Yaron Wolf

Does experience itself unfold in time? This paper defends an extensional account of temporal consciousness—on which the temporal properties we directly experience match the temporal properties of experience itself—while drawing upon features of agential awareness. After showing that recent debate on the ability of introspection to settle the question about the temporal properties of experience leaves us in a dialectical impasse, I develop a new argument in favor of the extensional account based on introspection into, and veridicality conditions of our awareness of (some) bodily actions. I then address the appropriate framing of the temporal character or ontology of conscious experience on the extensional view, in light of the claims concerning agential awareness. I discuss and critique a prominent version of the extensional account, according to which temporally extended experiences covering whole intervals possess explanatory and metaphysical priority over their temporal parts. I proceed to suggest that attention to facets of agential awareness yields the outlines of a position on which extended experience should rather be understood as processual in its temporal character.

This paper examines Bergson’s position concerning the relation between memory and the immediate experience of change. I argue that Bergson’s view, which has not been discussed in significant detail in the literature, can shed new light upon recent debates on the topic. I approach this in three steps. First, I examine the “memory theory” of immediate temporal experience in its two main forms — a “traditional” version and a “modified” account — situating Bergson’s views vis-à-vis this distinction. Second, I explore a contemporary defence of the memory theory and underline a limitation in this account. Finally, I focus on a feature of Bergson’s reflections on memory and temporal experience that can potentially address this limitation.

This thesis engages with central debates on the nature of temporal experience, drawing upon the thought of Henri Bergson. Part one, comprising two chapters, critically explores two issues at the forefront of contemporary research on the experience of time. The first chapter examines attempts by B-theorists of time to address the manifest flow of temporal experience, arguing that these have been thus far unsuccessful. The second chapter focuses on recent articulations of the Process View of temporal experience, according to which temporal experience itself has temporal structure. Recent varieties of the Process View, I argue, do not satisfactorily accommodate the experientially robust insight which provides the most powerful motivation for the position. This insight is captured by what I call the Experiential Process Thesis: we have a pre-reflective sense that our experience of change itself unfolds through time. Part two, comprising three chapters, brings to bear perspectives from Bergson's work on debates concerning temporal experience. The third chapter connects themes from the first two. I argue that Bergson's account of temporal experience provides resources for a successful articulation of the Process View, insofar as it can accommodate the Experiential Process Thesis. What allows us to give shape to the thesis, on Bergson's account, is the explanatory role ascribed to an experiential feature of qualitative flow, which Bergson terms durée. The fourth chapter discusses (i) the relation between memory and temporal experience, and (ii) the unity of experience over time. I suggest that Bergson's account cogently motivates a memory theory of temporal experience - which takes memory to be partially constitutive of immediate temporal experience - in contrast with a recent formulation of the memory account. I then argue that a view of experiential unity over time appealing to Bergson's durée is a theoretically parsimonious and phenomenologically attractive alternative to a number of proposals from the recent literature. In the fifth chapter, I focus on a frequently-discussed feature of 'continuous novelty' in temporal experience. I examine a suggestion from Bergson's work, according to which this aspect is paradigmatically found in a sub-class of agential experiences, namely experiences of creative agency.

Bergson’s influential discussion of durée—the concept at the heart of his dynamic view of time’s reality—emerges from an inquiry into the nature of temporal experience. In this chapter, I outline Bergson’s view of the non-inferential or immediate experience of time, and mark out the place of durée within his account. I underscore the relation between Bergson’s controversial argument concerning number and his view of temporal experience, and contrast Bergson’s notion of ‘immediate experience’ with immediacy as typically understood in contemporary thought. Bergson’s view of the experience of time, I suggest, is a dual-aspect theory in which durée is accorded a fundamental role in relation to the temporal properties of succession, intervals, and simultaneity.

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) is widely regarded as one of the most original and important philosophers of the twentieth century. His work explored a rich panoply of subjects, including time, memory, free will and humor and we owe the popular term élan vital to a fundamental insight of Bergson's. His books provoked responses from some of the leading thinkers and philosophers of his time, including Einstein, William James and Bertrand Russell, and he is acknowledged as a fundamental influence on Marcel Proust. The Bergsonian Mind is an outstanding, wide-ranging volume covering the major aspects of Bergson's thought, from his early influences to his continued relevance and legacy. 36 chapters by an international team of leading Bergson scholars are divided into five clear parts: Sources and Scene Mind and World Ethics and Politics Reception Bergson and Contemporary Thought. In these sections fundamental topics are examined, including time, freedom and determinism, memory, perception, evolutionary theory, pragmatism and art and aesthetics. Bergson's impact beyond philosophy is also explored in chapters on Bergson and spiritualism, modernism, Proust and post-colonial thought. An indispensable resource for anyone in Philosophy studying and researching Bergson's work, The Bergsonian Mind will also interest those in related disciplines such as Literature, Religion, Sociology and French studies.