Yiftach Fehige

Thought experiments are a means of imaginative reasoning that lie at the heart of philosophy, from the pre-Socratics to the modern era, and they also play central roles in a range of fields, from physics to politics. The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments is an invaluable guide and reference source to this multifaceted subject. Comprising over 30 chapters by a team of international contributors, the Companion covers the following important areas: · The history of thought experiments, from antiquity to the trolley problem and quantum non-locality; · Thought experiments in the humanities, arts, and sciences, including ethics, physics, theology, biology, mathematics, economics, and politics; · Theories about the nature of thought experiments; · New discussions concerning the impact of experimental philosophy, cross-cultural comparison studies, metaphilosophy, computer simulations, idealization, dialectics, cognitive science, the artistic nature of thought experiments, and metaphysical issues. This broad ranging Companion goes backwards through history and sideways across disciplines. It also engages with philosophical perspectives from empiricism, rationalism, naturalism, skepticism, pluralism, contextualism, and neo-Kantianism to phenomenology. This volume will be valuable for anyone studying the methods of philosophy or any discipline that employs thought experiments, as well as anyone interested in the power and limits of the mind.

In our contribution to this special issue on thought experiments and mathematics, we aim to insert theology into the conversation. There is a very long tradition of substantial inquiries into the relationship between theology and mathematics. Platonism has been provoking a consolidation of that tradition to some extent in recent decades. Accordingly, in this paper we look at James R. Brown’s Platonic account of thought experiments. Ultimately, we offer an analysis of some of the merits and perils inherent in framing the use of thought experiments in mathematics and theology in terms of Platonism.

This paper challenges the view that scientific culture promotes democracy while religious culture threatens it. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s account of the “sacred complex” and his theory of deliberative democracy, the paper argues that religion and science are co-evolving responses to the cognitive and social demands of human life. Religious contributions, when open to deliberation, serve vital democratic functions. The liberal state, although committed to worldview neutrality and equal participation, must therefore include religious reasoning in public deliberation to sustain the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld and the legitimacy of democratic will-formation.

In our contribution to this special issue on thought experiments and mathematics, we aim to insert theology into the conversation. There is a very long tradition of substantial inquiries into the relationship between theology and mathematics. Platonism has been provoking a consolidation of that tradition to some extent in recent decades. Accordingly, in this paper we look at James R. Brown’s Platonic account of thought experiments. Ultimately, we offer an analysis of some of the merits and perils inherent in framing the use of thought experiments in mathematics and theology in terms of Platonism.

In my contribution to this special issue, I draw attention to the topic of the imagination at the interface of modern science and Christian theology. The paper entertains in critical perspective the notion that language divides, while the imagination unites. While the paper is intended to be explorative, a clear thesis emerges: in its commitment to consilience, Christian theology is directed to the imagination under the pressure of the pluralizing effects of a reason that is constrained by language.

This paper is about the remarkable explosion in the literature on thought experiments since the 1980s. It enters uncharted territory. The year 1986 is of particular interest: James R. Brown presents his Platonism about thought experiments for the first time in Dubrovnik, and in Pittsburgh John D. Norton shares his empiricist approach with participants in what was probably the 20th century’s very first major conference on thought experiments. It was the time when philosophy of science had taken a pluralistic turn, and the paper develops the notion that this is a key factor in the outburst of discussions about thought experiments in the 1980s.