Yasha Sapir

We all have been deceived, whether by politicians, pundits or peers. Likely more often than we would wish to admit. But what is it to be deceived? As we argue, victims of deception settle on a false answer to a question. This settling proposal not only makes good on the intuitive idea that sceptical agents are harder to deceive than their non-sceptical peers, but also finds support in the infelicity of reporting an agent as both inquiring and deceived. Want to avoid being duped? Our proposal provides an answer: inquire further, don't settle.

What sort of epistemic positions are compatible with inquiries driven by interrogative attitudes like wonder and puzzlement? The ignorance norm provides a partial answer: interrogative attitudes directed at a particular question are never compatible with knowledge of the question’s answer. But some are tempted to think that interrogative attitudes are incompatible with weaker positions like belief as well. This paper defends that the ignorance norm is exhaustive. All epistemic positions weaker than knowledge directed at the answer to a question are compatible with having an interrogative attitude towards that question. We offer two arguments for this conclusion. The first is based on considerations about the role of hedging in inquiry. The second is conditional on considerations related to the aim of inquiry as a goal-directed activity.