战；在此基础上，总结MeToo运动追责、赋能与促变之三重诉求，并将质疑者的论调归纳为三大类型：“群氓批判”、“弱女子批判”与“道学家批判”。第二至四节针对“群氓批判”的不同版本做出回应，第五节着力批驳“弱女子批判”，至于“道学家批判”则留待系列的下篇再行讨论。 具体而言，第二、三两节分别澄清质疑者对“无罪推定”与“舆论审判”概念的滥用与误用，指出为何质疑者将MeToo运动（以及其它公共舆论运动）视为践踏法治的群氓狂欢，乃是基于对法治原则的错误理解、以及对历史经验的错位应激。第四节与第五节各自通过对质疑者“虚假指控论”与“自我受害者化论”的剖析，包括对相关经验研究的总结讨论、以及对此类论述中概念与逻辑的抽丝剥茧，揭示性别偏见如何隐蔽而深入地扭曲着我们在性侵扰问题上的认知。恰恰是由于这种扭曲的系统性，导致我们无法以散兵游勇的方式有效反对性侵扰，而必须动员起MeToo这样的公共舆论运动，以集体行动的方式促成社会文化观念的变革，并在此基础上建设起新的救济制度。