Yifan Sun

Many philosophers endorse the view that normative reasons for action are often explained by our desires, but the right kind of desire that warrants reason-explaining status remains a topic of debate. The non-ideal theory of desire-based reasons, which asserts that actual intrinsic desires explain normative reasons for action, faces criticism for allowing reasons to exist in cases where we intuitively believe they do not. In this article, I defend the non-ideal theory against this “Too Many Reasons” objection. I argue that the error-based or ignorance-based characteristics of an actual intrinsic desire are not directly relevant to its ability to explain normative reasons for action. Meanwhile, the intuition that some intrinsic desires target inappropriate objects, leading us to believe that there is no reason to pursue them, does not genuinely challenge the non-ideal view. This holds true provided we distinguish between different usages of the word “reason.” Therefore, the non-ideal theory of desire-based reasons can be upheld against the criticism that it allows too many reasons.

Marko Jurjako’s book, Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View, defends a response-dependent account of normative reasons in a way compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach. In this commentary, I raise two general concerns about the sophisticated project presented in this book. My first concern is that, in this book, more work should probably be done to clarify why response-dependent views are superior to response-independent ones. My second concern is that, given the original purpose of engaging in normative discourse, further justification is needed for endorsing a revisionary response-dependent theory. By addressing these concerns, I believe the project presented in this book can be made more compelling, thereby alleviating the doubts of those who are skeptical of this approach.

Quasi-realists have proposed an “internal” reading of the mind-independence claim embedded in our moral discourse, according to which the claim to mind-independence itself is a moral claim. I argue against such a quasi-realist “internal” reading. My objection is that quasi-realists cannot plausibly explain why the majority of us, either implicitly or explicitly, take moral mind-independence to be a metaethical notion. Quasi-realists either must attribute a quite obvious mistake to most metaethical theorists without explaining why they cannot recognize it, or give us an intolerably ad hoc explanation about why ordinary moral speakers fail to understand their own words. Without properly addressing this problem, we have good reason to reject the quasi-realist account of moral mind-independence.

A non‐normative, response‐dependent view about morality can avoid metaphysical extravagance and explain why the extension of some non‐normative concepts can non‐accidentally match the extension of moral concepts. These features make it a plausible reductive account of moral properties. However, some philosophers believe that a response‐dependent account of morality must contain an irreducibly normative component. I argue that it is impossible to defend such a position while retaining the response‐dependent nature of morality in the ordinary sense. However, I believe that philosophers' motivation for engaging in such a philosophical project should be taken seriously. The underlying concern is that the plausibility of a response‐dependent view makes people's strong commitment to irreducible normativity a puzzle that requires an explanation. I explain why people systematically fail to give up this commitment without claiming that they rationally cannot give it up, which means a non‐normative response‐dependent view is immune from such a challenge.